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Recent research has led to a growing awareness that the 
dominant method of settling criminal cases in the United States 
involves disposition without trial. The ovenoJhelming majority of 
criminal cases are settled by guilty pleas, and the majority of 
guilty plea dispositions involve some kind of bargain on the 
charge or sentence. The purpose of the present study was to 
examine and analyze the phenomenon of negotiating the guilty plea 
in terms of its relationship to the functional needs and ideal 
goals of the court system. 
A basic assumption of this study was that case disposition 
through a bargaining process provides for both functional needs 
and ideal goals which are not clearly provided for in the trial 
system. A detailed examination of felony case disposition without 
trial in one Pacific Northwest urban court system was undertaken 
2 
to ascertain the precise nature of the bargaining process. Records 
regarding the nature and outcomes of felony dispositions in 1976 
and 1977 were researched, along with information on the formal 
structure, procedures and pOlicies of the court organization. 
Interviews with prosecutors, public defenders and judges in the 
felony court system provided attitudinal data. Observations of 
guilty plea hearings and negotiation conferences allowed the 
researcher to record actual activities in the disposition process. 
The data indicated that the majority of cases were settled 
by guilty pleas and that the majority of guilty pleas involved some 
kind of bargain. Plea negotiation in this court system was 
routinized, formalized and highly structured. The bargaining 
process was prosecutor-dominated, in part due to the District 
Attorney Office policy which was noticeably inflexible in terms of 
bargaining criteria. The one commodity of power held by the defense 
attorney was strength of case. If the defense could find legal 
"loopholes" in the state I s case, the chances of the defendant 
getting a good deal improved. Tnis emphasis on legal factors 
appeared to strengthen the professional orientation as well as 
the adversary perspective of the opposing attorneys. 
Pleading guilty to a reduced charge resulted in the greatest 
likelihood of a defendant receiving a non-incarceration sentence. 
The majority of reductions were to offenses necessarily included 
3 
in the initial charge. Conviction by trial resulted in the highest
l 
proportion of incarceration sentences of all closing types. However, 
there was evidence that circumstances of the case and the defendant 
were influential regarding the likelihood of incarceration at the 
sentencing stage. 
A balancing factor aFpeared to be at work according to 
comparisons of the 1976 and 1977 data. Changes in the District 
Attorney Office policy instituted in 1977 expanded the list of 
non-reducible offenses. While the proportion of trial closings 
consequently increased for these non-reducible offenses, this 
increase was offset by a decrease in the proportion of trials for 
offenses not included in the non-reducible category. 
Generally, the findings supported the theoretical assumption 
that disposition by guilty plea negotiation could fulfill functional 
needs of the court system within a legalistic framework. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: 
SETTLING CASES THROUGH THE GUILTY PLEA 
INTRODUCTION 
Concomitant with the growth of urbanism and industrialism 
in modern society was a growth in the social scientific study of 
formal organizations. Following Max Weber's early treatise 
delineating the characteristics of formal organizations, soci-
ologists began to look at greater depth into the social reality 
of such organizations. The result has been an increasing awareness 
of the multi-faceted complexity which pervades these organizations 
in modern society. This complexity is still not fully understood, 
and thus there remains a need for exploratory studies of particular 
organizations. The present study offers an analysis of the social 
reality of the case disposition process in one type of formal 
organization--that of the criminal court system in American society. 
The social scientific study of legal organizations is 
relatively new within the larger field of formal organizations 
research. In particular, the structured activities of the court 
system have" received little in-depth study until quite recently. 
However, in the last decade, several major works on the American 
court system have opened up the way for further study (Newman, 1966; 
Skolnick, 1966; Neubauer, 1974). 
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As a sub-system of the criminal justice system in the 
United states, the courts are responsible for achieving justice 
through formally charging alleged law violators, establishing the 
guilt or innocence of those individuals, and meting out legal 
punishment to persons found guilty. Both substantive and procedural 
laws provide the rules by which these activities are to be carried 
out. Rules regarding charges, pleas and punishments are delineated 
in substantive law. Substantive law attends to the criminal 
justice system's goals of crime control, protection of the public 
good and achieving justice by defining criminal acts and the 
appropriate punishments for such behaviors. Procedural law deals 
with another major criminal justice goal, i.e., insuring due process 
by guaranteeing alleged law violators the right to presumed 
innocence until guilt has been proved, the right to counsel, and 
the right to trial. 
It would be a mistake, however, to view the court system 
solely in terms of its legal mandate to work toward these goals 
by means of the formal rules. The court is a formal organization 
which also responds to its own functional needs to maintain stability 
and viability. Since the ideal system, based upon substantive and 
procedural law, does not consider explicitly the functional needs 
of the organization it has created, the organization must develop 
its own processes through which stability and viability can be 
achieved. In order to maintain its legitimacy, however, the court 
must achieve these functional imperatives without forsaking its 
responsibility for achieving justice. In addition, legitimacy 
3 
requires a commitment to the larger system's goals of crime control, 
protection of the public good, and due process. 
The ideal process for criminal case disposition within the 
court system involves the following elements: formal charges are 
made based exclusively on substantive law; the guilt issue is 
resol\red through adversary proceedings in a trial by jury or judge; 
for those adjudicated guilty, punishment is set based exclusively 
on substantive law. However, this is not the dominant method of 
case settlement in American courts. Rather, the overwhelming 
majority of cases are settled by guilty pleas prior to the trial 
stage. Although there are variations among jurisdictions, studies 
indicate that from 70 percent to 90 percent of criminal cases in 
which fonnal charges are filed are settled by guilty pleas rather 
than trials (Newman, 1956; Mather, 1973; Mulkey, 1974; Heumann, 1975). 
Moreo'Jer, many of the cases disposed of by guilty pleas involve some 
kind of bargain on the charge or sentence which may not be based 
exclusively on substantive law (Sudnow, 1965; Newman, 1966). These 
findings have led to a social-scientific interest in examining the 
case disposition process within the court system. 
The purpose of the present study was to explore and analyze 
the phenomenon of negotiating the guilty plea and its relationship 
to the ideal and actual process of criminal case disposition within 
an organizational setting. ~he study involved a detailed examination 
of the felony case disposition process in one urban court system, 
located in a metropolitan area in the Pacific Northwest. Data were 
collected from several sources. Records and case files were used to 
~,--.,~~ .............. , .•.. , .. , ...... ", .... . 
~~. 
4 
gather data regarding the nature and outcomes of felony dispositions 
in 1976 and 1977. Official documents yielded information on the 
formal structure, procedures and policies of the court organization. 
Interviews with prosecutors, public defenders and judges in the 
felony court system provided attitudinal data from the key actors 
in the disposition process. Finally, observations of guilty plea 
hearings and plea negotiation conferences allowed the researcher to 
record actual activities relevant to the research focus. 
Regarding the precise nature of the case disposition process 
through negotiation in this particular court system, the study can 
be appropriately described as exploratory. A preference for 
"exploring" rather than "testing" resulted from 1) the recognition 
'that the area of study is relatively new and thus lacks extensive 
research and 2) an awareness that the negotiation process in this 
court system has certain formal characteristics which differ from 
those in court systems previously researched. However, the research 
problem was approached from a specific theoretical perspective 
\vhich has provided the framework for the analysis of the data. 
Based upon organizational and exchange theories, as well as prior 
studies of plea negotiation, a functional argument has been offered 
as an explanation of plea negotiation as the dominant method of case 
disposition in the American court system. The ultimate goal of the 
study then was three-fold: 1) to construct, based upon the data, a 
model of case disposition without trial in one urban court system; 
2) to analyze this model from a theoretical perspective; 3) to 
compare the findings from this research with those from prior 
research. 
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The theoretical framework of the study is introduced in the 
next section, followed by a discussion of the findings from prior 
studies in which case disposition through negotiation has been 
researched. The final part of the chapter is devoted to an explicit 
descr:iption of the research questions to be subjected to empirical 
examination. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A conceptualization of the court as a formal organization 
is useful in order to understand the case disposition process. One 
of the primary defining characteristics of an organization is its 
okientation to the achievement of formal goals (Parsons, 1956). 
Etzioni has suggested that organizations may be classified 
according to their orientation to one of three borad categories of 
goals: maintenance of social order; maintenance of cultural 
conditions; economic production. 
Organizations with order goals attempt to control 
actors who are deviants in the eyes of some social 
unit the organization is serving (frequently society) 
by segregating them from society and by blocking them from 
further deviant activities. 
Organizations that have culture goals institutionalize 
conditions needed for the creation and preservation of 
symbolic objects, their application, and the creation 
of reinforcement of commitments to such objects. 
Organizations with economic goals produce commodities 
and services supplied to outsiders (Etzioni, 1975: 104-
105) • 
While some organizations may be easily placed into one or another 
of these categories, the court organization is difficult to classify 
in terms of its goal orientation. It appears that courts attempt to 
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contend with all three categories of goals. First, there are the 
order and culture goals of the superordinate system which the 
courts must consider. The courts, as part of the superordinate 
system of criminal justice, must work toward the maintenance of 
rule by law, crime control, protection of the public good, and 
due process. Second, there are order and culture goals which are 
specifically assigned to the organization in terms of its role in 
the superordinate system. The courts are assigned the specific 
goal of achieving justice by formally charging the alleged violator, 
resolving the guilt/innocence issue, and meting out the appropriate 
punishment to the guilty. Although economic goals may not be 
construed as a major orientation of the court system, they are 
functionally important to the maintenance of the system; that is, 
efficient production of settled cases is imperative. 
Order and culture goals best describe the ideal goal 
orientation of the court system. There are also the functional 
goals of stability and viability which must be attained if the 
organization is to survive. Stability and viability are dependent 
on the satisfaction of the functional needs and requirements of 
the organization. Such needs often take priority over the ideal 
goals, for without the satisfaction of the former, the latter have 
little chance of being realized. According to one theorist: 
• . . a given empirical system is deemed to have 
basic needs, essentially related to self-maintenance; 
t.ile system develops repetitive means of self-defense; 
and day-to-day activity is interpreted in terms of the 
flIDctions served by that activity for the maintenance 
defense of the system (Selznick, 1948: 25). 
In order to enhance its stability and viability, an organization 
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must satisfy production and efficiency needs. stability is 
further enhanced by routinization and cooperation within a 
system. Another functional necessity is that key actors exhibit 
compliance with and commitment to the system. 
Production and Efficiency 
An organization is a system which "produces an identifiable 
something which can be utilized in some way by another system" 
(Parsons, 1956: 64). The courts "produce" settled cases which 
reflect justice. The individual, as a component of the product, is 
either released to society or moved on into the correctional system. 
Production must be efficient. To be efficient the court must 
conserve scarce resources (time, labor, money) by settling cases 
quickly and thus avoiding overload (Blumberg, 1967; Rosett and Cressey, 
1976). Case dispositions through guilty pleas advance both production 
ru1d efficiency goals. In fact, a high proporation of guilty pleas 
is essential to the survival of large, urban COUl:t systems, which 
are constantly threatened with collapse due to case overload (Newman, 
1956). The importance of production and efficiency to the stability 
and viability of the court organization leads to the recognition that 
the utilitarian nature of this formal organization and its pursuit 
of economic goals cannot be overlooked. 
Routinization 
Routinization, which refers to the standardization, institu-
tionalization and legitimation of processes and norms, is another 
fW1ctional requirement. First, routinization enhances production 
and efficiency. Second, it strengthens the security of system 
members by spelling out norms for interaction which can be learned 
and relied upon: 
The security of all participants, and of the system 
as a whole, generates a persistent pressure for the 
institutionalization of relationships, which are thus 
removed from the uncertainties of individual fealty 
or sentiments (Selznick, 1948: 20). 
l·ierton suggested that a formal, rationally organized social 
structure involved "clearly defined patterns of activity in which, 
ideally, every series of actions is functionally related to the 
purposes of the organization" (1957: 195). However, neither the 
forn~l rules of the criminal justice system, nor those of the 
court sub-system, provide adequately for the production and 
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efficiency needs of the court. Nor do they provide for the security 
needs of system members. Therefore, it is understandable that 
an informal process for case disposition emerges ann becomes 
routinized. Although the routinized process vcu :.es with the needs 
of specific courts, prior empirical studies of court systems 
indicate that it centers around bargaining to achieve a guilty plea. 
It has been found that this routinized process includes: 
1. A classification scheme of offenses/offenders 
and appropriate punishments which are deemed 
"just" (Sudnow, 1965; Newman, 1966; Mather, 1973; 
Neubauer, 1974). 
2. Identifiable factors which guide decisions to 
charge, plea and bargain (Newman, 1956; Blumberg, 
1967; Cole, 1970; Neubauer, 1974; Mulkey, 1974; 
Rosett and Cressey, 1976). 
3. Procedural norms for interaction through a 
bargaining process (Blumberg, 1967; Rosett and 
Cressey, 1976). 
----~~L---·-·-·-·· F 
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Cooperation 
To attain its functional goals, an organization must operate 
as a cooperative system. Organizational theory posits that a 
formal organization is made up of interdependent parts which must 
function as a unit to achieve organizational purposes (Selznick, 
1948; Etzioni, 1961). However, the ideal rules for case disposition 
in the court system emphasize adversary proceedings, in which 
prosecuting and defense attorneys represent the opposing interests 
of their clients or publics. The bargaining process, on the 
other hand, allows prosecuting and defense attorneys to work in 
cooperation with one another with the goal of speedy case 
disposition through guilty pleas. Prior studies indicate that 
the routinized plea bargaining process includes norms for cooperation 
among key actors in the system (Feeley, 1973; Neubauer, 1974). 
Compliance and Commitment 
The stability and viability of the organization also require 
that the needs of system members be taken into consideration. A 
fW1ctional organization relies upon the compliance and commitment 
of its members (Etzioni, 1961). Compliance is facilitated when 
system members are motivated to participate willingly in organizational 
activities and to be committed to organizational goals (March and 
Simon, 1958). Compliance thus motivated is, in turn, facilitated 
when an organization acknowledges its members' needs and provides 
incentives in accordance with those needs. 
The ideal system of criminal justice does not attend adequately 
to the provision of incentives for system members: 
----Ia!J~,---"--"" , 
'r 
• • • what one finds in the system of criminal 
justice is a highly formalized and defined set of 
rules, norms, and goals, but also an organization 
which possesses no corresponding set of incentives 
and sanctions which act systematically to enforce 
them (Feeley, 1973: 422). 
Case disposition through bargaining can be seen as providing 
inducements for key court actors to comply with, willingly 
participate in, and be committed to the court system. The way in 
which this is accomplished can be understood by examining the 
case disposition process in the context of exchange theory. 
Exchange theory posits that interaction between persons 
consists of an exchange of material and non-material goods. The 
exchm1ge process is functional for the organization because it 
meets system-member needs for cooperation, security, involvement 
and rewards. Bargaining is an exchange process which allows for 
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frequent interaction between key court actors (particularly between 
prosecuting and defense attorneys). The reciprocit~' inherent in 
the exchange process also provides an atmosphere of cooperation 
~ld trust. Reciprocity may be defined as a cooperative, mutually 
gratifying pattern of exchanging goods and services (Gouldner, 1960). 
Coope:cation and trust are also advanced through norms which routinize 
,~nteraction, in that attitudes and behaviors can be anticipated. The 
bargaining process serves members' needs for security by reducing 
the risks and uncertainties of outcomes. Risks are reduced through 
the avoidance of trial, and uncertainties are reduced through the 
routinization of the process (Church, 1976). Bargaining also allows 
prosecuting and defense attorneys to play active roles in case 
disposition. This is important for several reasons: 1) it allows 
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actors to experience a sense of autonomy and control in the decision-
making process; 2) it contributes to individual feelings of se1f-
worth and usefulness; 3) it allows actors to consider ideal goals 
as they make decisions. Finally, the exchange process provides 
benefits for both prosecuting and defense attorneys. Unlike the 
adversary system, the outcomes are not zero-sum, i.e., there is not 
a total win for one side accompanied by a total loss for the 
other side. 
The commodities exchanged in the bargaining process are 
charges, pleas and punishments. The defense attorney has command 
(through his or her client) of the plea commodity. Since the 
guilty plea is the desired outcome, this commodity gives the 
defense attorney considerable leverage. However, the prosecutor 
has command of the charge commodity. Since punishments are 
formally related to charges, the prosecutor also has some 
control over the punishment commodity. In addition to influencing 
punishment through the charge, the prosecutor also gains power 
through his or her right to recommend punishment to the judge. 
Prior studies indicate that the issue of punishment is of primary 
concern in the bargaining process (Rosett and Cressey, 1976; 
Sudnow,1965). The threat of severe punishment, which is consider-
able under the law, may reduce the bargaining power of the defense 
attorney. Studies show that the balance of power is tipped in 
favor of the prosecutor in the exchange process (Newman, 1956; 
Mulkey, 1974; Neubauer, 1974). 
i-
i'. 
,.' 
!~ 
",". 
12 
Bargains may be of several types: charge reduction, dismissal 
of one or more charges or counts, punishment reduction, or charge 
or punishment concurrency. This variety of possibilities leads to 
a number of benefits and costS. What is important to remember is 
that benefits and costs are not zero-sum; all actors can receive 
some of both. For example, the defense attorney may decide to 
e}cchange a guilty plea for a reduced charge. Although the defense 
attorney suffers some costs through this exchange (both in terms of 
the interests of his or her client and in terms of his or her 
professional role as advocate for the accused), he or she also gains 
a benefit in the form of the reduction of the severity of the 
charge (and most likely punishment) against the client. The 
prosecutor, on the other hand, suffers a cost in giving up the 
full potential of the charge and punishment commodities, but benefits 
in getting a convicition in the interests of the state. Blumberg 
(1967) has suggested that rewards in the form of prestige and 
approval are given attorneys who advance the instrumental goals of 
the court by settling cases quickly through the routinized 
bargaining process. These rewards may further personal and career 
concerns of attorneys and thus act as a further incentive for 
complying with the system. 
Thus far, ways in which case disposition through bargaining 
contributes to the satisfaction of functional needs of the courts 
have been discussed. While functional theories go a long way 
toward explaining why plea bargaining is the dominant method of 
case disposition in American courts, examinations of the precise 
i. 
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nature of the disposition process reveal that other elements are 
also involved in plea bargaining as well. The following section 
elaborates upon this point by reviewing the findings of prior 
research. 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION 
While the precise nature of the bargaining process varies 
among court systems, studies to date indicate that it exists in 
some form in virtually all systems. Since the actual process may 
no·t have formal status or may deviate from formal policy, consid-
erable probing is required in order to capture the essence and 
implications of the actual process. Prior research points to 
several problems which are in need of further exploration. First, 
there is a need to examine the way in which the actual process 
does or does not reflect formal policies and laws. A second 
problem has to do with the way in which plea bargaining reflects 
functional and/or ideal goals. Finally, the nature of the exchange 
relationship between key court actors needs further clarification. 
Plea Bargaining: Relationships Between the Informal and Formal 
Process 
'l'he extent to which plea bargaining is formally recognized 
varies among court systems. The recent acknowledgement of plea 
bargaining at the national level (President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1968; Brady v. U.S., 
397 U.S. 742, 1970) is likely to lead to increased formal 
recognition at state and local levels. Since the widespread use 
of plea bargaining is conceded by most authorities, there has been 
,-
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a recen't movement to see plea bargaining given uniform formal 
status. However, in court systems where formal policy does exist, 
there is little information regarding the way in which the informal 
process does or does not deviate from formal policy. 
A related problem has to do with the way in which the plea 
bargaining process relates to substantive and procedural law. For 
example, consider Sudnow's study on charge reduction in plea 
bargaining. He argued that the classification scheme by which 
offenses and offenders along with appropriate punishments are 
delineated is not based upon substantive law: 
. . . in searching an instant case to decide what 
to reduce it to, there is no analysis of the statutorily 
referable elements of the instant case; instead, its 
membership in a class of events, the features of which 
cannot be described by the penal code, must be 
decided (Sudnow, 1965: 259). 
The classification scheme, according to Sudnow, outlines categories 
of "normal" crimes. Normal crimes share certain features: a 
typical manner in which offenses are committed, social character-
istics of persons who regularly commit them, typical setting in 
which they occur, and types of victims typically involved. For 
example, Sudnow reported that public defenders view normal 
burglaries as involving repetitive violators, no weapons, in-
expensive items, little property damage, lower class establishments, 
black defendants, and a non-professional orientation to the offense. 
Normal crimes, according to Sudnow, are easily settled by routinized 
bargains, legitimated by the belief that the bargain outcome is 
reasonable and just because of the typical nature of the crime. He 
also concluded that the bargained charge on a normal crime is often 
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neither necessarily or situationally included in the original 
charge, i.e., neither statutorily included in the initial offense 
whereby the commission of one crime includes the commission of 
another, e.g., murder and attempted murder--nor situationally 
included as a part of the offense behavior, e.g., loitering and 
public indecency. Rather, normal crimes are often reduced on 
the basis of their typical features to lesser offenses not 
necessarily or situationally included in the original offense, e.g., 
burglary to petty theft. Such reductions are deemed reasonable, 
however, if the offense/offender fits the typical description. 
It is obvious that plea bargaining deviates from formal 
procedural law for case disposition. Through plea bargaining 
the trial process for resolution of guilt is circumvented. The 
issue of importance to the key actors in plea bargaining is not 
guilt/innocence, but rather punishment. For the bargaining process 
to work, some guilt must be presumed at the outset; the focus is on 
what will be done to the offender in terms of punishment (Heumann, 
1975; Rosett and Cressey, 1976). By giving up the right to trial, 
the defendant gives up the right to presumed innocence, the protection 
against self-incrimination, and the right to confront his or her 
accusers. Recent court decisions have ruled that this is legal 
provided the defendant is advised of the rights he or she is 
waiving by pleading guilty (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238, 1969). 
Thus, the shortened procedure is gaining legitimacy •. 
Mather (1973) has suggested that case disposition through 
bargaining deviates from the ideal process in another way. From 
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his research, he concluded that the way in which a case is to be 
settled depends primarily on two factors--seriousness of offense 
and strength of case. "Dead-bang" cases--those in which the 
offense is not extremely serious, the punishment not extremely 
severe, and the case against the accused is strong--are routinely 
settled through a plea of guilty on the original charge, although 
·the defense may receive some benefit (e.g., recormnendation for 
ptmishment reduction or concurrency) in exchange for cooperation. 
"Reasonable doubt" cases, in which the offense is not extremely 
serious, the case for the original charge is weak, but the case 
is strong for guilt on a lesser charge, can be quickly settled 
by routinized bargain reductions. More troublesome cases are those 
in which the offense and/or punishment are considered to be 
extremely severe and in which there is reasonable doubt in terms 
of the strength of the case. Such cases, of which there are 
relatively few, are unlikely to be settled by a bargained guilty 
plea, for the costs to the defense attorney and her or her client 
outweigh the benefits of a guilty plea. These are the cases 
which most often go to trial. 
The examination of relationships of the bargaining process 
to substantive and procedural law gives considerable insight into 
the way in which plea bargaining reflects functional and ideal 
goals. Yet there are other factors to be considered in examining 
the goals issue. 
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Plea Bargaining and Goal Achievement 
Case disposition through bargaining does not discount ideal 
justice goals. Although these goals may be modified in line with 
functional requirements for stability and viability, the notions 
of crime control, due process and justice are incorporated into 
the routinized process for case disposition (Mulkey, 1974; Rosett 
and Cressey, 1976). In fact, it has been suggested that the nature 
of routinized plea bargaining in American court systems provides for 
the achievement of ideal justice goals which are less likely to be 
achieved through strict adherence to the formal rules. Rosett and 
Cressey (1976) concluded that plea bargaining processes outline 
uniform standards of justice while allowing for a consideration of 
mitigating factors which are not included in the formal penal code. 
They also argued that the range of punishments provided by law is 
reduced, thus limiting the broad discretionary powers of judges in 
sentencing. Crime control is taken into account by separating 
serious from non-serious cases and delineating reasonable punishments 
for both types. Also, plea bargaining practices can be geared to 
the needs of particular jurisdictions regarding crime control and 
justice. 
While it does appear that the goals of crime control and 
justice may be served by plea bargaining practices, serious questions 
have been raised regarding the due process goal. Legally a plea 
of guilty can only be entered if the defendant assures the judge 
that he or she is pleading guilty willingly and with full knowledge 
of the consequences of such a plea. Yet such formal assurances are 
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of questionable value. The defendant most often does not have 
adequate knowledge of either the informal or the formal system. 
Lacking complete knowledge, lacking power, and threatened by severe 
punishment, the defendant may be at least implicitly coerced into 
compliance with the recommendations of his or her counsel. The 
evidence suggests that public defense attorneys are likely to 
advise clients to plead guilty if a bargain can be obtained 
(Newman, 1956, 1966; Blumberg, 1967). 
While there are obvious due process problems when the trial 
process is circumvented and guilt is presumed from the outset, 
participants in the bargaining process do endeavor to attend to 
justice norms of "appropriateness" and "fairness" in terms of 
punishment. Also, bargains usually do appear to reduce the severity 
of punishment allowable under maximum sentencing. Finally, the 
defense attorney does have a commitment to a professional role, i.e., 
representing the interests of the defendant (Mather, 1973). Thus, 
the defense attorney has an interest in "getting a good deal" for 
the client. 
As was pointed out earlier, the achievement of ideal 
criminal justice goals is not the sole orientation of the court 
organization. Functional goals (perhaps more appropriately labeled 
needs and requirements) cannot be overlooked. 
Conservation of limited resources is the most often cited 
advantage of plea bargaining (Mulkey, 1974). In their study, 
Rosett and Cressey (1976) found that prosecutors and defense 
attorneys consistently mentioned conservation of resources and 
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administrative expediency when asked what purposes plea bargaining 
serves. Thus , it appears that, from the perspeci:i ves of key court 
actors, organizational needs are of paramount importance in case 
disposition. Conservation of resources is increasingly important 
to all three of the criminal justice sub-systems (law enforcement, 
courts, corrections). Since the activities of any of the three 
sub-systems have consequences for the others (e.g., limiting arrests 
reduces the load of the court; dismissing cases and reducing 
sentences in the court reduces the load of corrections), it seems 
likely that an important factor to be considered in the disposition 
process is the needs of law enforcement and corrections. 
The police have considerable discretionary power in making 
arrest decisions and thus are influential in selecting offenses/ 
offenders to be handled by the courts (Skolnick, 1966; Wilson, 
1968). Law enforcement helps curb court overload by not arresting 
all suspected offenders and by dismissing approximately one third 
of felony cases after arrest but prior to initial prosecutorial 
screening (Rosett and Cressey, 1976). The police also have come 
influence regarding the formal charge decision, for the report of 
the arresting officer is taken into consideration by the prosecutor. 
Findings on the extent of police influence in the charge decision 
are somewhat unclear, as influence varies among particular juris-
dictions. However, prior studies indicate that the police experi-
ence some frustration in what they perceive as their inability to 
play a more active role in settling cases for which they are initially 
responsible (Banton, 1964; Wilson, 1968). Corrections plays a role 
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in the case disposition process through the pre-sentence investi-
gation conducted by the probation department. Like the police, the 
probation officer's role in case dispositions is essentially 
advisory. However, the court system needs the cooperation of law 
enforcement and corrections in order to coordinate activities in 
line with the functional stability and ideal goals of the super-
ordinate criminal justice system. Thus, it is advisable for key 
court actors to take into account these sub-systems in the decision-
making process. 
There are also interests outside of the criminal justice 
system which must be attended to by the courts. Related systems, 
e.g., social work, mental health, are affected by and attempt to 
affect court activities. Community attitudes toward law, order and 
justice may also be influential in court activities. There is some 
evidence that special interest groups have and exercise the pOWer to 
impinge on court operations in order to satisfy their own vested 
interests. In his study, Cole (1970) found that prosecutors invariably 
consider the demands of community influentials in making charge 
decisions. While more research is in order, it does appear that the 
needs and demands of extraorganizations are important in terms of 
the functional stability of the courts. Since these various needs 
are often conflicting, decisions pertaining to court structure and 
process may be continually problematic: 
Each subculture [of a court] is thus a crystallized 
solution to the problems given courthouse workers by 
specific groups whose conflicting demands and conceptions 
of justice must all be somehow worked into the scheme of 
things. Each is a negotiated social order--a set of 
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rules, understandings and customs--that has developed 
as courthouse workers have accommodated themselves 
to the demands of these various groups (Rosett and 
Cressey, 1976: 94). 
The extent to which personal needs of key court actors 
influence charge, plea and bargain decisions has received little 
empirical attention. There are some indications that prosecuting 
and defense attorneys who settle cases quickly by obtaining guilty 
pleas and being clever bargainers are perceived by other actors in 
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the system as "good" attorneys, thus enhancing career possibilities 
(Blumberg, 1967; Rosett and Cressey, 1976). It has also been 
suggested that attorneys who learn the routinized system quickly 
and proficiently are rewarded with approval from superiors within 
the system (Blumberg, 1967). Further research is needed to assess 
the l/lay in which key court actors perceive the court system as 
meeting their own personal needs. 
There is also a lack of agreement regarding whether or not 
o·ther factors influencing charge, plea and bargain decisions are 
consistent with criminal justice goals. The strength of the state's 
case has been identified as the most important factor in the 
prosecutor's charge and bargain decisions (Alshuler, 1968; McIntyre, 
1967; Mulkey, 1974). The strength of case factor can be perceived 
as reflecting criminal justice goals, for a strong case is likely 
to end in conviction, thus furthering crime control. However, 
strength of case is a variable which can also be used to facilitate 
speedy case settlement. with a strong case, the prosecutor has a 
good chance of getting defense counsel to agree to a guilty plea. 
22 
In agreeing to a guilty plea, the defense may only receive a 
minimal concession, but avoid, however, the actual risks of trial. 
On the other hand, if the state's case is not strong, the state 
still gains from getting a quick and certain guilty plea conyiction; 
the defense--likely to be offered a good deal--also may opt for 
the speedy and sure guilty plea disposition. Since the overwhelming 
majority of cases are settled by guilty pleas, it can be speculated 
that strength of case factors are more often used as levers in the 
negotiation process than as mechanisms for achieving ideal justice 
goals. Although the data are conflicting, some studies suggest that 
prosecutors may overcharge, anticipating that charge reduction will 
be necessary to obtain a guilty plea (Newman, 1966; Blumberg, 1967; 
Alshuler, 1968; Cole, 1970). Such a move on the part of the 
prosecutor can be viewed as an attempt to further functional 
imperatives. 
One category of factors which has been found to have sub-
st~1tial influence regarding charge, plea and bargain decisions 
attends (at least theoretically) to criminal justice goals. This 
category includes nature of offense and nature of offender factors. 
The seriousness of the offense has been found to be extremely 
influential in the disposition process. The most serious offenses 
are those least likely to be settled through the bargaining process; 
also, the most serious offenses are most llkely to be subjected to 
the full charge potential (Mulkey, 1974). Additionally, cases 
t, which deviate from the norm (are not typical) are less likely to be 
settled through the bargaining process. Apparently the justice 
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norms which have been informally established for typical cases 
cannot be easily applied to atypical cases, and thus trial is 
felt to be necessary in the interests of justice. The value of 
property losses and the costs (material and non-material) to 
victims are also important elements in the nature of the offense 
(Subin, 1966; McIntyre, 1968). 
Previous research has indicated that attributes of the 
offender are influential in determining the nature of case 
dispositions. Prior criminal record of the defendant appears 
to be of particular importance. Like seriousness of the offense, 
prior record increases the likelihood of certainty ann severity of 
punishment for the defennant and thus gives the prosecutor an 
advantage in the bargaining process. Severe treatment of criminal 
repeaters may be perceived by key court actors as furthering the 
crime control goal. Data also suggest that defendant characteristics 
such as appearance, demeanor, sex, race, education and socio-economic 
status influence case disposition (Piliavin and Briar, 1958; 
Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Quinney, 1975; Gibbons, 1977; Chiricos 
and Waldo, 1970). Discriminatory treatment of defendants is 
difficult to rationalize on the basis of criminal justice goals. 
While there is general agreement that case disposition through 
plea bargaining meets functional needs and requirements of the 
system, there are conflicting opinions regarding the extent to which 
plea bargaining serves ideal criminal justice goals (Neubauer, 1974). 
Critics point out that defendants' rights to due process and equal 
treatment are threatened through the plea negotiation process. 
~' 
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They also argue that functional needs take precedence in the 
bargaining process, thus subverting ideal goals: 
In short, critics of plea bargaining maintain that 
reliance upon bargaining involves an emphasis upon 
administrative convenience which subverts achieve-
ment of criminal justice goals, including the sup-
pression of crime, the rehabilitation of offenders, 
and the maintenance of procedural due process 
(Mulkey, 1974: 57). 
'l'he Relationship Between Key Actors in the Bargaining Process 
Further research is in order regarding the nature of the 
relationship between key actors in the bargaining process, 
partic~larly the primary actors, i~e., the prosecutor and the 
defense attorney. As mentioned earlier, the relationship between 
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the prosecutor and defense attorney is increasingly being described 
as a cooperative one, thus calling into question the ideal concept 
of case disposition through adversary proceedings. When the 
defense attorney is a member of the public court orjanization, 
i.e., a public defender, his or her role is particularly problematic. 
Ideally, the public defender represents the interests of the accused 
~ld thus stands in opposition to the attempts of the state to 
prosecute fully a given case. Yet the public defender is also part 
of an organization which requires coordination and cooperation in 
order to satisfy functional needs. Blumberg (1967) argued that the 
public defender acts as an agent-mediator who helps the accused 
"redefine the situation and restructure perceptions concomitant 
with a plea of guilty." According to Rosett and Cressey: 
it becomes a breach of etiquette for a lawyer 
to take a stance so adversary that it disturbes the 
conditions of peaceful co-existence (Rosett and 
Cressey, 1976: 105). 
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In addition, both prosecutors and public defenders belong to the 
same professional system, thus promoting cooperation in the 
protection of shared professional norms (Sudnow, 1965). Another 
argwnent in favor of the cooperative model is that frequent inter-
action among members of the public court organization promotes 
cooperation (Mulkey, 1974). Many of these claims are based 
primarily on theory; further empirical data are needed to ascertain 
the extent to which prosecutors and public defenders share the 
same values and perspectives regarding plea bargaining as well as 
the fW1ctions and goals of the court system. Data are also needed 
to assess the extent to which key actors perceive of cooperation 
as functionally necessary. In addition to surveying the opinions 
of key court actors, the nature and extent of cooperation can be 
explored by observing the bargaining process in action, with 
attention to the content and frequency of interactions. 
While the relationship of the prosecutor and public defender 
is of paramount interest in examining the plea bargaining process, 
there are other court actors with whom the attorneys must interact. 
One obvious key actor in the process is the judge, who has the 
ultimate decision power in setting of punishments. Although, as 
a result of the bargaining process, the prosecutor's charge may 
reduce the legal limits of punishment, within those limits the 
prosecutor can only make sentence recommendations. In addition to 
those recommendations, the judge receives inputs from the police, 
the probation department, and the defense attorney. Although in 
theory the final decision regarding punishment is guided by the 
neutrality of law, in actuality it is also guided by system needs. 
I It is likely, therefore, that the judge will playa cooperative 
t 
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! .. role in the routinized case disposition process. From their 
lengthy study, Rosett and Cressey concluded: 
for a guilty plea system to work there must 
be some reliable expectation of what the sentence 
\>lill be if the defendant pleads guilty, and this 
expectation inevitably must come explicitly or 
tacitly from the judge who will impose sentence 
(Rosett and Cressey, 1976: 80). 
There is evidence that prosecutors and defense atto~~eys attempt 
to become familiar with attitudes and behaviors of individual 
judges, ru1d that expectations of particular judges' actions is 
an influential factor in charge, plea and bargain decision (Cole, 
1970). Also, Church (1976) found in his study of a mid-western 
urban court system that when bargains on a charge are not allowed, 
bargains on punishment occur in which the judge becomes a focal 
actor in the exchange process. 
There is also a need for further research on the nature of 
the role of the defendant in the negotiation process. Although it is 
the fate or future of the defendant which is being decided in the 
case disposition process, there is evidence that the accused plays 
a minor role in the bargaining process (Rosett and Cressey, 1976). 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Propositions 
It was the assumption of this study that case disposition 
through a bargaining process in which commodities are exchanged 
(charges, pleas, punishments) by key court actors (prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, judges) with the goal of obtaining a guilty 
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plea without trial has become the dominant "method of action" in 
American court systems due to its provisions for both functional 
and ideal goals which are not clearly provided for in the ideal 
system. This assumption, based upon organization and exchange 
theories, as well as prior studies of American court systems, was 
subjected to empirical examination through a research focus on the 
following four general propositions. 
Proposition I. The majority of felony cases which result 
in formal charges are settled by guilty pleas, and the majority 
of guilty plea dispositions are the result of some kind of bargain 
which explicitly or implicitly invovles punishment reduction. 
Proposition II. Case disposition through negotiation is 
routinized, i.e., there are identifiable patterns both in the 
substance of the bargain and in the procedures for the exchange 
which are known to and accepted by key court actors. 
Proposition III. Key actors in the negotiation process, 
the prosecutor and the defense ~ttorneYI work in cooperation 
with one rulother and interact frequently. 
Proposition IV. The negotiation process provides for the 
needs of key actors to be active participants, to work toward ideal 
goals, and to receive rewards for their work. 
Exploratory Areas 
It has also been suggested that a thorough analysis of case 
disposition through negotiation requires further exploration of 
certain features of the process. By examining in detail the case 
disposition process in one urban court system, such an exploration 
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1 was achieved. Based upon the findings, a model of the court system [: 
under study was constructed which was analyzed both in terms of its 
theoretical relevance and in terms of its similarities and dis-
similarities to previously researched systems. Additionally, formal 
plea negotiation policies in the system under study underwent 
certain changes between 1976 and 1977 ltlhich allowed for the incor-· 
poration of intra-system comparisons into the analytical model. 
The following aspects of court operations and plea negotiations 
have been explored and the findings included in the model of felony 
disposition in one court system: 
The formal organization. 
Structure, procedure, policy. 
Intra-organization comparisons. 
The nature of the process of case disposition through 
negotiation. 
Relationship between the formal and actual proces~. 
Routinization in the process. 
The nature of the exchange relationship. 
Cooperative and adversary roles. 
Facilitation of compliance and commitment. 
The nature of the substance of ca.se disposition. 
Characteristics of offenses, offenders and dispositions. 
Relationships between offenses, offenders and dispositions. 
Types of bargains. 
Relationship of bargains to substantive law. 
Routinization of bargains. 
Factors which influence disposition decisions. 
Relationships between bargains and punishment. 
Other factors which influence punishment. 
Relationship between beliefs about and actualities of the 
process and substance of case disposition through negotiation. 
Policy changes aimed at restricting bargaining. 
Effects on production and efficiency. 
Effects on disposition outcomes. 
Effects on the exchange relationship. 
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The way in which case disposition without trial satisfies 
functional needs and ideal goals. 
Attitudes and actualities. 
Summary 
Chapter I has introduced the research problem, set forth the 
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theoretical framework, and discussed prior research. Additionally, 
the research problem has been explicitly defined in the form of 
four general propositions and an outline of the exploratory areas 
which have been subjected to empirical investigation. The research 
methodology of the study is described in detail in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCHING THE PROBLEM: 
DESIGN, SETTING, SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this study was to examine a particular process, 
i.e., case disposition without trial, within an organizational 
context, i.e., the public court system. Although the study had an 
explicit theoretical focus as well as a set of initial propositions 
based upon theory and previous research, the general orientation 
of the study was exploratory. In order to grasp fully the nature 
and meaning of the case disposition process, a decision was made 
to do an in-depth study of the social reality of this phenomenon in 
one urban court system. The intent of the study was not purely 
descriptive; rather, description was used to facilitate interpretative 
and explanatory analyses of the topic under study. Comparisons of 
the findings with those from similar studies as well as assessments 
of the theoretical relevance of the data further facilitated such 
analyses. Considering the purpose and the nature of the study, it 
seemed appropriate to adopt field research as the methodological 
model. 
Field research is a broad label which covers a variety of 
scientific endeavors utilizing a number of specific methodological 
techniques. The field research design deemed to be appropriate for 
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the present study has the following characteristics. First, it 
attempts to comprehend the social reality of a total field area. 
The research design must incorporate techniques for examining the 
"total picture," for the focus is not on isolated parts of the 
whole, but rather on the way in which the parts fit into a model 
of the whole. In the present study, the "total picture" referred 
to case disposition within a formal organization. The component 
parts which formed the whole were: the formal and informal 
structures, procedures and norms of the organization; the formal 
and informal process of case disposition without trial; the substance 
and outcomes of case disposition; the attitudes and behaviors of key 
actors in the disposition process. 
A second characteristic of this methodological model is that 
it is non-experimental. Neither the setting nor the other variables 
lmder study are controlled or manipulated. Whereas an experimental 
study tests relationships by comparing data on experimental and 
control groups, the field study examines relationships as they 
occur naturally. Without an experimental design, the testing of 
pre-determined hypotheses is at the least problematic. When the 
orientation of the study is exploratory, the testing of hypotheses 
is even less appropriate. 
Although direct observation is the data-collection technique 
most often associated with field research, a growing number of 
field studies combine observations with other techniques in order 
to strengthen the likelihood of accurately depicting the total 
reality of the field of study. The use of multiple data sources 
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(often referred to as triangulation) is thus another characteristic 
of the model used in the present study. The use of multiple methods 
for data collection lends itself to a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative methods of data analysis. This mixture is another 
component of the methodology utilized in the current study. For 
a further elaboration of the advantages of the field research model 
in an eJcploratory study see Appendix A. 
THE RESEARCH SETTING 
The research took place in an urban county in the Pacific 
Northwest. The 1970 Census data provided a general description 
of the population of the county (although the actual statistics 
obviously have changed since 1970, the overall profile remains the 
same). The total population of the county numbered 556,667. 
Slightly over half of the population was female, and 30 percent 
of the population was under age 35. The overwhs1itling majority of 
the residents were white. Blacks made up only 4 percent of the 
population, and those defined as "persons of Spanish language" made 
up another 2 percent. There was a small percentage (5 percent) of 
foreign born individuals. 
The popUlation was also relatively stable. Fifty percent had 
not changed residences between 1965 and 1970. Another 28 percent had 
changed residences, but remained in the same SMSA. Of all housing 
units, 58 percent were owner-occupied. 
The population also showed relative stability regarding income 
and employment. Only 8 percent of families had an income below the 
, .. 
I.. 
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poverty level. Seventy-six percent of males over 16 were employed, 
as were 45 percent of females over 16 years of age. Table I 
indicates the distribution of employee groups. 
TABLE I 
PERSONS 16 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER EMPLOYED IN SELECTED 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES, BY PERCENT: 
1970 COUNTY CENSUS DATA 
Occupational Category 
Professional, technical and kindred workers 15% 
Manager and administrators, except farm 9% 
Sales workers 9% 
Clerical and kindred workers 22% 
Craftsmen, formen and kindred workers 13% 
Operatives, except transport 10% 
Transport equipment operatives 4% 
Laborers, except farm 5% 
Farm workers 1% 
Service workers 13% 
Private household workers 1% 
Finally, the education level of the population further 
suggested stability. Only 10 percent of the people between the 
ages of 16 and 21 were not high school graduates or not enrolled 
in school. Over 24,000 of the residents under age 35 were enrolled 
in college. 
The general population of the county in which the research took 
place, then, did not appear to suffer overall from the deprivations 
indicated in the statistics on many other urban jurisdictions in 
the country. 
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DATA COLLECTION: SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES 
Four types of data were collected, two from secondary sources 
and two from primary sources. The first secondary source was 
official documents. Information regarding the formal structures, 
procedures and policies of case disposition within the court 
organization was collected from official documents produced within 
the system. The Offices of the District Attorney and Public Defender 
provided information about the formal organization of their offices. 
Info~nation about the formal organization was also collected from 
state statutes. 
The other secondary source was records kept by the organization 
on felony cases settled in 1976 and 1977. Two random samples were 
taken from the Criminal Court records of cases settled in 1976 and 
1977. Ten percent samples (one for 1976 and one for 1977) were 
dra~1 from a master list of felony cases alphabetized by defendants' 
last names. The drawing of every tenth case for which an arrest and 
closing took place in 1976 yielded a sample of 306 cases for this 
year. '!'he method for drawing a sample of 1977 was the same; however, 
only cases for which there was an arrest and closing from June 
through December were included in the 1977 sample. The decision to 
use only the population from July through December in 1977 was based 
on the fact that new policies instituted by the Office of the District 
Attorney expanding the list of non-negotiable felonies went into 
effect in July of 1977 (see Chapter III). Although this decision 
meant that the sample size for 1977 would be considerably smaller 
(n = 163), it was felt that comparisons would more accurately reflect 
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the case settlement process before and after the policy changes. 
Data were collected on 33 variables (see Appendix B for a list of 
variables and codings). Not all case files contained information on 
all the variables. There are no apparent reasons to suspect, however, 
that these omissions were not randomly distributed. In addition to 
these random samples, summary statistics compiled by Criminal Court 
on the number and type of closings for the total populations of 
felony cases in 1976 and 1977 were used as a check on the reliability 
of the samples. These summary statistics did indicate that the 
samples were indeed representative of the total popUlations. 
The researcher attempted to collect data from the case files 
of the Office of the Public Defender of the county on 17 variables 
(see Appendix C for a list of variables and codings) for the total 
populations of initial charge Burglary I and Forgery I cases which 
were closed by the Public Defender's Office between July and 
December of 1977. Since a number of these files were in use by 
attorneys and thus not available for researching, the total population 
goal was not reached. Of the population of 46 Burglary I cases, 
data were collected on 33. Of the population of 59 Forgery I cases, 
data were collected on 47. In addition, data were not available on 
type closing, judge or sentence for the 10 Burglary I cases and the 
8 Forgery I cases in which there was a change of attorney after 
assignment (and thus a public defender did not handle the case 
through to closing). Data were also missing on other variables for 
these latter cases, particularly when the change of attorney took 
place early in the process. Summary statistics were also taken 
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from Public Defender records on type offense and type closing for 
the July to December period in 1977. 
The selection of the variables on which data were collected 
from case files was based on the research problem as outlined in 
the propositions and the areas for exploration. The choice of 
variables was also determined in part by the findings from other 
studies of case disposition in which relevant relationships were 
indicated. Finally, of course, the selection was limited by the 
information provided in the case files. For example, the researcher 
had hoped to collect data on the race of the defendant; however, race 
was not recorded in the Criminal Court files. While race was 
recorded in the Public Defender files, the small number of cases 
investigated in this data set rendered conclusions regarding race 
tenuous at best. 
Interviews were the source of the third type of data. Three 
groups of court actors were interviewed by the researcher: 
public defenders, prosecutors and judges. These three groups were 
selected because of their roles as key actors in the disposition 
process in general and in the negotiation process in particular. 
Although it is recognized that both private and public attorneys are 
key actors in the bargaining process, the focus of this study was on 
the way in which members of the public court system perceived this 
system. In addition, it was necessary to set some limits on the 
number of people interviewed. Since nearly half of all felony 
cases in this county were handled by the public defender system, the 
,',; 
decision was made to interview only this group of public defense 
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attorneys. The intent was to interview all public defenders, 
prosecutors and judges who handled felony cases in this county. All 
felony public defenders in the county (plus five who had recently 
left the office) were interviewed, resulting in a total population 
of 15. Due to time constraints on their office, the District 
Attorney decided that only five full interviews could be granted. 
The interviewees, all high-level deputy district attorneys, were 
selected by the D.A.'s Office. In addition to these five complete 
interviews, nine prosecutors from the coUnty office responded to 
the questionnaire segment of the interview form. These latter 
respondents were also selected by the D.A.'s Office. Eleven of the 
13 Circuit Court judges who handled felony cases agreed to be and 
were interviewed, but only 8 of them agreed to fill out the question-
naire. 
The interviews consisted of two parts. At the beginning of the 
interview, respondents were given a questionnaire which called for 
written responses to questions using a five-point rating scale. 
with the exception of the nine prosecutors who filled out this form 
on their own, respondents completed the questionnaire in the presence 
of the researcher. This afforded an opportunity to make written 
notes on comments made by the interviewees as they filled out the 
form. The second part of the interview called for open-ended 
verbal responses to a standard set of questions asked of the 
respondent by the interviewer. The questions calling for verbal 
responses are stated in full in Chapter VI. A copy of the question-
naire form is found in Appendix D. 
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The construction of the interview instrument was accomplished 
by identifying the key concepts outlined in the propositions and 
exploratory areas and then operationalizing these concepts with the 
aid of instruments used in previous studies of the same concepts. 
The interview was pre-tested by giving it to three attorneys who 
work or have worked in the court system of this county. Their 
suggestions (as well as those of academic experts in the field) led 
to some modifications in the interview form. In spite of these 
checks, it became clear as the interviews proceeded that certain 
questions were consistently problematic, in that the meaning or 
wording was unclear or unfamiliar to the respondents. A discussion 
of these problematic questions is included in Chapter VI. 
Overall, the data-collection process took the researcher 
(working alone) five months. During this five-month period (from 
November, 1976 through March, 1977), the investigation included 
continual observations of the case disposition process within the 
court system. Casual conversations with court actors yielded 
various pieces of information which have been incorporated into the 
analysis of the findings. Also, a variety of general impressions 
were recorded from the direct observation of a number of trials, 
hearings and informal exchanges between court actors. 
In addition to these exploratory observations, standardized 
schedules were constructed and used for recording data on observations 
of two activities in the case disposition process. The first was 
for the observations of pre-trial conferences. These conferences, 
mandatory for all felony cases, represent the setting in which the 
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formal negotiation process takes place. Although generally the 
only people allowed in the room during a pre-trial conference were 
the attorneys and the defendant, the investigator was granted 
permission by the attorneys and defendants involved in five different 
cases to sit in as an observer. The observation schedule (see 
Appendix E) called for the recording of each comment in the sequence 
in which it took place. Recorded for each comment were the following: 
the speaker; the content, coded as one of 16 categories; whether 
the verbalization was a statement or a question. Additional nota-
tions were made regarding the conversations as time allowed, and 
finally, the duration time of each conference was recorded. 
The second set of observations made with a pre-determined 
schedule was of guilty plea hearings and sentencings in Chief Criminal 
Court. Recordings were made as the observer sat as a spectator 
in the courtroom. Since these hearings were open t~ anyone, 
permission to observe was not necessary, nor was invasion of privacy 
a concern. The great majority of hearings were completed within 
five minutes, with several more minutes elapsing prior to the next 
hearing. The entire conversation of each hearing was recorded 
(either by a summary of each comment or by a direct quotation). 
Observations of 25 hearings were made in this manner. 
METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
Data collected from written documents describing the formal 
structures, procedures and policies of case disposition within the 
court system were analyzed qualitatively. This information was 
--~--
used to describe the formal organization and to point out the way 
in which the formal organization (as depicted by the organization 
itself) did or did not differ from the informal organization. 
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Data from the case files on settled felony cases were sub-
jected to quantitative analysis. First, the frequency distributions 
of the coded variables were prepared. Second, relationships between 
variables were ascertained through cross tabulations and computa-
tion of chi square values. Some relationships, while not reaching 
statistical significance, nevertheless indicated trends or patterns 
which were described with the use of percentage statistics. Through-
out the analysis of the findings from the case files data, percentage 
descriptions were used generously, based upon the belief that this 
kind of numerical description had the distinct advantage of pre-
senting the data in a manner which could be clearly communicated to 
the court actors and to the public in general. Since a major goal 
of this research undertaking was to provide system members and the 
general public with information about the reality of the case dispo-
sition process, easy communication was a methodological priority. 
In addition to frequencies, percentages and tests of statistical 
significance, relationships were described qualitatively in order 
to analyze the meaning of the findings in terms of the total picture 
of case disposition. 
The questionnaire part of the interview yielded interval 
level data. However, the use of inferential sample statistics 
for analysis of these data was inappropriate since the respondent 
groups were not random or representative samples (in fact, one group 
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was a total population and another group was just short of a total 
population). Thus, these data were presented with the use of 
descriptive statistics: means, modes, ranges and standard deviations. 
Inferential analysis was done qualitatively. 
For the open-ended, conversational part of the interview, each 
question was separately analyzed. Between and within group differ-
ences were pointed out by noting the numbers of respondents who 
held similar or opposing views. The content of the responses was 
qualitatively described and relationships were noted between attitudes 
of the interviewees and the data on case disposition collected from 
other sources. Again, the ultimate purpose was to show the way in 
which the parts fit into a picture of the whole. 
While the analysis of the pre-trial observations included 
numerical accounts of the frequency and order of comments, the 
major analytical focus of the observational data was on the content 
of the activities. The content of the observations was analyzed 
qualitatively, again with an eye toward relationships to data from 
the other sources and toward the overall picture of the case 
disposition process. Particular care was taken to distinguish 
between the description of events and observer impressions or 
interpretations of those events. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The preceding discussions of the field research model and 
the specific methodology for this study indicate that this type 
of research is no small undertaking. It is not surprising, 
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therefore, that a number of questions have been raised regarding the 
"methodological soundness" of the field research model on which this 
study was based. Appendix A is devoted to a discussion of these 
questions and reflects the author's confidence in the appropriatenesss 
of this methodology for the present study. 
In this chapter, the research design, setting and methods for 
data collection and analysis have been described. Beginning with the 
next chapter, the remainder of the dissertation is given over to a 
presentation and analysis of the research findings. The formal 
organization is described in Chapter II. The findings from records 
and case files are presented in Chapters IV and V. Chapter VI deals 
with the interview data, and Chapter VII focuses on the observational 
data. In the final chapter, a model of the case disposition process 
in the court system under study is set forth. Accompanying the 
model is a detailed analysis of the findings in terms of their 
relationship to theory and previous research. 
CHAPTER III 
THE FORMAL ORGANIZATION: 
STRUCTURES, PROCEDURES AND POLICIES 
INTRODUCTION 
The formal organization under study was the felony court 
system in one urban county. The specific research focus was on 
three parts of the formal organization: (1) felony court, in 
which accused felons were processed from initial charge to final 
disposition; (2) the Office of the District Attorney, through which 
the prosecution process took place; (3) the Office of the Public 
Defender, through which the defense process for approximately half 
of accused felons took place. Although all three were inter-
dependent parts of the overall public court system, the formal 
organization of each was independently examined in order to assess 
the relationship of the parts to the whole. 
The court system which had as its jurisdiction the county 
under study was located in the central city of the county. The 
building which housed the courtrooms, judges' chambers, records 
divisions and District Attorney's Office (plus a number of other 
county offices) was the County Courthouse. The top floor of this 
building was a jail, used primarily as a temporary holding center 
, 
for accused offenders at various stages of the court process. The 
county office of the public defender system was located in a separate 
office building several blocks away from the c0arthouse. Also, 
a separate building in the immediate area provided a second office 
site for the district attorney system. Following is a description 
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of the formal organization of felony court, the Office of the District 
Attorney and the Office of the Public Defender. 
FELONY COURT 
Felony defendants moved in and out of various locations within 
the courthouse as their cases proceeded toward final disposition. 
The first appearance of the defendant took place in a courtroom 
(with easy access to the jail) over which different District Court 
judges presided on assignment. This appearance--at which time the 
formal charge was gone over, the defendant was assured of an attorney, 
and the date for a preliminary hearing was set--was required by law 
to take place within 24 hours of the defendant's arrest. The second 
appearance was at the preliminary hearing (held in a different 
courtroom), the purpose of which was to determine whether or not 
the evidence warranted a formal arraignment on the charge. If the 
decision was affirmative, the defendant appeared in the Chief 
Criminal Courtroom for the formal arraignment. At the arraignment, 
the defendant entered a not-guilty plea (if he or she refused to 
enter such a plea, one was automatically entered), and the dates for 
the pre-trial conference (the plea negotiation session) and the 
actual trial were set. The pre-trial conference date must be within 
15 days of the formal arraignment. After the pre-trial conference, 
the defendant could enter a petition to change the plea of guilty 
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either to a plea of not-guilty or to a plea to a bargained charge. 
If the accused had entered a plea to a misdemeanor rather than to 
the original felony (or if the judge decided to grant misdemeanor 
status at the plea hearing), he or she could waive sentence post-
ponement and be sentenced at the same time that the plea was 
entered and accepted by the judge. The guilty plea hearing did 
not, of course, take place if the defendant maintained the not-
guilty position. If the individual plead guilty to a felony, a 
pre-sentence investigation was required prior to sentencing. Such 
an investigation then took from four to six weeks. Following the 
cou~letion of the pre-sentence report, the offender either returned 
to Chief Criminal Court for sentencing or had his or her case 
assigned out to one of the other felony judges for sentencing. 
After the initial court appearance in front of a District Court 
judge, felony cases was handled by 13 felony court judges who held 
the Circuit Court positions (an additional Circuit Ccurt position 
was created after the research had been completed). At all times 
one of these 13 judges was sitting on the bench in Chief Criminal 
Court. Through a rotation system, the judges were assigned to 
this latter position for a duration of from two to three months. 
The result of this system was that the majority of cases was heard 
and settled by only a few judges in any given year. Another Circuit 
Court judge was elected to serve as Presiding Judge; his or her 
responsibilities were the handling of civil cases, administrative 
activities, and the assignment of trials to judges. 
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The judges as a group played an active role in the structuring 
of the case disposition process. Through this administrative role, 
they had set up the mandatory pre-trial conference, the mandatory 
pre-sentence investigation for convicted felons, and the guidelines 
for speedy disposition of cases. State statutes gave further 
for~mal recognition to the procedures for plea bargaining and speedy 
case disposition. In addition to the procedures for plea negotiation, 
policy on plea bargaining is outlined in the state statutes (see 
Appendix F). The Speedy Trial Act passed by the legislature states 
that cases must be disposed of within 60 days or dismissed. 
The courtrooms were physically designed in such a way as to 
create an aura of awe and respect. The rooms were very large; the 
ceilings were high; the decor was austere. The judge sat at the 
back of the room, set off from others by a raised platform and 
podimo--both effective boundaries. The hard-back spectator benches 
were similar to those found in churches. All court authorities 
were formally dressed, but the dress of the judge indicated the 
highest status. Beginning with the entrance of the judge into 
the courtroom, a number of verbal rituals followed which further 
added to the atmosphere of austerity and formality. 
The only courtroom which deviated from the above description 
was the Chief Criminal Court. This room was considerably smaller 
than the other courtrooms. The spectator section was very small, and 
thus the spectato~s were situated quite close to the judge. The 
pre-trial conference rooms could only be entered from the inside of 
this courtroom, and the entrance was located between the spectator 
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section and the judge's podium. There was continual traffic in and 
out of these rooms while cases were being heard. The enormous 
amount of continual activity provided for an atmosphere which was 
much less austere than in the other courtrooms. 
Overall, then, the organization of felony court was highly 
formalized and structured. The judges played an active administrative 
role (formalizing and structuring the disposition process) as well 
as the traditional judicial role. The formal organization was 
backed up by state statutes which provide not only procedural rules 
but also policy guidelines for case disposition through guilty pleas. 
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
Formal Structure 
The Office of the District Attorney is responsible for 
prosecuting all criminal cases. With the aid of federal monies, 
the Office had expanded its operations considerably in recent 
years. Two separate buildings in the central city provided office 
sites. Headed by the elected District Attorney, the Office staff 
consisted of 152 deputy district attorneys, investigators, and other 
professional and clerical staff. The staff size had increased 
noticeably over the last 20 years. In 1956, the Office had a staff 
of 27, consisting only of deputy district attorneys and clerical 
personnel. 
Along with the increase in size, the Office had become special-
ized in its division of labor. Seventeen deputy attorneys handled 
felony cases. Additionally, two attorneys were assigned to the 
Intake Office, their task being to review all misdemeanor cases and 
:~' , 
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decide whether or not to proceed with prosecution. The professional 
staff were also assigned to special units and divisions within the 
Office. There were six units handling different offense types. 
Unit A handled arson, felony driving and some burglary cases; 
unit B was assigned drug, pornography and prostitution cases; Unit C 
handled burglary, robbery, weapon offenses and negligent homicide; 
sex crimes and assaults were assigned to Unit D; and finally cases 
handled by unit E were described as fraud and white collar offenses. 
Unit U was the Career Criminal Dnit, which handled a variety of 
offenses in which the defendant had been declared by the Office to 
be a career criminal. 
Two special divisions within the Office were Child Support and 
Juvenile Justice. The Child Support Unit was responsible for 
the enforcement of child support obligations and for trying 
paternity suits in the county. The Juvenile Justice Division handled 
cases against juvenile defendants and acted as an advocate for 
children involved in abuse, neglect and termination of parental 
rights cases. 
There were two relatively new programs in which Office 
personnel expressed particular pride. The first was a victims' aid 
program which included three projects: Victim's Assistance Project; 
Rape Victim Assistance Project; Project Repay (all established in 
the last five years). The other program was composed of three special 
prosecution units, aimed at "taking a hard line" against certain 
offenses/offenders. The No Plea Bargaining Unit initiated in 1973 
directed its efforts toward the reduction or elimination of plea 
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bargaining on certain cases. Initially, this unit focused on 
burglary and robbery cases, but recently expanded its operations 
to include other offenses (see following section on plea bargaining 
policy). The Career Criminal unit discussed above was funded by 
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1976 and was 
another of the "hard line" programs aimed at controlling crime. 
This program was carried out by five deputy attorneys and support 
staff who, according to the Office manual 
. • • devote their full energies and special 
prosecution techniques toward building solid cases 
and securing substantial sentences for those 
offenders whose criminal career poses, and continues 
to pose, a threat to the lives and property of the 
citizens in our community. 
The Negligent Homicide Unit, funded by the state Traffic Safety 
Commission, was the responsibility of specially trained deputy 
attorneys whose duty was to aid in investigation and prosecution 
of cases in which traffic accidents resulted in fatalities. 
Recent re-organization of the D.A.'s Office emphasized a 
team approach to the handling of cases. The manual stated: 
The felony attorneys are divided into crirne-
specific teams that correspond to and work with 
crime-specific police investigative units. With 
this reorganization, the team which makes the 
initial decision to file charges also tries the 
case. 
There are two ways in which felony cases may be initiated. The first 
is to present a case to a Grand Jury, which decides whether or not 
the facts suggest that there is enough evidence for issuing a charge 
against a defendant. The second method is the filing of charges 
through the District Attorney's Information of Felony, which gives 
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the formal decision-making power to the District Attorney. The 
majority of felony cases were initiated by Information, and the use 
of the Information was increasing (in 1976, initiation by Information 
increased by 53 percent, whereas Grand Jury initiations decreased 
by 28 percent). 
It was clear that the District Attorney's Office in this 
county had a complex social structure characterized by specialization. 
Documents compiled by the Office clearly depic'ted the formal organ-
ization by delineating statuses, roles and procedures within the 
structure. Additionally, care had been taken by the Office to set 
down in writing lengthy descriptions of Office policy. Of relevance 
to the present study was the Office's description of plea bargaining 
policy. 
Plea Bargaining: Formal Policy 
The Office of the District Attorney had formally recognized 
plea bargaining as a method in case disposition. The policy manual 
included a section entitled "Plea Negotiation Policy--Adult Felony 
Charges," in which the philosophy and guidelines for plea bargaining 
were explicitly stated. In the first paragraph of this section, plea 
bargaining was given formal recognition: 
As a part of its professional responsibilities, the 
office is ethically required to make known its general 
policy of a willingness to consult with the defense con-
cerning disposition of charges by a plea and to establish 
criteria for those discussions and potential agreements. 
It has been recognized, of course, that during these 
discussions bargaining concerning criminal charges 
between defense and prosecution takes several forms. 
Sentence bargaining and the dropping of indicted and 
unindicted counts (many of which may merge into one 
offense regardless) are but two methods of bargaining. 
----~. 
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Of interest is the fact that bargaining by charge reduction was not 
mentioned in this paragraph. This omission reflected current 
efforts by the Office to limit and in some cases eliminate charge 
reduction bargains. Initially, these efforts were formalized by 
policy which disallowed bargaining for charge reduction on robbery 
and burglary offenses, but the restrictions have been expanded. As 
of June 1, 1977, charge reduction bargains were prohibited for the 
following felonies: (1) Robbery I; (2) Robbery II (committed with 
simulated weapon; (3) Burglary I; (4) Burglary II; (5) Theft I; 
(6) Furnishing heroin or cocaine; (7) Supplying contraband; (8) 
Forgery I; (9) Escape I; (10) Escape II; (11) Ex-convict in possession 
of a firearm; (12) All cases where the defendant had been designated 
as a career criminal by the District Attorney's Career criminal 
Project's staff. The formal policy did, however, include a clause 
which made charge reduction permissible for special cases of these 
offenses. This clause read: 
This policy recognizes that there will be times when 
it is in the interest of justice for a reduction of a 
non-reducible charge to occur. It is anticipated that 
this will not occur in more than five percent of the 
cases in the non-bargainable categories. These 
reductions may only occur with the written consent of 
the District Attorney or his designate. 
The ultimate decision on charge reduction, then, lay with the 
District Attorney himself. 
The target offenses for the "campaign" to reduce plea 
bargaining were either property offenses or victimless crimes. The 
rationale for not including crimes against persons in the non-
reducible category had to do with the needs and interests of victims. 
The Office perceived of itself as playing a major role in 
victim advocacy: 
Because of the District Attorney's policy of total 
victim involvement and the consideration of the 
victim's needs in the cases of violent crimes against 
persons such as rape, sodomy, sex abuses and assault, 
the prosecutor shall retain the discretion in these 
cases to plea negotiate. The prosecutor is required, 
however, to have contact with the victim and take 
into consideration the victim's needs and desires in 
the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion to 
negotiate. 
In addition to charge reduction bargaining, formal policy 
allowed for the following sentence and charge dismissal bargains 
for all felonies: 
To make or not oppose favorable recommendations 
concerning the sentence which may be imposed if the 
accused enters a plea of guilty. 
To seek or not to oppose dismissal of the offense 
charged if the accused enters a plea of guilty to 
another offense reasonably related to the accused 
conduct. 
To seek or not oppose dismissal of other charges or 
potential charges against the accused if the defendant 
enters a plea of guilty. 
The selection of the words "reasonably related" in the second type 
of bargain implied a recognition that not all guilty pleas would 
be to a charge necessarily included in the initial charge. 
There were also explicit statements concerning criteria which 
were not to be considered in deciding to negotiate for a plea. It 
was strongly stated that plea negotiation should not be undertaken 
to meet production needs: 
Plea negotiations, however, shall never be used to reduce 
case backlogs or reallocate manpower. This would constitute 
a flagrant abuse of the process and the inherent respons-
ibility and discretionary powers of the prosecutor. 
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However, there were other policy statements which implied a concern 
for organizational needs. For example, it was stated that one 
criterion to be used in deciding whether or not to bargain was 
the advancement of other prosecution goals through non-prosecution 
of certain charges. It was also stated that plea bargaining could 
be undertaken in cases where it appeared that the interests of 
effective administration of criminal justice would be served. 
These rather vague statements would appear to allow for considerable 
flexibility in the decision-making process. 
Another criterion which was not to guide plea negotiation 
decisions referred to the relationship between the prosecutor and 
defense attorney handling a given case: 
The choice of defense counsel shall not be a factor in a 
deputy district attorney's decision to negotiate or not 
negotiate with a defendant. A defendant shall not receive 
favorable advantages or unfavorable treatment in negotiations 
based upon past or present relationships between defense 
counsel and the District Attorney's Office. 
This statement implied a concern for equal treatment of cases. An 
equal treatment approach was emphasized in another policy statement: 
Similarly situated defendants shall be afforded 
equal plea agreement opportunities. 
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Yet, in still another section, individual ratehr than equal treatment 
was emphasized: 
The deputy district attorney shall be certain that all 
cases are determined individually and on their own' unique 
facts and circumstances. 
In fact, formal policy outlined criteria which were to be considered 
in determining the "availability and acceptance of a guilty plea" for 
each individual case. These criteria included: seriousness of offense; 
---.~ .. 
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mitigating circumstances; age; background; prior record, attitude 
and mental state of the defendant; nature and needs of victims; 
attitudes of witnesses; strength of case; arrest circumstances and 
attitudes of the arresting officer. 
In addition to criteria for deciding whether or not to plea 
bargain, formal policy also outlined procedure for plea bargaining. 
In line with state law, Office policy was that plea negotiations were 
to be carried on only in the presence of defense counsel. A bargain 
could not be offered a defendant without defense counsel's approval. 
While this policy was seen by its makers as a due process safeguard, 
it did lend support to the contention that the prosecutor and 
defense attorney were formally viewed as the key actors in the 
bargaining process. It was the interaction between these two parties 
which was essential in order for a bargain to eventually take place. 
Procedural policy also stated that the deputy district attorneys 
should make known to defense counsel the general policy and willing-
ness of the Office to plea negotiate and to set aside times and 
places for negotiation discussions. Policy statements warned 
deupty district attorneys that they were not to make any promises 
regarding sentence. Sentence bargaining could only take the form 
of a recommendation. Again in line with state law, policy stated that 
if the prosecutor was unable to fulfill an understanding previously 
agreed upon in a plea negotiation, the defense could withdraw the 
guilty plea. It must be assumed that this included sentence agree-
ments; however, since sentence bargains were only recommendations, 
the meaning of the plea withdrawal policy for sentence bargains was 
unclear. 
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This detailed description of plea bargaining policy issued by 
the Office of the District Attorney was indicative of the importance 
which was attached to the role of plea negotiation in the case 
disposition process. Although they were given lesser space in the 
policy manual, guidelines for screening and charging criminal cases 
were also explicitly outlined. These guidelines are described in 
the following section. 
Screening and Charging: Formal Policy 
Screening refers to a decision not to charge or to dismiss a 
charge(s) early in the process. The policy manual defines screening 
as a "process by which a person is removed from the criminal justice 
system prior to trial or plea." Screening was alleged to meet two 
prosecution goals. The first had to do with efficiency needs of the 
system: 
The first is to eliminate cases which the prosecution 
knows are futile--futile due to lack of evidence or other 
case necessities--and a continuation of prosecution process 
would be fruitless and result in wasted economic resources. 
The second goal was to stop action against people who were found to 
be falsely accused. If either of these criteria applied to a given 
case, it would be screened out of the system. A case might also 
be screened out for the following reason: 
Specific laws and elements that constitute crime are 
legislative responsibilities, but prosecutorial discretion 
must be applied in granting "immunity" by screening special 
individuals due to extenuating circumstances, i.e., 
individuals who aid law enforcement in the apprehension 
of criminals and who participate in certain crimes in doing 
so. 
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This description is ambiguous. The suggested reference was to 
individuals who had been asked to aid law enforcement and in so 
doing had to be involved in a criminal offense. However, it is 
unlikely that individuals acting under the auspices of law enforce-
ment will be subsequently charged with a crime which is part of an 
assistance plan. Whether or not this clause applied to individuals 
who first committed an offense and then aggred to assist the system 
in exchange for immunity was unclear. 
Formal policy emphasized the discretionary power of the 
prosecutor in making charge decisions (although a list of factors 
to be considered in charge decisions similar to factors to be 
considered in bargaining decisions was given). The following 
statements were indicative of the formal policy of discretion: 
Within his discretion, the prosecutor shall determine 
what charges shall be filed, how many charges shall be 
filed, and how charges shall be presented. 
The prosecutor is not obligated to file all possible 
charges which available evidence might support. The 
prosecutor may properly exercise his discretion to 
present only those charges which he considers to be 
consistent and in the best interest of justice. 
While the charging policy was much less restrictive than the plea 
bargaining policy, there were two charging restrictions which were 
relevant to the present study. The first implied a concern for 
getting convictions: 
The prosecutor shall file only those charges which 
he believes can be reasonably substantiated by 
admissible evidence at trial. 
The second referred to the ethical issue of overcharging in 
anticipation of plea bargaining: 
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I: 
The prosecutor shall not attempt to utilize charging 
decisions only as a leverage device in obtaining guilty 
pleas to lesser charges. 
The policies of the District Attorney's Office concerning plea 
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bargaining, charging and screening were numerous and well-delineated. 
They attended to a variety of needs and goals of the criminal justice 
system. The complexity of the formal policies complemented the 
complexity of the formal structure of the Office. 
OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
While the Office of the Dis·trict Attorney was a part of the 
county court system and was allocated funding as a part of the system, 
the Office of the Public Defender was a non-profit private corporation 
operating under contract with the county. As such, the Public 
Defender's Office was an independent organization and not vunerable 
to changes in funding allocations in the same way as was the District 
Attorney's Office. Under contract, the Public Defender's Office 
agreed to handle a certain number of civil and criminal cases in a 
given year for a set fee. Thus, the Office knew in advance what 
its case load would be for the year and could plan accordingly. From 
June 30, 1977 to June 30, 1978, the designated caseload for the Office 
in this county was 1,520 felonies, 1,200 misdemeanors and up to 
1,000 civil commitments. 
The formal title of the Office was the Metropolitan Public 
Defender Office, and the Office under study was actually a branch 
(although it was the central and largest branch) of the metropolitan 
organization. The individual who headed the entire Metropolitan 
---Lf·,~-­
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Office was called the Public Defender (his office was in the central 
Office under study). Staff attorneys were not called public defenders, 
but rather were referred to as attorneys who work for the Public 
Defender's Office (in the text of this paper, however, they are 
referred to as public defenders for the purpose of role identification). 
The Public Defender's Office of the county under study was 
located in an office building several blocks away from the County 
Courthouse. Offices were located on two floors in this building. 
In addition to the Public Defender, there were 13 attorneys in this 
Office, 8 of whom worked specifically on felony cases. In addition, 
there were investigators, attorney assistants and clerical staff--
the entire staff consisting of approximately 80 individuals. 
The eight felony attorneys, working in teams of two, were 
responsible for a designated number of cases on a weekly basis. 
Case assignment was randomly carried out through a rotation system. 
A team appeared in District court for two weeks, during which time 
it picked up 18 cases. The third week, the team appeared in Circuit 
Court and picked up another eight cases. The fourth week was known 
as "free week," and during this time the team picked up no new cases. 
In any given week, then, there were two teams in District Court and 
one team in Circuit Court for case assignment. The only cases which 
were not randomly picked up through this sytem were those declared 
as "major cases," i.e., homicides or others so declared due to their 
need for greater time and effort than routinely expected. Major 
cases were assigned only to senior attorneys; however, within this 
group, assignment was done on a rotation basis. The Public 
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Defender himself did not have a caseload; his role was administrative 
(he also appeared to be counted on quite heavily as an advisor to the 
staff attorneys). 
It was the researcher's impression that the Public Defender's 
Office operated under an atmosphere of informality and intimacy 
(particularly in comparison to the Courthouse or the District 
Attorney's Office). All levels of staff referred to one another on 
a first-name basis, and interactions suggested no feelings of 
superiority/inferiority. In fact, this lack of hierarchical 
structure apparent to the observer was promoted by the Public Defender 
and was an integral part of formal Office policy. 
The underlying philosophy of the Public Defender's Office was 
that attorneys and their professional assistants were independently 
responsible for the entire handling of a case once it was assigned 
to them. The way in which the case was to be handled from start to 
finish was decided by the attorney and assistants to which it had 
been assigned. Beyond the legal rules, the attorneys were free 
to make their own judgments as to the way in which the case would 
be handled. This philosophy, then, was really the Office policy. 
Unlike the Office of the District Attorney, the Office of the Public 
Defender had no policy manual. What it did have was a brief statement 
of purposes and goals. According to this statement, the Public 
Defender's Office was concerned with the following: 
Providing the best possible legal defense services 
to indigents as determined and appointed by the courts. 
Providing those services at a savings to governmental 
units entering into service contracts with the 
Metropolitan Public Defender Services. 
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Extending specialized knowledge of defense counseling 
to the benefit of clients, judicial system and the 
private bar. 
The philosophy of independence and individual responsibility was 
formalized in these words: 
• • • that which best serves the client and office 
is what is expected of every employee, limited only by 
a commitment to working within and improving the criminal 
justice system. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A description of the formal organization of the public court 
system indicated both similarities and differences between the sub-
parts. Both Felonly Court and the Office of the District Attorney 
were highly formalized and structured. By comparison, the Office 
of the Publi.c Defender appeared informal. Role specialization was 
dominant in the structure of the Office of the District Attorney. 
Role generalization better characterized the activities of Circuit 
Court judges and attorneys in the Office of the Public Defender. 
It was clear that the Offices of the District Attorney and 
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Public Defender in this county differed both in structure and policy. 
The larger District Attorney's Office had a noticeably more complex 
structure which was basically hierarchical. Formal policy statements 
were detailed and lengthy, allowing for little decision-making at 
the lower staff levels. Both the structure and the philosophy which 
guided the Public Defender's Office emphasized individual responsi-
bility for decision-making; policy guidelines were general and brief. 
Whereas plea bargaining was given specific attention in the policy 
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manual of the District Attorney's Office (and showed a close 
relationship to the statutory guidelines), it was not directed by 
formal policy in the Public Defender's Office. 
The formal organization provides the setting in which felony 
cases are processed and settled. The substance of the disposition 
process, i.e., characteristics of offenses, offenders and outcomes, 
is the subject of the next two chapters, in which the findings from 
case records and files are discussed. 
y---' 
CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURE OF OFFENSES, OFFENDERS AND DISPOSITIONS: 
CRIMINAL COURT FELONY CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
Essential to the understanding of the totality of the case 
settlement process in a given court system is a statistical 
description of the nature of offenses, offenders and dispositions 
processed through the system during the time of the research 
undertaking. A descriptive profile of the populations of offenses, 
offenders and dispositions--presented in the first part of this 
chapter--was constructed on the basis of frequency distributions of 
the variables listed in Table II. 
The next task was an analytical examination of the descriptive 
data relevant to the specific inquiries of the research endeavor. 
This examination was done by identifying statistical relationships 
between certain variables which were meaningful for the analytical 
purpose of this study. The findings from this examination are 
discussed under five headings--each of which attends directly to the 
, 
form and/or outcome of case disposition through negotiation. These 
areas are: (1) the relationships between closing types (straight 
guilty pleas, bargained guilty pleas, trials and dismissals) and 
offense/offender characteristics; (2) the relationships between 
closing types, offense/offender characteristics and punishment; (3) 
the relationship of original charges to reduced charges; (4) the 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
B. 
9. 
10. 
ll. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
TABLE II 
VARIABLES ON WHICH DATA WERE COLLECTED 
FROM CRIMINAL COURT FELONY CASE FILES 
Initial most serious charge lB. Pre-trial custody status 
Initial charge: 2nd count 19. Sentence: incarceration 
Initial charge: 3rd count 20. Fine 
Initial charge: 4th count 2l. Drug or alcohol program 
Number initial counts 22. Mental health program 
Number initial felony counts 23. Restitution 
Settled most serious charge 24. Community services 
Settled charge: 2nd count 25. Month arrest 
Settled charge: 3rd count 26. Total disposition time 
Settled charge: 4th count 27. Sex of defendant 
Number settled counts 2B. Age of defendant 
Number settled felony counts 29. Prior record of defendant 
No contest plea 30. Education of defendant 
Type closing 3l. Employment of defendant 
Number setovers 32. Residence of defendant 
Type attorney 33. D.A. unit (1977 only) 
Judge 
relationship between closing types and efficient production; (5) 
changes in patterns from 1976 to 1977. 
Ultimately, these findings from the Criminal Court case files 
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were interwoven with the findings from other data sources to form the 
model of case disposition in one urban court system which is presented 
in the final chapter. 
Data discussed in this chapter were collected from individual 
case files from the County Criminal Court Records Division. Two 10 
percent samples (one for 1976 and one for the latter half of 1977) 
were drawn from a master list of felony cases settled in these years 
(see Chapter II). Data were collected on the 33 variables listed 
in Table II. Not all case files contained information on all the 
variables, and, in particular, the number of cases with missing 
i 
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data on defendant characteristics was relatively high. There is no 
reason to suspect, however, that missing data were not random. 
In the following pages, certain offense types are referred 
to by an abbreviated label. These labels, described in Table III, 
not only serve the interests of brevity, but also were used commonly 
within the court system. 
CAID: 
CDP: 
Burg: 
Forg: 
Rob: 
UUV: 
ECPFA: 
DUlL: 
DWS: 
Sod: 
Att: 
TABLE III 
ABBREVIATIONS FOR OFFENSE TYPES 
Criminal Activity in Drugs 
Criminal Drug Promotion 
Burglary 
Forgery 
Robbery 
Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle 
Ex-Con in Possession of a Firearm 
Driving Under the Influence of Liquor 
Driving While Suspended 
Sodomy 
Attempted 
A PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE POPULATIONS 
The Nature of Offenses 
Drug and petty property offenses accounted for the majority of 
initial charge offenses and the overwhelming majority of settled 
charge offenses in both years. Tables IV and V present the frequency 
distributions of most serious initial and settled charges for both 
years. Due to the small number of cases in 1977, robberies and 
other property crimes were not broken down further as they were for 
1976. Crimes against the person were divided for 1976 into homicides, 
kidnaps, assaults and sex crimes. For 1977, sex crimes were coded 
separately, but homicides, kidnaps and assaults were placed into one 
category. 
1976 
CAID 
Theft I 
Burg I 
other Burg 
UUV 
Rob I 
Assaults 
Forg I 
Misc. 
other Rob 
Escape/ECPFA 
Sex Crimes 
Traffic 
Homicides 
TABLE IV 
MOST SERIOUS INITIAL CHARGE: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER of 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
19% 
12% 
8% 
8% 
7% 
7% 
7% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
1977 
CAID 
Burg I 
Forg I 
Traffic 
Other Property 
Theft I 
Rob 
Homicides/ 
Assau1ts/ 
Kidnaps 
Misc. 
Escape/ECPFA 
Other Burg 
Sex Crimes 
Other Drug 
Other Property 2% 
TOTAL 
Kidnaps 2% 
Other Drug 1% 
TOTAL 100% (306) 
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19% 
12% 
10% 
10% 
9% 
7% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
1% 
100% (163) 
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TABLE V 
MOST SERIOUS SETTLED CHARGE: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
1976 1977 
Other Drug 11% Other Property 11% 
Theft I 9% Traffic 11% 
other Burg 9% CAID 11% 
UUV 8% Forg 11% 
Misc. H Theft I 10% 
Rob I 7% Other Drug 9% 
Assaults 7% Burg I 8% 
CAID 7% Misc. 8% 
Other Property 6% Homicides/ 
Assaults/ 
Other Rob 6% Kidnaps 7% 
Burg I 6% Other Burg 7% 
Escape/ECPFA 4% Sex Crimes 4% 
Forg 4% Rob 4% 
Sex Crimes 4% Escape/ECPFA 1% 
Traffic 4% 
TOTAL 100% (141) 
Homicides 2% 
TOTAL 100% (253) 
----.~-
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As these tables indicate, CAID was the most cammon initial 
charge, accounting for 19 percent of the total initial charges in 
both years. From Tables VI and VII it can be seen that the majority 
of cases were property offenses. Crimes against the person made up 
a small minority of the offense types. Noticeable was the increase 
in the proportion of traffic offenses from 1976 to 1977, largely 
due to a legislative change making some traffic offenses felonies 
rather than misdemeanors. Relatively uncommon as settled charges 
were the most serious, Class A felonies (for a listing of the 
felony and misdemeanor levels of different offenses see Appendix G). 
Property 
1976 
TABLE VI 
INITIAL CHARGE CATEGORIES: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
(include Rob) 52% Property 
1977 
(include Rob) 
Crimes Against Person 14% Crimes Against Person 
Drugs 20% Drugs 
Traffic 3% Traffic 
Other 11% Other 
TOTAL 100% (306) TOTAL 
50% 
10% 
20% 
10% 
10% 
100% (163) 
The great majority of cases in both years were single count 
rather than multiple count cases. As indicated in Table VIII, how-
ever, there was a slight increase in settled multiple count cases in 
Property 
TABLE VII 
SETTLED CHARGE CATEGORIES: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
(include Rob) 54% Property (include Rob) 
Crimes Against Person 13% Crimes Against Person 
Drugs 
Traffic 
Other 
TOTAL 
18% Drugs 
4% Traffic 
11% Other 
100% (253) TOTAL 
TABLE VIII 
TOTAL CASES BY TYPES OF MULTIPLE COUNTS: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
49% 
11% 
20% 
11% 
9% 
100% 
1976 1977 
TOTAL CASES 306 163 
Percent multiple initial counts 26 25 
Percent multiple initial felony counts 20 19 
Percent multiple settled counts 6 13 
Percent multiple settled felony counts 4 8 
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(141) 
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1977. While the number of multiple count initial charges was small, 
the number of multiple count settled charges was even less. The 
number of cases settled with more than one felony count was miniscule. 
About a quarter of the cases (27 percent in 1976 and 25 percent in 
1977) which resulted in conviction ended up with ~ felony counts. 
Thus, a reduction in offense severity was notable as cases moved 
from initial charge to settled charge. 
The Nature of Closings 
Nine categories of closing types were coded. The labels given 
the closing types, which are used in subsequent references, 
symbolize the following. PG refers to those cases in which the 
defendant entered a straight guilty plea to the initial charge(s). 
PG + Dis s·ymbolizes those cases in which the defendant plead guilty 
to the initial charge but had a count(s) and/or other charges(s) 
dismissed. PGTL indicates those cases in which the defendant plead 
guilty to a less serious charge (a lower class offense) than the 
initial one. PGTL + Dis refers to cases in which the defendant plead 
guilty to a lesser charge and also had a count(s) and/or other 
charge(s) dismissed. CBJ means convicted at trial by jury; ABJ means 
acquitted at trial by jury. CBC refers to those cases in which the 
defendant waived the right to trial by jury and was convicted by 
the court (judge); ABC means acquitted by trial heard by the judge. 
DIS refers to cases which were dismissed subsequent to formal arraign-
mente The categories are mutually exclusive. However, at times 
the following narrative refers to all PGTLS (which includes PGTL 
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and PGTL + Dis), all PG bargains (which includes PGTL, PGTL + Dis and 
PG + Dis), or all PG's (which includes PG, PGTL, PGTL + Dis and 
PG + Dis). Table IX gives the percentage distributions of closing 
types in 1976 and the latter half of 1977. 
TABLE IX 
CLOSING TYPES: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT 
1976 
Type Closing 
PG 26% 
PG + Dis 12% 
PGTL 24% 
PGTL + Dis 9% 
CBJ 8% 
CBC 3% 
ABJ 2% 
ABC 1% 
Dis 15% 
TOTAL 100% 
(306) 
1977 
23% 
13% 
29% 
7% 
9% 
7% 
1% 
0 
12% 
100% 
(163) 
Variations in the distribution of closing types between 1976 
and 1977 were slight. There was a small decrease in the proportion 
of PG closings and a small increase in the proportion of trial 
closings. Charge reduction closings (PGTL and PGTL + Dis) were 
the most common type closing in both years. Only a small percentage 
of cases went to trial, and an extremely small number ended in 
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acquittal. It should be noted that the number of dismissals was 
actually higher than here indicated (see Chapter VI) since Criminal 
Court statistics include only dismissals after formal arraignment. 
OVer half of all cases which did not end in dismissal were settled 
with a bargained guilty plea. It should also be noted that data on 
two other types of bargains--agreements not to file on other known 
charges and sentence agreements--were not available from this data 
source. However, data from the Public Defender files (see Chapter V) 
indicated that if these two types of bargains were included, the-
number of bargained closings would account for the great majority of 
convictions. 
The Nature of Offenders 
The defendants were ~ representative of the general pop-
ulation; rather, they were characterized by high rates of under-
education, unemployment and underemployment, and recidivism. Also, 
young people and men were over-represented in the offender population. 
Finally, the great majority were defended by public attorneys. 
Reflecting national patterns, the overwhelming majority of 
defendants were male (83 percent in 1976 and 88 percent in 1977). 
Also in line with national statistics, defendants were relatively 
young. In 1976, the mean age of defendants was 29, and in 1977 it 
was 28. The mode statistics was even lower (20 in 1976 and 19 in 
1977) • 
Compared to the general county population, defendants were 
considerably undereducated. Thirty-eight percent in 1976 and 42 
percent in 1977 had completed less than four years of high school. 
Seventeen percent in both years had some college, but only 1 
percent in 1976 and 2 percent in 1977 were college graduates. 
The statistics indicated that about half of the defendants 
in both years were unemployed. Although high, the unemployment 
statistic only partially reflected the extent of employment 
instability which characterized the offender population. First, 
employment status was often a self-report measure, and as such was 
subject to bias. Since attorneys interviewed expressed the belief 
that a defendant with employment increased his or her chances of 
receiving a light sentence (an opinion likely passed on to the 
client), the bias may have been in favor of underreported unemploy-
ment. Also, it is likely that anything that could qualify as 
employment was reported as such, e.g., part-time yard maintenance or 
off-and-on janitorial work. Additionally, an unemployed defendant 
who was not in jail custody may have been urged to find some employ-
ment in order to increase the chances of light sentencing. An 
attempt was made to take these points into account by coding 
defendants who had been employed less than six months in a separate 
category. However, data on length of employment were not available 
for all cases. Also, the data on part-time and off-and-on employ-
ment were too sketchy to record with any confidence (although these 
descriptions appeared frequently enough to suggest that there was 
likely a substantial number of these kinds of employment). However, 
a profile of job instability was definitely indicated by the 
statistics on defendants who had been employed for over six months, 
as only 20 percent in 1976 and 26 percent in 1977 fell into this 
category. 
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An attempt was also made to get some idea of the nature of 
jobs held by those accused offenders who were employed. Many of 
the case files only gave the name of the defendant's employer, and 
thus it was not possible to ascertain the nature of the job in these 
cases. However, job descriptions were obtained for 72 defendants 
from the 1976 sample (a complete description of these jobs is given 
in Appendix H). The great majority of these persons either had 
labor or low-level service jobs. Only three individuals held jobs 
which could be classified as administrative types. It should be 
remembered that most defendants were relatively young, and therefore 
it would not be expected that they would have a significant rate of 
high-level employment. Nevertheless, the complete picture indicated 
by the data was one of employment instability. The people who got 
in trouble with the law tended to be unemployed, only partially 
employed, or have employment which society characterizes as working 
or lower class. 
Prior record, like employment, was a problematic variable. 
Some of the files from which the data were drawn included only the 
sheet on which self-reported prior record was recorded. Others 
only included a form which called for prior felony convictions. 
Arrests not resulting in convictions were not uniformly recorded, 
and thus were not included in the prior record category. Even 
so, the great majority of defendants were recorded as repeaters. 
Seventy percent had prior felony convictions in 1976, as did 72 
percent in 1977. When the only prior record information available 
was for prior felony convictions, the researcher coded no prior 
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felony convictions as a separate category. This latter category is 
really an unknown, since it included those with misdemeanor 
convictions as well as those with no prior record of any kind. 
However, there was a clear indication of no prior record of 
convictions of any type for only a small percentage of individuals 
(10 percent in 1976 and 14 percent in 1977). 
Offenders were highly likely to be defended by a public 
attorney. In only 15 percent of the cases in 1976 and 20 percent 
of the cases in 1977 was an attorney privately retained. Almost 
half of the cases (49 percent in 1976 and 41 percent in 1977) were 
handled by public defenders, while the remainder were handled by 
court-appointed attorneys from the private bar. These findings 
point to the low economic status of the offender population, for in 
order to be assigned either a public defender or a court-appointed 
attorney from the private bar, the defendant had to sign a statement 
saying that he or she was indigent and unable to afford to retain an 
attorney. 
The Nature of Punishment 
OVer half of the charged offenders (53 percent in both years) 
spent their pre-trial time in jail custody. Release on own 
recognizance was granted in 31 percent of the cases in 1976 and 
35 percent of the cases in 1977. Bail release was obviously the 
least common of the three possible pre-trial custody statuses. 
While these gross distributions likely reflected reality, it should 
be noted that for individual cases, the type of pre-trial custody 
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recorde'd may have only represented a portion of pre-trial time, as 
changes in custody status can occur during the course of case settle-
ment. 
The largest number of convictions resulted in a non-incarcer-
ation sentence in both years, although non-incarceration sentences 
decreased from 54 percent in 1976 to 47 percent in 1977. Of those 
who were not incarcerated, 89 percent in 1976 and 86 percent in 1977 
were placed on probation. The remainder either received no punish-
ment at all or were punished through a fine, restitution, or partici-
pation in a special program. The proportion of defendants who 
received jail sentences increased from 23 percent in 1976 to 33 
percent in 1977. The percentage of defendants sent to the peniten-
tiary was about the same for both years (23 percent in 1976 and 20 
percent in 1977). 
Table X shows the distributions of convicted cases in which 
the sentences included a fine, restitution, or participation in a 
special program. While the variations between the years were slight, 
the use of special programs did increase in 1977. It should be 
noted that these conditions were usually not alternatives to 
incarceration or probation, but rather, in almost all cases, were 
accompanied by a jailor probation sentence. 
Since all felony charges carry a potential penitentiary 
placement, it is clear that sentencing was much less severe than 
allowed for by law. While charge reductions prior to conviction 
accounted for some of the reduction in punishment severity, maximum 
sentencing even on non-reduced felonies was under-utilized. Of those 
TABLE X 
TOTAL CONVICTIONS FOR WHICH SELECTED SENTENCE CONDITIONS 
WERE ORDERED: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT* 
1976 1977 
TOTAL CONVICTIONS 253 142 
Percent restitution 23 22 
Percent fine 13 16 
Percend drug or alcohol program 17 16 
Percent mental health program 5 10 
Percent community service 2 B 
*These are not mutually exclusive conditions. Multiple sentence 
conditions could be ordered for a single case. 
who were sent to the penitentiary, however, the majority (66 percent 
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in 1976 and 72 percent in 1977) were given sentences of five years or 
more. Thus, if one was sent to the penitentiary, he or she was 
likely to have received a long sentence. 
Relationships Between the Nature of Offenses and Offenders 
As an addition to the population profile presented thus far, 
relationships between offense and offender characteristics are 
presented in this section. Relationships involving the type offense 
variable refer to settled rather than initial charge unless other-
wise specified. 
The relationship between initial charge and multiple counts 
was highly significant (at the .001 level in both years). As 
indicated in Table XI, Drugs and Crimes Against Person (along with 
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TABLE XI 
MULTIPLE INITIAL COUNTS FOR SELECTED OFFENSES: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977 , 
BY PERCENT 
1976 1977 
Total # % Mu1t Total # % Mu1t 
f 
Offense Type Offenses Init cts Offenses Init cts 
Drugs 62 50 33 49 
Crimes Against Person 45 40 16 43 
Rob I 21 24 4 0 
Traffic 9 22 17 47 
Theft I 38 10 12 17 
Burg I 24 8 19 10 
Forg I 15 7 17 12 
Other Burg 23 4 7 14 
other Rob 14 6 14 13 
Other Property 27 10 8 0 
Traffic in 1977) were the offense categories most commonly charged 
with multiple counts. The findings on the relationship between 
settled charge and multiple counts showed a similar patterns. 
Property offenders were relatively unlikely to be charged with 
multiple counts. However, there was some indication that if the 
initial charge was to a Class A property felony and with multiple 
counts, the settled charge was likely to be for multiple counts. 
For example, 24 percent of the Rob I charges in 1976 were multiple 
count cases; of those charged and convicted of Rob I, 22 percent 
still ended up with multiple settled counts. 
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Offense types were differentially distributed on the basis 
of the sex and age of offenders. The relationship between sex and 
type offense (significant at the .01 level of 1976 and the .001 
level in 1977) indicated that females were most likely to commit 
offenses which could be categorized as petty property crimes, 
e.g., Forg I, Theft I, Other Rob and Other Property. The relation-
, ship between age and type offense was also significant at the .01 
i 
level in 1976 and the .001 level in 1977. Crimes with particularly 
high numbers of youthful offenders in both years were: Burg I 
(60 percent in 1976 and 67 percent in 1977 were 17 to 20 years old); 
UUV (60 percent in 1976 and 75 percent in 1977 were 17 to 20 years 
old); other Burg (35 percent in 1976 and 40 percent in 1977 were 
17 to 20 years old). These relationships between type offense and 
sex and age of offender are in line with official national statistics. 
Statistically significant relationships were not found between 
the type offense variable and prior record, education or employment 
of the defendant. However, there were patterns worth noting which 
were consistent for both years. Of all offenses, the Rob, Burg 
and Traffic categories had the highest proportions of offenders with 
prior felony records. Drug offenders much less frequently had prior 
felony records. The less serious property offenses (Other Rob, 
Other Burg and Other Property) involved the highest proportions of 
defendants with less than four years of high school. Drug offenses 
showed the lowest proportion of defendants with less than four years 
of high school. Unemployment was most frequent among petty property 
offenders. Traffic and Crimes Against Person offenders were the most 
l~kely to have been employed for over six months. 
The only relationship which was significant for both years 
between type attorney and the offense/offender characteristics was 
that between type attorney and employment status of the defendant 
(significant at the .05 level in 1976 and the .001 level in 1977). 
As shown in Table XII, the differences were more dramatic in 1977, 
but the patterns were consistent for both years. As would be 
expected, those who retained attorneys were less likely to be unem-
ployed than those who had public attorneys. Of all offense types, 
TABLE XII 
UNEMPLOYED DEFENDANTS WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ATTORNEYS: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
1976 1977 
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Total # % Defendants Total # % Defendants 
Type Attorney Defendants Unemployed Defendants Unemployed 
Public defender 102 56 44 61 
Court-appointed/ 
private bar 66 56 34 63 
Privately retained 26 31 19 16 
Traffic cases were the most likely to be handled by retained 
attorneys in both years (38 percent in 1976 and 43 percent in 1977 
were handled by retained attorneys). The offenses with the next highest 
proportion of retained attorneys was Theft I for both years (35 percent 
in 1976 and 29 percent in 1977). In 1976, the relationship between 
attorney and prior record of defendant was significant at the .01 
level, with those defendants who retained attorneys much less likely 
to have prior felony reocrds. The fact that this relationship was 
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not significant in 1977 was likely due in part to the rise in Traffic 
offenses in 1977 (since Traffic offenders were likely to retain 
attorneys and also likely to have prior felony reocrds). 
Defendant Characteristics: Inter-Relationships 
A final piece of information entered into the population profile 
is on the inter-relationships between defendant characteristics. The 
only relationship which was statistically significant for both years 
was that between age and education. Over half of the youngest (17 
to 20) and oldest (over 30) defendants had not completed four years 
of high school. Patterns were similar in 1976 and 1977 in the relation-
ship between age and employment. The 17 to 20 age group included a 
high proportion of unemployed individuals; younger defendants had 
infrequently been employed for more than six months. As one moves up 
the age scale, the proportion of defendants with prior felony 
records increased steadily in both years. Almost all defendants over 
40 years old had prior felony records. 
Of males, 50 percent were unemployed in 1976 and 51 percent in 
1977. Of females, 70 percent were unemployed in 1976 and 78 percent 
were unemployed in 1977. If females were financially supported by 
an employed male, they were counted as employed; thus, the differences 
in employment were not due to the housewife status of women. Males 
were much more likely than females to have a prior record in both 
years. However, a greater proportion of females than males in both 
years reported having no prior felony record. As explained earlier, 
the no prior felony category was an ambiguous one; it could include 
a number of women with prior misdemeanor records. 
Profile summary 
The descriptive data from the 1976 and 1977 samples indicated 
overall stable patterns in terms of the nature of offenses, 
offenders and dispositions of felony cases processed through this 
urban court system. In this section, these consistent patterns are 
summarized. 
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Property offenses accounted for about half of both initial and 
settled charges. Drug offenses made up another fifth of the offense 
types. The most serious offenses (Class A felonies) constituted a 
minority of all initial charges and an even smaller minority of all 
settled charges. The great majority of cases began as single count 
cases; very few cases ended up with more than one settled count, and 
the number of cases settled with multiple felony counts was extremely 
small. 
The overwhelming majority of cases were settled by guilty pleas. 
Guilty pleas with reductions and/or dismissals were more common than 
straight guilty pleas as charged. About half of the accused felons 
spent their pre-settlement time in jail custody, and approximately 
half of the convicted offenders were incarcerated at sentencing. 
Compared to the general population, accused felons were under-
educated and underemployed. The great majority were defended by 
public attorneys, and attorneys from the Public Defender's Office 
defended almost half of all accused felons. The offenders were 
predominantly male, tended to be young, and were highly likely to 
have prior criminal records. 
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Offenders accused of Traffic and Theft offenses were the most 
likely of all offenders to privately retain attorneys. Those who 
retained attorneys were more likely than those who had public 
attorneys to be employed and (with the exception of Traffic offenders) 
less likley to have prior felony records. 
Offenses in the Drugs, Crimes Against Person and Traffic 
categories were the most likely to be charged with multiple counts. 
Women were most likely to commit offenses which fall into the petty 
property category. Individuals in the 17 to 20 age group accounted 
for the great majority of Burg I and UUV offenses. Crimes Against 
Person and Traffic offenses were categories with relatively high 
numbers of over age 30 offenders. The data indicated patterns 
suggesting that prior felony records were most common in the Rob, 
Burg and Traffic offender populations. Undereducation and unemploy-
ment were most common for petty property offenders. 
There were also indications of inter-relationships between 
defendant characteristics. The youngest and oldest defendants were 
the most likely to be undereducated. The youngest offenders were 
the most likely to be unemployed and underemployed. From young to 
old, the proportion of offenders with prior felony records increased 
steadily. The women were more likely than the men to be unemployed, 
but the men were more likely than the women to have prior felony 
records. 
What emerges, then, is a profile of felony offenders who bear 
a number of negative labels upon entrance into the court system. 
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Their most common offenses are drugs and property violations. Most 
are convicted through guilty pleas, and very few are acquitted in 
any manner. Only about half, however, go to jailor the penitentiary 
upon conviction. Having presented this population profile, the 
discussion now moves to a description and analysis of relationships 
which are specifically relevant for an assessment of the nature and 
outcome of case disposition through negotiation. The first two of the 
remaining five sections in this chapter attend to relationships which 
showed consistent patterns between 1976. The final three sections 
are concerned with comparisons of the 1976 and 1977 data. 
Offense Type 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TYPE CLOSING Ar~ 
OFFENSE/OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 
The data on type closing and offense type indicated some 
relationships which were consistent in both the 1976 and 1977 
samples. Offenses which were most likely to be closed with charge 
reduction bargains fell into the Drugs, Assaults, Traffic, Other 
Rob and Other Property categories. Straight guilty plea closings 
without reductions or dismissals were most common for the offense 
categories of Rob I, Burg I, other Burg, Theft I and Forg I (all 
of which were included in the non-reducible classification scheme 
of the District Attorney's Office). With the exception of Sex 
Crimes, no Crimes Against Person were closed with a straight plea 
of guilty as charged in either year. There were no consistent patterns 
between 1976 and 1977 in the proportions of offense types closed 
either by PG + Dis or by trial. In 1976, the highest proportion of 
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PG + Dis closings were in the Homicide, Kidnap and Other Property 
categories; in 1977, Theft I and Traffic offenses had the highest 
proportions of PG + Dis closings. The data showed little variation 
in the type offense/closing by trial relationship in 1976 (although 
Forg I and Other Property offenses had a noticeable lack of trial 
closings). In 1977, however, the non-reducible offenses had high 
proportions of trial closings. 
Offender Characteristics 
Cross tabulations were carried out between type closing and 
offender characteristic variables. Ideally, these relationships 
could best be analyzed by controlling for the type offense variable. 
However, when offense types were broken down into as many categories 
as they were, the small number of cases made this type of analysis 
unfeasible. On the other hand, lumping offenses into a few broad 
categories covered up important differences. The decision to retain 
the more precise categories of offenses meant, therefore, that it 
was impossible to make statements about the relative importance of 
other variables on type closing independent of offense type. Despite 
this methodological impediment, the data did indicate the existence 
of patterns which would appear to warrant future, more precise 
testing. 
The findings suggested that sex, age, prior record, employement 
and education were not influential factors in terms of whether or 
not a defendant was offered and accepted a bargain in exchange for a 
guilty plea. 
In 1976, women accounted for 10 percent of PG closings and 
30 percent of PGTL closings. However, women were likely to be 
charged with offenses which were likely to close by PGTL. Of the 
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19 women in the 1977 sample, 8 closed by PG, and 6 closed by PGTL. 
The larger proportion of female PG closings in 1977 was likely due to 
the larger number of Forg I convictions for females in the 1977 
sample. 
Age did not appear to be an important factor regarding 
straight versus bargained guilty pleas. However, age did make a 
difference in the trial closings. The statistics were particularly 
dramatic in 1977. Only 13 percent of 17 to 20 age offenders went 
to trial in 1977. Offenders over the age of 30, on the other 
hand, accounted for 53 percent of the trial closings in the same 
year. These statistics are even more meaningful when one takes into 
account that offenses common to young people had a relatively high 
proportion of trial closings in 1977, and offenses common to older 
people had a relatively low proportion of trial closings in 1977. 
Prior felony record did not appear to be related to type 
closing independent of offense type. In both years, of those 
offenders with prior felony records, the highest proportion of 
bargained closings was PG + Dis, followed in order by PGTL + Dis 
and PGTL. However, offenses which commonly closed by PGTL were also 
those with relatively low numbers of offenders with prior felony 
records. 
No significant relationships or interesting patterns were 
found between education and type closing or between employement and 
-.: 
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type closing with the exception of one interesting piece of information. 
Of all closing types, trials had the lowest percentage of unemployed 
for both years (38 percent in 1976 and 47 percent in 1977). 
Multiple Counts 
Significant relationships were found for both years between 
number of initial counts and type closing. OVer 90 percent of those 
who PG and PGTL in both years were initially charged with only one 
count. In fact, 100 percent of PG in 1977 had only one count. Of 
trials, however, 76 percent in 1976 and 79 percent in 1977 had only 
one initial count. The fact that the offenses that were most 
likely to have multiple initial counts (Drugs, Crimes Against 
Person, Traffic) were ~ offenses with high trial rates suggests 
that multiple counts may be an important variable in terms of the 
defense'S decision as to whether or not to go to trial. Table XIII 
gives the percentages of bargained closings which had multiple 
TABLE XIII 
BARGAINED CASES CLOSED WITH MULTIPLE COUNTS AND NO FELONY COUNTS: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
1976 1977 
Total # % Mult % No Fe1 Total # % Mu1t % No Fe1 
Type Bargain Cases Counts Counts Cases Counts Counts 
PGTL 73 1 70 47 0 62 
PGTL + Dis 28 3 47 12 27 46 
PG + Dis 37 3 0 21 14 a 
settled felony counts and which had no settled felony counts. A 
particularly relevant piece of information was that the majority of 
PGTL bargains ended up with no settled felony (but rather only 
misdemeanor) counts. 
Summary 
The findings from the cross tabulations on type closing and 
offense/offender variables indicated several patterns which were 
consistent in the 1976 and 1977 samples. Charge reduced guilty 
plea closings were most common for Drugs, Assaults, Traffic, Other 
Rob and Other Property offenses and least common for Rob I, Burg I, 
Other Burg, Theft I and Forg I offenses. Being charged with 
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multiple counts, being older and being employed showed a positive 
relationship to disposition by trial. However, none of the defendant 
characteristic variables appeared to be independently 'related to 
whether or not cases were closed by straight as opposed to bargained 
guilty pieas. Finally, the great majority of PGTL closings ended 
up with no settled felony counts. 
THE ISSUE OF PUNISHMENT 
Two areas of punishment were considered in the collection and 
analysis of data from the case files: pre-disposition detention and 
sentencing. The researcher endeavored to uncover relationships 
between punishment and offense/offender characteristics and to 
examine the way in which punishment was related to type closing. 
Again, in this section, the focus is on findings which were con-
sistent in both years. 
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Pre-Trial 'Detention and Offense/Offender Characteristics 
, 
• 
The relationship between pre-trial custody status and type 
offense was significant at the .001 level in 1976 but not significant 
in 1977. However, the patterns were similar for both years. The 
most serious property offenses--Burg I, Rob I--along with Escape 
and ECPFA had the highest proportions of jail custodies in both 
years (70 percent and over). Over half of those convicted of 
Crimes Against Person had also been in jail custody in both years. 
Offenders who were least likely to be placed in jail custody 
were Drug and Traffic offenders; over half of defendants in these 
two categories were released on their own recogniznace. While the 
total number of bail releases was small in both years, Forg I and 
Other Property offenders had higher proportions of bail releases 
than any other offenses. 
The only statistically significant relationship between 
custody status and the defendant characteristic variables was 
between custody status and prior record. The findings (significant 
at the .001 level in both years) were that of those placed in jail 
custody, 84 percent in 1976 and 85 percent in 1977 had prior felony 
records. In contrast, of those released on recognizance, 53 
percent in 1976 and 59 percent in 1977 had prior felony records. Of 
bail releases, 65 percent had prior felony records in 1976 as did 
50 percent in 1977. 
Males were more likely than females to be placed in jail 
custody in both years (56 percent in 1976 and 53 percent in 1977 
as opposed to 38 percent in 1976 and 37 percent in 1977). However, 
because females were commonly charged with crimes which were less 
likely than others to be accompanied by pre-disposition custody, 
it appears that sex may indeed be an influential variable in pre-
disposition custody. Similarly, although no differences were 
found in the relationship between age and pre-disposition custody, 
in view of the finding that youthful offenders commonly committed 
offenses ''''ith a high likelihood of jail custody, the no-differences 
relationship becomes meaningfuL If age were not an influential 
factor in pre-disposition custody, one would expect to find an 
inverse relationship between age of offenders and jail custody. 
No patterns were indicated in the relationships between custody 
status and education or employment. 
The relationship between attorney type and pre-disposition 
custody status was significant at the .01 level in both years. 
As shown in Table XIV, those who retained attorneys were much less 
TABLE XIV 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ATTORNEYS' CLIENTS HELD IN PRE-TRIAL 
CUSTODY: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEt1BER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
1976 1977 
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Total It % Pre-Trial Total It % Pre-Trial 
Type Attorney 
Court-appointedj 
private bar 
Public defender 
Privately retained 
Clients 
99 
144 
36 
Custody Clients Custody 
61 58 67 
47 65 55 
22 30 23 
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likely to receive jail custody. This finding may be accounted for 
in great part by the category of Traffic offenders, who were highly 
likely to retain their own attorneys but not ·likely to receive jail 
custody. In both years, a larger percentage of defendants with 
court-appointed attorneys from the private bar than those with 
public defenders were placed in pre-trial jail custody. This 
relationship appeared to be independent of offense type. 
Sentencing and Offense/Offender Characteristics 
As would be expected, the most serious crimes of violence 
(Homicide, Kidnap) as well as Rob I, Escape and ECPFA had the 
highest proportions of incarceration sentences in both years. 
Incarceration was highly unlikely for those convicted of Other 
Property and Other Drug offenses in both years. Sentencing on 
Burg I, Theft I and Forg I convictions showed considerable variations 
in 1976 and 1977. These variations are discussed in the section on 
1976/1977 comparisons. 
Since the relationships between sentencing and defendant 
characteristics were not examined controlling for offense type, their 
interpretations are only suggestive. However, the consistent 
findings strongly indicated that sex, age, prior record, employment 
and education were influential variables in terms of sentencing. 
Seventy-one percent of females were not incarcerated in 1976, 
and 62 percent were not incarcerated in 1977. In comparison, 51 
percent of males were not incarcerated in 1976, and 45 percent were 
I I; 
" 
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incarcerated in 1977. However, the fact that females were over-
whelrningly convicted of petty property offenses (which had relatively 
low incarceration rates) suggests that sex may have been influential 
in terms of sentence severity. 
No significant differences were found in the relationship 
between age and sentence. However, this does not mean that age 
was an unimportant variable in sentence severity, for young people 
were most likely to be convicted of crimes for which incarceration 
sentences were common. Thus, if age were not an influential 
variable, one would expect to find a high proportion of young 
people receiving incarceration sentences. The findings do suggest, 
then, that being young may work in favor of sentencing leniency. 
The relationship between sentence and prior record was 
significant for both years, and in both years the patterns were 
consistent. Table XV depicts this relationship. Those defendants 
TABLE XV 
DEFENDANT PRIOR RECORD BY SENTENCE: 1976 AND JULY 
THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT 
1976 1977 
Fel No Fel No Fel No Fel 
Sentence Record Record Record Record Record 
Pen 29% 6% 9% 26% 0 
Jail 28% 13% 14% 35% 30% 
No Incarc 43% 81% 77% 39% 70% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(163) (47) (22) (81) (20) 
No 
Record 
0 
27% 
73% 
100% 
(15 ) 
., 
", ~. 
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with prior felony records were much more likely than those with no 
prior felony records to receive incarceration sentences. 
Table XVI presents the distributions of persons in the various 
education categories along with incarceration sentences. As can be 
seen, those offenders with less than four years of high school had the 
TABLE XVI 
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS BY INCARCERATION SENTENCES: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
1976 1977 
Total # % Incarceration Total # % 
Educational Level Defendants '.Sentence Defendants 
Less four years 
high school 78 55 43 
Four years 
high school 90 36 40 
College 36 35 19 
Incarceration 
Sentence 
53 
49 
31 
highest proportions of incarceration sentences for both years. Yet, 
offenders with less than four years of high school were most likely 
to be convicted of petty property crimes--offenses which overall had 
a relatively low proportion of incarceration sentences. Thus, the 
findings do suggest that the education variable may be influential 
in terms of sentence severity. 
The data on employment and sentence suggested the same 
possibility as did those on education and sentence. Of unemployed 
defendants, 46 percent were incarcerated in 1976 and 44 percent were 
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incarcerated in 1977, even though unemployed defendants had high 
proportions of convictions for petty property crimes. 
The data were also examined regarding the relationship 
between offense type and sentencing conditions other than in-
carceration. Of those offenses in which fines were ordered as a 
sentencing condition, in both years almost half were Drug offenses. 
Traffic offenses accounted for the second highest proportion of 
fines in both years (13 percent in 1976 and 16 percent in 1977). 
Restitution was most commonly ordered for Assault in both years 
(over half of Assault convictions received restitution orders). 
Taken as a single category, the less serious property offenses 
(Theft I, Other Property, Forg I) received restitution order in 
about one third of the cases. Participation in drug or alcohol 
programs was most commonly ordered for Traffic Homicides and Traffic 
offenses in general. Only a small minority of Drug offenders (13 
percent in 1976 and 14 percent in 1977) were ordered at sentencing 
to participate in a drug or alcohol program. The number of offenders 
ordered to participate in a mental health program was extremely 
small in both years. However, in both years, sex offenders were 
more likely than any other offender types to receive an order to 
participate in a mental health program as a condition of their 
sentence. The number of community service orders was also extremely 
small but did not appear to be related to offense type. 
Variations in Sentencing 
In this county a rotation system was used in which one judge 
sat on the bench of Chief Criminal Court for several months hearing 
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all guilty pleas and sentencing the overwhelming majority of 
defendants who had plead guilty. The result of this system was that 
a small number of Circuit Court judges closed the great majority of 
felony cases in any given year. Data were collected on the four 
judges in each year who settled the largest number of cases. No 
noticeable differences appeared between judges by offense type or 
between judges by closing type. Some differences did appear between 
judges and sentence which could not, thus, be accounted for by 
type offense or type closing. 
Tables XVII and XVIII show the percentages of various 
sentences ordered by respective judges. Judges have been labeled 
anonymously as A, B, C and D (these are different individuals 
in each year). In 1976, Judge C gave a much higher proportion of 
incarceration sentences than any other judge. He also ordered a 
relatively high proportion of fines. Judge A, who handed out the 
lowest proportion of incarceration sentences, gave the highest 
proportion of drug/alcohol, mental health, and community service 
orders. 
In 1977, Judges A and C gave higher numbers of incarceration 
sentences than did the other two judges. Here, the judge who gave 
the highest proportion of incarceration sentences also ordered 
the highest percenuage of drug/alcohol, mental health, and 
community service participations. Judge C, who also gave a 
larger number of incarceration sentences, gave no drug/alcohol, 
mental health or community service orders; yet he ordered the 
highest percentage of restitution of all four judges. 
i,' 
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TABLE XVII 
SELECTED SENTENCING ORDERS GIVEN BY SELECTED JUDGES: 
1976, BY PERCENT* 
Selected Sentencing Orders 
% 
Total % Incar- % % Resti- % Drug/ % Mental Community 
Judge # Cases ceration Fine tution Alcohol Health Service 
A 42 33 14 25 27 15 10 
B 79 39 5 17 16 3 3 
C 35 63 25 14 9 6 6 
D 49 39 10 22 14 4 4 
*The selected sentencing orders are not mutually exclusive categories; 
multiple orders could be given for one case, e.g., incarceration, 
fine and participation in drug program. Thus, the percentages of 
total cases resulting in selected sentencing orders (computed across 
rows) total to OVe~ 100 percent. 
TABLE XVIII 
SELECTED SENTENCING ORDERS GIVEN BY SELECTED JUDGES: 
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT* 
Selected Sentencing Orders 
% 
Total % Incar- % % Resti- % Drug/ % Mental Community 
Judge # Cases ceration Fine tution Alcohol Health Service 
A 28 68 19 26 23 16 10 
B 25 32 21 21 18 5 21 
C 18 61 6 35 0 0 a 
D 19 42 6 9 6 6 6 
*The selected sentencing orders are not mutually exclusive categories; 
multiple orders could be given for one case, e.g., incarceration, 
fine and participation in drug program. Thus, the percentages of 
total cases resulting in selected sentencing orders (computed across 
rows) total to over 100 percent. 
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The patterns between judge and sentencing lead to no clear 
interpretations. What the statistics did show was that there were 
clearly variations in sentencing patterns of different judges which 
were not related to variations in type offense or type closing. 
Bargains and Punishment 
Pre-Disposition Punishment. The relationship between pre-trial 
custody status and type closing was significant at the .01 level in 
1976 and at the .05 level in 1977. Table XIX presents the percentages 
of type closings with jail custody. Noticeable were the high 
percentages of PG + Dis closings with jail custody, again suggesting 
that the multiple count variable (regardless of whether or not 
multiple counts were dismissed) may be accompanied by harsh punishment. 
In contrast, PGTL had a low percentage of jail custodies in both 
years. Although the offenses which were likely to be closed by 
PGTL were the same offenses which were likely to be granted pre-
trial release, the PGTL percentages of pre-trial release were higher 
than the Drug and Traffic percentages of pre-trial release. Again 
while inconclusive, the findings do suggest a possible positive 
relationship between pre-trial release and PGTL independent of 
offense type. 
Sentence Punishment. The relationship between sentence and 
type closing is depicted in Table xx. As indicated, those who were 
convicted at trial had by far the greatest proportion of penitentiary 
sentences for both years. Those who PGTL were almost never sent to 
the penitentiary and were highly unlikely to be incarcerated at all. 
I',', 'j-
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The findings suggest that PG + Dis was not an advantageous bargain. 
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TABLE XIX 
TYPE CLOSING BY PRE-TRIAL CUSTODY STATUS: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
Type Closing 
PGTL PG + CBC/ ABC/ 
PG PGTL + Dis Dis CBJ ABJ Dis 
1976 
Custod:l Status 
Recognizance 28% 54% 38% 18% 19% 0 24% 
Bail 15% 13% 10% 12% 25% 38% 17% 
Jail 57% 33% 52% 71% 56% 63% 59% 
I TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% ~ (75 ) (67) (29 ) (34) (32 ) (8) (41) 
~ 
I 1977 Custod:l Status 
~ 
~ Recognizance 28% 50% 50% 24% 17% 33% 37% 
Bail 14% 22% 0 10% 4% 0 11% 
l' Jail 58% 28% 50% 67% 78% 67% 53% i I 
l-
TOrrAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(36 ) (46) (10) (21) (23) (3) (19) 
~~"'~".~"!F'-""-~ ,-,,<""---'~---~-'--~-
TABLE XX 
TYPE CLOSING BY SENTENCE: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT 
1976 
TYEe Closing 
PG + PGTL + CBC/ PG + 
Sentence PG Dis Dis PGTL CBJ PG Dis 
Penitentiary 28% 33% 20% 0 53% 28% 29% 
Jail 25% 28% 23% 21% 18% 34% 29% 
No Incarceration 48% 39% 57% 79% 29% 38% 41% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(80 ) (36 ) (30 ) (73) (34) (29 ) (17) 
1977 
TYEe Closing 
PGTL + 
Dis PGTL 
9% 2% 
36% 32% 
55% 66% 
100% 100% 
(11 ) (44 ) 
CBC/ 
CBJ 
48% 
33% 
19% 
100% 
(21 ) 
1.0 
OJ 
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Similarly, PGTL + Dis was more disadvantageous than PGTL in terms of 
sentencing. It appears that those charged with multiple counts do 
not gain much in terms of sentence leniency by having counts dis-
missed. 
In order to get a better idea of the importance of type 
closing regarding sentence, this relationship was analyzed con-
trolling for four offense types. Again, the small number of cases 
in several categories made it unwise to form any unequivocal 
conclusions, but the data did indicate patterns. Table XXI gives 
the frequency distributions of type closing by sentence for initial 
charges of Burg I, Theft I, Forg I and CAID. 
Although the proportion of PG to the initial charge of Burg I 
was about the same in 1976 as in 1977, those who did PG to Burg I 
in 1977 were more likely not to be incarcerated than those in 1976. 
In both years, all defendants initially charged with Burg I who 
either were convicted by PG + Dis or by trial received penitentiary 
sentences. Of those who were initially charged with Burg I but 
closed with PGTL or PGTL + Dis, the tendency was toward non-
incarceration. Thus, for initial charges of Burg I, pleading guilty 
to a lesser offense did appear to be an advantageous bargain in terms 
of sentencing. On the other hand, PG was more advantageous than PG 
+ Dis (again indicating the negative influence of multiple count 
charges). Of all four offenses discussed here, only Burg I had trials 
in which defendants were convicted of lesser offenses. Actually, 
those initially charged with Burg I who were convicted at trial 
appeared to have a good chance of being found guilty of a lesser 
offense and a non-incarceration sentence. 
~'-:"I,.........".~ . 
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TABLE XXI 
TYPE CLOSING BY SENTENCE ON SELECTED OFFENSES: 
r 1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977 
t 
t 1976 1977 j' 
I Sentence Sentence 
Pen Jail No Jail Pen Jail No Jail 
~. BURG I 
k r Txpe Closing 
t 
~ 1 0 4 1 
t PGTL 
0 0 
~ PG + Dis 2 0 G 
2 0 0 
• PG 5 4 2 1 1 3 f 
" 
Trial/reduced 
1 offense 0 0 2 0 1 1 !: Trial/same 
offense 1 0 0 3 0 0 
THEFT I 
Type Closing 
PGTL 0 0 8 0 0 0 
PG + Dis 1 2 1 2 2 0 
PG 2 4 10 2 3 1 
Trial/same 
offense 0 1 1 0 0 1 
CAID 
Type Closing 
PGTL 0 4 15 0 1 9 
PGTL + Dis 0 3 8 0 3 5 
PG + Dis 3 0 3 1 1 2 
PG 1 3 0 0 1 2 
Trial/same 
offense 1 1 2 0 0 1 
FORG I 
Type Closing 
I PGTL 0 1 3 0 0 2 i 
I 
PG + Dis 1 1 0 0 0 2 
PG 0 0 6 2 2 2 
I Trial/same , 
! offense 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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The decrease in the number of initial Theft I charges which 
resulted in non-incarceration was due in part to the absence of 
PGTL in 1977. However, of those who PG to an initial charge of 
Theft I in 1976, 63 percent were not incarcerated in 1976, as 
compared to only 17 percent in 1977. Similarly, harsher sentences 
were received by those who PG + Dis in 1977 than in 1976. 
In 1976, regardless of whether an initial charge of Forg I was 
closed by PG or PGTL, defendants were not likely to be incarcerated. 
Harsher sentencing was indicated for those who PG to an initial 
charge of Forg I in 1977. Although the number of Forg I PGTLs was 
small in 1977, PGTL did appear to be a good bargain in this year in 
terms of sentencing. 
In both years, the overwhelming majority of those initially 
charged with CAID who PGTL were not incarcerated. PGTL + Dis was 
a slightly less advantageous bargain, and PG + Dis even less 
advantageous. Those who PG to an initial charge of CAID were 
sentenced less harshly in 1977 than in 1976. 
S~ary 
The findings on relationships between closing types and 
punishment indicated some patterns relevant to the study which were 
consistent in 1976 and 1977. Overall, pleading guilty to a lesser 
. 
charge appeared to be related to leniency regarding both pre- and 
post-disposition incarceration. The great majority of offenders who 
PGTL were not incarcerated upon conviction. Pleading guilty to a 
reduced charge with counts and/or charges dismissed was the next most 
advantageous closing in terms of sentencing. A straight guilty 
, 
, 
i 
r 
I 
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plea as charged was slightly more advantageous than a guilty plea 
as charged with dismissal of counts and/or charges in 1976, but 
the former was slightly less advantageous than the latter in 1977~ 
Conviction by trial resulted in the harshest sentencing of all 
closing types. Approximately half of offenders convicted by trial 
were sentenced to the penitentiary, and only about a quarter of 
these offenders were not incarcerated at sentencing. 
PLEADING TO A LESSER OFFENSE 
Contrary to other studies in which it has been suggested 
that bargains often result in pleas to charges which are not 
necessarily or situationally included in the original charge 
(Sudnow, 1965), the data from this study indicated that 69 percent 
of the 1976 cases and 74 percent of the 1977 cases involving 
reduced charges were to the initial offense at a lower level. 
Table XXII gives the distributions of different types of plea 
reductions. Although the overall percentages of those who plead 
guilty to a lesser charge were almost the same for both years, the. 
nature of reductions underwent certain changes between 1976 and 
1977. The most noticeable change was in the increased percentage 
of offenses in which a guilty plea was entered to the same charge, 
but at a misdemeanor rather than a felony status. Even omitting 
Traffic offenses from these statistics, the increase of bargains to 
a misdemeanor of the same charge went from 7 percent to 27 percent. 
These statistics did not take into account those cases in which 
either immediate or deferred felony status was granted by the judge 
, 
~ . 
TABLE XXII 
TYPES OF PLEA REDUCTIONS: 1976 AND JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT 
Type Reduction 1976 
Different offense 31% 
Attempted (same offense) 39% 
Reduced level (same offense) 21% 
Misdemeanor status (same offense) 9% 
TOTAL 100% (103) 
103 
1977 
26% 
26% 
10% 
38% 
100% (58) 
at the time of sentencing (rather than at the time of entering a plea). 
If these cases were counted, the number of same-charge felony to mis-
demeanor reductions would be even higher. 
Tables XXIII and XXIV show the exact nature of the reduction 
of all reduced caseS in both years. In 1976, Drug offenses and 
Crimes Against Person accounted for 69 percent of the total offenses 
resulting in a lesser plea to a different offense. In 1977, these 
same two categories of offenses accounted for 80 percent of the 
different-offense reduced pleas. 
In the above discussion, reduction to misdemeanor status 
referred to those cases in which the charge and level were the same, 
but only the felony status was dropped, e.g., from CAID as a felony 
to CAID as a misdemeanor. In this paragraph, statistics refer to any 
reduction to a misdemeanor (whether it be to a different offense, 
reduced level, etc.). Of all reduced guilty pleas, 58 percent in 
1976 and 69 percent in 1977 resulted in a settled misdemeanor charge. 
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TABLE XXIII 
INITIAL CHARGE/SETTLED CHARGE REDUCED PLEAS: 
1976 
Initial Charge/Settled Charge 
CAID/Att CAID 16 
CAID/CDP 9 
Att CAID/Other Drugs 1 
CAID/Other Drugs 1 
CAID/Mis1emeanor 4 
Att Murder/Assault II 1 
Mansltr I/Mansltr II 1 
Mansltr I/Crim Neg Homicide 1 
Att Assault I/Menacing 1 
Asslt II/Att Asslt' II 6 
Asslt II/Asslt III 6 
Asslt II/Menacing 
Asslt II/Resist Arrest 
Att Asslt II/Harrassment 
Kidnap I/Rob II 
Kidnap II/Att UUV 
Rape I/Sex Abuse I 
Att Rape I/Sex Abuse I 
Sod I/Sex Abuse I 
Sex Abuse I/Sex Abuse II 
Rob I/Rob II 
Rob II/Rob III 
Rob II/Theft I 
Rob III/Att Rob III 
Rob III/Misdemeanor 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
DWS/Other Traffic 1 
Other Traffic/Misdemeanor 2 
Initial Charge/Settled Charge 
Burg I/Burg II 
Burg I/Att Burg I 
Burg I/Crim Trespass I 
Burg I/Theft I 
Att Burg I/Crim Trespass I 
Att Burg I/Burg II 
Burg II/Att Burg II 
Burg II/Theft II 
Theft I/Theft II 
Theft I/Att Theft I 
Theft I/Misdemeanor 
UUV/Att uuv 
Other Prop/Att Other Prop 
Arson I/Arson II 
Arson I/Reckless Burning 
Forg I/Att Forg I 
Forg I/Att UOPA 
Forg I/Misdemeanor 
Escape I/Escape II 
Escape II/Att Escape II 
ECPFA/Weapons 
Prostitution/Att 
Prostitution 
104 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
5 
2 
1 
5 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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TABLE XXIV 
INITIAL CHARGE/SETTLED CHARGE REDUCED PLEAS: 
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977 
r 
I" 
L Initial Charge/Settled Charge Initial Charge/Settled Charge ; 
t 
CAID/Att CAID 5 Rob II/Theft II 1 
CAID/CDP 5 Rob III/Theft II 2 
" 
CAID/Other Drugs 1 Rob III/Misdemeanor 1 
~. Other Drugs/Att Other Drugs 1 il 
I 
Other Drugs/Misdemeanor 7 Burg I/Burg II 2 
Att Murder/Assault II 1 Forg I/Misdemeanor 2 
Mansltr/Crim Neg Homicide 1 
I Crim Neg Homicide/Misdemnr 1 UUV/Att UUV 4 Arson I/Arson II 1 Assault II/Assault III 1 Other Prop/Att Other Prop 2 
1) Assault II/Att Assault II 1 Other Prop/Misdemeanor 3 
Kidnap II/Att Coercion 2 Traffic/Misdemeanor 9 
Sod I/Sod III 1 Escape II/Misdemeanor 1 
Sod I/Sex Abuse II 2 
Sex Abuse I/Sex Abuse II 1 
At first glance, this may seem as though defendants were getting better 
bargains in 1977 than in 1976. However, this was actually not the 
situation, since more of the bargained cases were on original 
charges of Class C as opposed to Class A or B felonies in 1977 than 
in 1976 (43 percent compared to 32 percent). Additionally, the 
data indicated that in terms of sentencing, guilty pleas to lesser 
charges resulted in a higher proportion of incarceration sentences 
in 1977 than in 1976. 
In both years, then, the overwhelming majority of charge 
reduction please were to lesser offenses which were necessarily 
included in the initial charge. In fact, the great majority were to 
the initial offense at a less serious level. Almost all the 
reductions to different offenses were to crimes which were 
reasonably related (or situationally included, to use Sudnow's 
term) to the initial charge. 
CASE DISPOSITION WITHOUT TRIAL 
AND EFFICIENT PRODUCTION 
The case disposition process in the county under study was 
extremely efficient in terms of time elapsed from initial charge 
to final settlement of cases. In 1976, 62 percent of cases were 
settled within 60 days, and only a very few took over 90 days to 
settle. Of particular interest, however, was the fact that in the 
latter half of 1977, 81 percent of cases were settled within 60 
days. A new state law called the Speedy Trial Act, which states 
that barring unusual circumstances, cases must be settled within 
GO days from time of arrest or else dismissed, went into effect 
in 1977, and it appears that this Act has been effective. Con-
comitant1y, there was a decrease in the percentage of cases with 
setovers or continuances during the settlement process. In 1976, 
35 percent of the cases had one or more setovers, compared to 
26 percent in 1977. There was also a decrease in the percentage 
of cases which had more than one setover. Of those cases which 
had setovers, 45 percent had more than one in 1976, but only 30 
percent had more than one in 1977. 
Total disposition time was not significantly related to type 
106 
closing in 1976, but a significant relationship (at the .001 level) 
between these two variables was found in 1977. One finding was 
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clear from the data for both years: trials were the least efficient 
of all closing types in terms of total disposition time. As 
indicated in Table xxv, no trials were completed within 30 days·, 
and 39 percent of the trials took over 60 days to complete (in 
1976, 55 percent of trials took more than 60 days to settle). The 
Total Time 
1 - 30 days 
31 - 60 days 
Over 60 days 
TOTAL 
TABLE XXV 
TYPE CLOSING BY TOTAL DISPOSITION TIME: 
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
PG 
35% 
49% 
26% 
100% 
(37) 
PG + 
Dis 
14% 
81% 
5% 
100% 
(21) 
TyEe Closing 
PGTL 
Dis 
18% 
64% 
18% 
100% 
(11) 
+ 
PGTL 
9% 
76% 
15% 
100% 
(46) 
Trials 
0 
61% 
39% 
100% 
(28) 
Dis 
28% 
50% 
22% 
100% 
(18) 
only clear finding from the 1977 data on time differences between 
straight guilty plea and bargained guilty plea closing was that the 
former had a much higher percentage than the latter of cases closed 
within 30 days. However, straight guilty pleas had a higher pro-
portion of over-60-day closings than did the bargained pleas. Thus, 
an assessment of the relationship of bargained vs. non-bargained 
guilty pleas to efficient production is problematic. The absence 
of any patterns in this relationship in the 1976 sample further 
clouded this issue. However, the findings were conclusive that any 
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kind of disposition without trial was more efficient than disposition 
by trial. Finally, it is of interest that even those defendants 
whose cases were ultimately dismissed had a high likelihood of 
spending over 30 days in the court system. 
The findings on the relationship between total disposition 
time and the D.A. unit which handled the case were in line with 
other data. Unit C, which handled serious felonies (Burg, Rob, 
Weapons and Negligent Homicide cases) and settled 62 percent of 
their cases with straight guilty pleas, had a relatively high 
proportion (39 percent) of cases settled within 30 days. Unit D, 
which handled primarily Crimes Against Person cases and had a high 
proportion of bargained closings, settled only 6 percent of their 
cases within 30 days. The Career Criminal Unit, which settled 60 
percent of its cases by trial, had the highest proportion of over-
60-day trials (30 percent) of any of the D.A. units. 
In summary, then, case disposition in this county, in 
comparison with national trends, was time-efficient. An efficiency 
component had been built into the structure by administrative and 
legislative mandate. However, there were variations in efficiency 
which were related to the way in which cases were closed. Guilty 
plea dispositions were more efficient than trial dispositions. 
Finally, there was no clear evidence that bargaining for a guilty 
plea was less time-efficient than getting a straight guilty plea. 
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CHANGES IN DISPOSITION PATTERNS: 
1976 AND 1977 COMPARISONS 
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A noticeably stable picture of offenses and offender popu-
lations processed through the felony court system was indicated by 
the data from the 1976 and 1977 samples. Additionally, there was 
very little variation in the overall closing type proportions 
between the two years. However, differences did appear between the 
two years in certain relationships regarding offense types, closing 
types and punishments. These differences are particularly relevant 
in view of the fact that plea bargaining policies of the District 
Attorney's Office underwent certain changes between 1976 and the 
last half of 1977. The list of non-reducible offenses was expanded, 
and the curb-p1ea-bargaining position was generally solidified. 
A hard-line approach was taken toward the treatment of the guilty 
offender. 
Shifts in the Relationships Between Offense and Closing Types: 
Stability in the Overall Picture 
Although the data indicated only slight variations in the 
overall proportions of type closings between 1976 and 1977, when 
type closings were examined within offense categories, noticeable 
differences did appear between the two years. Tables XXVI and 
XXVII present the statistical breakdowns of closing types for 
different initial charges for both years, and Tables XXVIII and 
XXVIX shows the breakdowns of closing types for different settled 
charges for both years. 
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TABLE XXVI 
INITIAL CHARGE BY TYPE CLOSING: 
1976, BY PERCENT 
Type Closing 
PGTL/ 
PGTL PG + 
Initial Charge PG + Dis Dis Trials Dis Total 
Homicides 0 38% 25% 13% 25% 100% ( 8) 
Assaults 0 80% 0 20% 0 100% (20 ) 
Kidnaps 0 40% 20% 40% 0 100% ( 5) 
Rob I 48% 5% 10% 29% 10% 100% (21 ) 
I.: 
:! 
" Other Rob 14% 50% 14% 2196 0 100% (14) 
Sex Crimes 17% 33% 8% 17% 25% 100% (12) 
Burg I 46% 21% 8% 17% 8% 100% (24) 
Other Burg 35% 26% 13% 17% 9% 100% (23) 
Theft I 42% 21% 11% 13~6 13% 100% (38) 
UUV 32% 23% 23% 0 23% 100% (22 ) 
Forg I 40% 27% 13% 0 20 96 100% (15) 
Other Property 40% 40% 20% 0 0 100% ( 5) 
CAID 7% 51% 10% 7% 25% 100% (59) 
Other Drug 0 33% 0 33% 33% 100% 3) 
, 
" i Traffic 44% 33% 0 22% 0 100% 9) 
i 
i' 
Escape/ECPFA 46% 23% 8% 15% 8% 100% (13) 
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TABLE XXVII 
INITIAL CHARGE BY TYPE CLOSING: 
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
Type Closing 
PGTL/ 
PGTL PG + 
Initial Charge PG + Dis Dis Trials Dis Total 
Homicides/ 
Assaults/ 
Kidnap 0 64% 0 36% 0 100% (11) 
Rob I 25% 0 0 50% 25% 100% ( 4) 
Other Rob 0 50% 13% 13% 25% 100% ( 8) 
Sex Crimes 0 80% 0 20% 0 100% ( 5) 
Burg I 47% 11% 11% 32% 0 100% (19) 
Other Burg 43% 0 14% 29% 14% 100% ( 7) 
Theft I 58% 0 33% 29% 0 100% (12 ) 
Forg I 53% 12% 18% 6% 12% 100% (17) 
Other Property 7% 64% 0 14% 14% 100% (14) 
CAID/Other Drug 9% 58% 15% 3% 15% 100% (33) 
Traffic 6% 53% 24% 6% 12% 100% (17) 
Escape/ECPFA 14% 14% 14% 29% 29% 100% ( 7) 
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TABLE XXVIII 
SETTLED CHARGE BY TYPE CLOSING: 
1976, BY PERCENT 
r 
t'. 
~ 
Tl12e Closin~ 
PGTL/ 
i PGTL PG + 
~ ~ Settled Charge PG + Dis Dis CBC/CBJ Total 
~ 
Homicides/ 
Kidnaps 0 40% 40% 20% 100% ( 5) 
Assaults 0 76% 6% 18% 100% (17 ) 
Rob I 59% 0 12% 29% 100% (17) 
Other Rob 14% 50% 14% 21% 100% (14) 
Sex Crimes 20% 40% 20% 20% 100% (10) 
I Burg I 29% 0 14%: 7% 100% (14) 
I 
Other Burg 36% 32% 9% 23% 100% (22 ) 
Theft I 70% 9% 13% 9% 100% (23) 
I 
I 
I UUV 35% 30% 35% 0 100% (20) 
I Forg 55% 27% 18% 0 100% (11) 
l Other Property 13% 81% 6% 0 100% (16) I 
E 
i 
I 
i CAID 24% 18% 35% 24% 100% (17) 
i , 
Att CAID 0 . 100% 0 0 100% (16) 
Other Drug 0 92% 0 8% 100% (13) 
Traffic 44% 33% 0 22% 100% ( 9) 
Escape/ECPFA 55% 18% 9% 18% 100% (11) 
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Settled Charge 
Homicides/ 
Kidnaps/ 
Assaults 
All Rob 
Sex Crimes 
Burg I 
Other Burg 
Theft I 
Forg 
Other Property 
CAID 
Other Drug 
Traffic 
Escape/ECPFA 
TABLE XXVIX 
SETTLED CHARGE BY TYPE CLOSING: 
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
PGTL/ 
PGTL 
PG + Dis 
o 70% 
20% 20% 
o 67% 
73% 0 
30% 20% 
50% 0 
60% 13% 
7% 80% 
20% 47% 
o 92% 
60% 
33% o 
Type Closing 
PG + 
Dis 
o 
20% 
17% 
9% 
10% 
29% 
20% 
o 
27% 
B% 
27% 
33% 
CBC/CBJ 
30% 
40% 
17% 
18% 
40% 
21% 
7% 
13% 
o 
33% 
113 
Total 
100% (l0) 
100% ( 5) 
100% ( 6) 
100% (11) 
100% (10) 
100% (14) 
100% (15) 
100% (l5) 
100% (l5) 
100% (l3) 
100% (l5) 
100% ( 3) 
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There was a slight increase in the proportions of PG closings 
for initial charges of Rob I, Burg I, Other Burg, Theft I and 
Forg I. The proportions of these same initial-charge offenses which 
went to trial showed substantial increases between 1976 and the 
latter half of 1977. For bargained closings, these offenses showed 
decreases in PGTL but increases in PG + Dis. All of the above 
offenses are (or in the case of Other Burg include) crimes on which 
the non-reducible policy was strengthened as of June, 1977. It is 
clear that these policies have been accompanied by an increase in 
trials for non-reducible crimes. However, as if in compensation for 
this increase, the proportions of trials decreased for initial 
charges of Other Rob, Other Property, Drug and Traffic offenses. 
The number of PGTLs for these latter offenses, while relatively 
high for both years, showed increases in 1977. 
The findings, then, supported theoretically-based arguments 
set forth in this study and in previous research. First, it 
appears that restricting one kind of bargain leads to an increase 
in other kinds of bargains. Similarly, restricting bargains for 
certain offenses leads to an increase in bargains for other offenses. 
Finally, restricting bargaining on certain offenses leads to an 
increase in trials for these offenses (not only was there an 
increase in trials for the non-reducible offenses, but also 60 
percent of the non-negotiable Career Criminal cases were closed by 
trial in 1977). The result is that smooth movement of cases 
through the criminal justice system is insured, thus fulfilling 
the court's need for efficient production. 
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Shifts in Relationships Between Offenses, Closings and Punishment: 
Overall Increases in the Likelihood of Incarceration 
Proportionately more convicted offenders were incarcerated in 
1977 than in 1976. Overall, 54 percent of offenders were not in-
carcerated in 1976; this percentage dropped to 47 percent in 1977. 
This drop was accompanied by a parallel increase in the proportion 
of offenders sentenced to jail; penitentiary sentences remained 
stable over the two years. 
Approximately the same proportions of PG + Dis and PGTL + Dis 
closings resulted in sentences of incarceration in both years. 
However, there were increases in the proportions of PG and trial 
convictions (10 percent in both categories) incarcerated in 1977. 
The most dramatic shift was in the PGTL category; 21 percent 
resulted in incarceration in 1976, but 34 percent resulted in 
incarceration in 1977. 
As depicted in Tables XXX and XXXI, there were shifts in 
punishment severity for different offense types. The most dramatic 
drop in incarceration sentences was for those convicted of CAID; 53 
percent were incarcerated in 1976 while only 20 percent were 
incarcerated in 1977. There also appeared to be a decrease in 
punishment severity for convicted burglars. While a relatively high 
proportion of those convicted of Burg I in both years received 
penitentiary sentences, there was an increase in the proportion of 
those convicted of Burg I not receiving incarceration sentences. 
A considerable increase in the proportion of Other Burg convictions 
which resulted in non-incarceration was indicated by the data. 
These findings could be due in part to the fact that Burg trials 
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set tIed Charge 
Homicide/ 
Kidnaps 
Assaults 
Rob I 
Other Rob 
Sex Crimes 
Burg I 
Other Burg 
Theft I 
UUV 
Forg 
Other Property 
CAID 
Other Drug 
Traffic 
Escape/ECPFA 
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TABLE XXX 
SETTLED CHARGE BY SENTENCE: 
1976, BY PERCENT 
Sentence 
Penitentiary Jail No Incarceration Total 
40% 40% 20% 100% ( 5) 
12% 29% 59% 100% (17) 
71% 0 29% 100% (17) 
36% 7% 57% 100% (14) 
30% 30% 40% 100% (10) 
57% 29% 14% 100% (14) 
45% 16% 36% 100% (22 ) 
17% 22% 61% 100% (23) 
5% 25% 70% 100% (20 ) 
9% 18% 73% 100% (11) 
0 19% 81% 100% (16) 
29% 24% 47% 100% (17) 
0 28% 72% 100% (29 ) 
0 11% 89% 100% ( 9) 
36% 45% 18% 100% (ll) 
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TABLE XXXI 
SETTLED CHARGE BY SENTENCE: 
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER 
OF 1977, BY PERCENT 
)', 
i 
',I 
~ i 
Sentence 
,. 
i Settled Charge Penitentiary Jail No Incarceration Total 
l 
~ Homicide/ 1 
Kidnap/ 
Assault 25% 63% 13% 100% 8) 
All Rob 40% 20% 40% 100% 5) 
Sex Crimes 50% 17% 33% 100% ( 6) 
Burg I 43% 14% 43% 100% ( 7) 
! 100% ( 6) g Other Burg 17% 17% 67% 
f Theft I 31% 54% 15% 100% (13) 
I 
t 
I 
Forg 18% 27% 55% 100% (11) 
Other Property 15% 15% 70% 100% (13) I, 
CAID 7% 13% 80% 100% (15) 
Other Drug 0 33% 67% 100% (12 ) 
Traffic 0 57% 43% 100% (14) 
Escape/ECPFA 33% 67% a 100% ( 3) 
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(which increased in 1977) appeared to have a relatively good 
chance of resulting in non-incarceration sentences. 
On the other hand, incarceration sentences for those convicted 
of Theft I increased substantially in 1977. Although not as 
dramatically as for Theft I, incarceration sentences also increased 
for those convicted of Forg I. The findings also indicated an 
increase in the likelihood of incarceration for the less serious 
property offenses not in the D.A.'s non-reducible cateogry. Thus, 
while incarceration increased overall from 1976 to 1977, increases 
in incarceration for certain offenses were offset by decreases for 
other offenses, again maintaining a balance necessary to the 
stability of the criminal justice system. 
Sentence severity also increased in 1977 for those defendants 
who had been granted pre-trial release. Whereas in 1976, only 19 
percent of those individuals who had been released on their own 
recognizance were incarcerated upon sentencing, 38 percent of the 
recog releases were incarcerated at sentencing in 1977. A similar 
pattern emerged for those granted bail pre-trail release; incar-
ceration sentences were given to 31 percent of bail releases in 
1976, but to 58 percent of them in 1977. Thus, while pre-trial 
custody status was a good predictor of sentence severity (incar-
ceration versus no incarceration) in both years, pre-trial release 
was much less likely to be accompanied by post-conviction release 
in 1977 than in 1976. 
The importance of the multiple count variable in terms of 
dispositional outcomes has been previously documented. The 1976-1977 
comparisons yielded another piece of information in support of 
the contention that it is multiple initial counts as opposed to 
multiple settled counts that work toward punishment severity. 
While there was an increase in 1977 in the proportion of PGTL + 
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Dis and PG + Dis closings with multiple settled counts, there was 
virtually no change in the proprotions of these closing types which 
resulted in incarceration sentences. In other words, regardless of 
whether an initial multiple count charge was settled with multiple 
or single counts, the likelihood of incarceration was the same. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The findings on the nature of offenses, offenders and 
dispositions processed in felony court were examined for 1976 
and the latter half of 1977 in this chapter. The data indicated 
a stable picture of the offenders and offenses processed through 
the system in both years. However, there were differences in 
dispositional outcomes which accompanied policy changes on 
bargaining. In the next chapter, data from the case files of 
the Public Defender's Office are examined for their relevancy to 
the research topic of case disposition without trial. 
CHAPTER V 
THE NATURE OF DISPOSITIONAL OUTCOMES: 
SUMMARY AND SELECTED STATISTICS ON 
CASES HANDLED BY THE OFFICE OF 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
INTRODUCTION 
From data in the records of the Office of the Public 
Defender in this county, the researcher endeavored to add to the 
body of information about the nature of cases settled in felony 
court in the system under study. The summary statistics on 
dispositional outcomes of all felony cases handled by the Public 
Defender's Office served as an independent source of information 
similar to that collected from the Criminal Court random samples. 
Additionally, these population statistics could be analyzed in 
terms of their consistency with the sample statistics collected 
from the Criminal Court case files. For this latter purpose of 
comparison, summary statistics from the Public Defender records are 
presented for the same time periods covered in the Criminal Court 
research (all of 1976 and the latter half of 1977). 
In addition to the summary statistics, two offenses were 
selected for a more in-depth examination. Files on Burg I and 
Forg I cases closed by the Public Defender's Office in the last 
six months of 1977 provided data relevant to the research topic. 
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DISPOSITION OUTCOMES OF FELONY CASES HANDLED BY PUBLIC DEFENDERS: 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Statistics on the closings of the total 'population of felony 
cases handled by the Public Defender's Office in all of 1976 and 
from July to December of 1977 are given in Table XXXII. These data 
confirmed the findings from the Criminal Court data that the great 
majority of cases were closed by guilty plea dispositions and that 
the number of acquittals at trial was extremely small. However, 
there were some differences between these statistics and those from 
the Criminal Court samples. 
The most noticeable difference was in the percentages of 
dismissals. The proportion of dismissals reported in the Public 
Defender records was nearly double that found in the Criminal 
Court records. Variations in record-keeping practices appear to 
account for this difference. Whereas about half of the Public 
Defender dismissals came about at the preliminary hearing, only 
dismissals after the preliminary hearing were recorded in the 
Criminal Court statistics. The way in which the dismissal category 
was handled also affected the conviction rates. If dismissals were 
excluded, the conviction rate was much higher than if dismissals 
were included in the non-conviction statistics. The importance of 
taking into account these methodological variations in an analysis 
of the data is obvious. 
Another difference between these data and those from Criminal 
Court was in the lower percentage of pleas to lesser offenses 
recorded in the Public Defender statistics. It is likely that the 
TABLE XXXII 
FELONY CASES CLOSED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977 
1976 1977 
Total closed 1,972 812 
Total adjudicated 1,325 444 
Percent pleas 58% 60% 
Percent trials 10% 14% 
Percent dismissals 32% 25% 
Percent guilty 66% 72% 
Percent not guilty/dismissed 34% 28% 
Probation/extradition cases 405 258 
Change of type attorney cases 172 73 
Bench warrant cases 68 37 
Total pleas and trials 907 331 
Percent plea to charge 49% 52% 
Percent plea to lesser 36% 29% 
Percent trials 15% 19% 
Percent guilty 96% 96$ 
Percent not guilty 4% 4% 
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fact that certain offenses, e.g., Traffic, which had high proportions 
of PGTLS, also had relatively high proportions of privately-retained 
attorneys accounted for some of this difference. 
The data on type closing of the various non-reducible offenses 
were consistent with the data from Criminal Court. with the 
exception of CAID (only some CAID charges are included in the non-
reducible category), very few of these offenses were closed by PGTL. 
On the other hand, Burg I, Rob I, Rob II and Theft I had relatively 
high proportions of closings by trial in 1977. The frequency 
distribution of closing types for the non-reducible offenses is 
depicted in Table XXXIII. 
Type Offense 
Burg I 
Burg II 
Escape II 
Forg I 
Rob I 
Rob II 
TABLE XXXIII 
CLOSING TYPES FOR NON-REDUCIBLE OFFENSES: 
CASES HANDLED BY THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S 
OFFICE FROM JULY THROUGH DECEMBER 
OF 1977 
Type Closing 
Dis PG PGTL Trial 
Percent Trial of 
Pleas and Trials 
1 19 1 12 38% 
9 15 2 4 19% 
1 9 o 1 10% 
12 33 o 5 13% 
o 9 o 5 36% 
5 2 3 2 29% 
Supp Contraband 1 7 o 1 12% 
Theft I 22 22 3 9 26% 
CAID 24 19 45 5 7% 
ECPFA 1 0 o 1 
TOTAL 76 135 54 45 
The findings on incarceration sentences were also generally 
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consistent with those from Criminal Court. As can be seen in Table 
XXXIV, the proportion of total incarceration sentences increased 
between 1976 and the latter half of 1977. The percentages of offenses 
TABLE XXXIV 
TOTAL CONVICTIONS RESULTING IN PENITENTIARY, JAIL AND 
NON-INCARCERATION SENTENCES: PUBLIC DEFENDER 
FELONY CASES IN 1976 AND JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT 
Sentence 1976 1977 
Penitentiary 21% 24% 
Jail 21% 24% 
No Incarceration 58% 52% 
TOTAL 100% (872) 100% (318) 
\'lhich resulted in incarceration sentences (Table XXXV) showed the 
same patterns as in the Criminal Court data with the exception of 
Theft I. There were two factors which may have in part accounted 
TABLE XXXV 
INCARCERATION SENTENCES FOR SELECTED OFFENSES: 
PUBLIC DEFENDER CASES FROM JULY THROUGH 
DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT 
Offense Percent Incarceration 
CAID 26% 
Theft I 33% 
Forg I 46% 
Burg I 66% 
Burg II 52% 
UUV 46% 
Assault II 64% 
Rob I 86% 
Rape I 50% 
Rob II 67% 
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for this difference regarding Theft I. First, closings of Theft I 
cases handled by the Public Defender were characterized by an 
inordinately high proportion of dismissals. Second, Theft I 
offenders had a high proportion of privately-retained attorneys. 
Both factors suggest the possibility that public defenders had a 
higher success rate (in terms of getting a non-incarceration 
sentence) with Theft I cases than did other types of attorneys. 
BURGLARY I AND FORGERY I PUBLIC DEFENDER CASES 
Data were collected from all of the available files of Burg I 
and Forg I cases closed by the Public Defender's Office from July 
through December of 1977. In addition to providing some new in forma-
tion, these findings generally supported the findings from the Criminal 
Court data. The list of variables on which data were collected is 
presented in Table XXXVI. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
TABLE XXXVI 
VARIABLES ON WHICH DATA WERE COLLECTED ON 
PUBLIC DEFENDER BURG I AND FORG I CASES 
Number initial counts 10. Sex of defendant 
Number initial felony counts 11. Age of defendant 
Most serious settled charge 12. Prior record of defendant 
Number settled counts 13. Education of defendant 
Number settled felony counts 14. Employment of defendant 
Type Closing 15. Race of defendant 
Judge 16. Defendant drug/alcohol 
Sentence recommendation by problem 
prosecutor 17. Offense in dwelling 
Sentence (Burg I only) 
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Burglary I 
The closing type frequencies for Burg I cases closed by the 
Public Defender's Office in the last half of 1977 are given in Table 
XXXVII. As can be seen, the trial percentage was relatively high; 
TABLE XXXVII 
TYPE CLOSING: PUBLIC DEFENDER BURG I CASES FROM 
JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, BY PERCENT 
Type Closing Percent 
PG 31 
PG + Dis 13 
PG + Not File 17 
PGTL 4 
CBC/CBJ 26 
ABC/ABJ 4 
Dis 4 
TOTAL 100 (23) 
Burg I cases were as likely to be closed by trial as by a straight 
guilty plea. In contrast, pleading guilty to a lesser offense was 
highly unlikely for Burg I offenders (the one offender in this 
category plead guilty to Burg II). However, other kinds of bargains 
were not uncommon. Of the five cases with initial multiple counts, 
three were closed with PG + Dis. In this data set, a new type of 
bargain was coded as a separate category. This category, labeled 
PG + Not File refers to a closing in which the defendant plead 
guilty to the initial charge in return for an agreement by the 
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prosecutor not to file on other known charges. The statistics 
suggested that this was a fairly common bargain for Burg I. Of 
all guilty plea convictions, then, some kind of bargain occurred in 
64 percent of the cases. 
A bargain agreement may also take the form of a sentence 
recommendation. Procedure in this court system required that 
prosecutors fill out a written form in which they are specifically 
to state their sentence recommendation. The data indicated that 
sentence recommendation was a powerful commodity held by the 
prosecutor, as the relationship between the recommendation and the 
actual sentence was significant at the .05 level. Prosecutors made 
an outright recommendation of incarceration in 43 percent of the 
cases; for another 35 percent, prosecutors stated that they would 
make a sentence recommendation subsequent to conviction and/or the 
completion of the pre-sentence investigation. They recommended no 
incarceration in 22 percent of the cases. Actual sentencing tended 
to be either quite severe or quite light. Fifty-three precent of 
the convicted were sentenced to the penitentiary (and of those 90 
percent were sentenced to five years or more), and 11 percent were 
sentenced to jail. Thirty-seven percent received a non-incarceration 
sentence. Thus, when prosecutors withheld a recommendation until 
after conviction, there was a greater chance that the actual sentence 
would be for incarceration than for non-incarceration. 
Specific evidence of the positive relationship between sentence 
recommendation and actual sentence includes the following. Of those 
cases for which a penitentiary sentence was recommended, all wer(' 
j.-
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sentenced to the penitentiary. Misdemeanor status was not recommended 
for any case, nor was it ever granted at sentencing. There was one 
recommendation for a concurrent sentence which was granted at 
sentencing. There were no recommendations for consecutive sentences, 
and none were given at sentencing. Neither fines nor community 
service were recommended, and no such orders were given. Of four 
recommendations for participation in a drug or alcohol program, 
three were sentenced to participate in such a program. Restitution, 
however, was recommended in eleven cases but only ordered at 
sentencing in six cases. 
In terms of sentencing, PG bargains were "no bargain" compared 
to straight PG closings. Of all PG bargains, 50 percent resulted in 
penitentiary sentences, and 33 percent resulted in non-incarceration 
sentences. In contrast, only 29 percent of PG closings resulted in 
penitentiary sentences, and 57 percent were not incarcerated at 
sentencing. However, the harshest sentencing was received by those 
convicted at trial; 83 percent of the Burg I offenders convicted at 
trial were sentenced to the penitentiary. 
Further support was also found for the previously-discussed 
finding that certain defendant characteristics were related to 
sentence severity. Of those defendants who received incarceration 
sentences, 92 percent had prior felony records, whereas of those who 
received non-incarceration sentences, only 71 percent had prior felony 
records. Similarly, employment status appeared to be influential in 
sentencing. Of those who were incarcerated, 73 percent were unemployed, 
and of those who were not incarcerated, only 43 percent were unemployed. 
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Another important factor in bargaining and sentencing decisions 
in Burg cases was whether or not the burglary took place in a 
dwelling. Non-dwelling burglaries appeared to be the most 
"bargainable." Eighty-three percent of the trial convictions were 
for dwelling burglaries; 71 percent of the PG closings were for 
dwelling burglaries, but only 38 percent of the PG bargain closings 
were for dwelling burglaries. Overall, non-dwelling burglaries had 
an advantage at sentencing. Only 43 percent of non-dwelling 
burglars (compared to 75 percent of dwelling burglars) received 
incarceration sentences. However, again the data indicated that PG 
bargain closings were not advantageous in terms of sentencing. 
While bargained closings included a relatively high proportion of 
non-dwelling burglaries, they also had a relatively high proportion 
of incarceration sentences. Thus, it seems that the advantage 
gained by committing a non-dwelling burglary is offset by pleading 
guilty with a dismissal or not file agreement as opposed to 
pleading guilty without such a bargain. Here it should be recalled 
that only one of the PG bargains was a charge reduction bargain. All 
others were pleas to the original charge with an agreement to drop 
other filed or known charges or counts. In line with the Criminal 
Court data, the Public Defender data on Burg I cases strongly 
suggested that the filing or knowledge of multiple counts or charges 
worked against the defendant at sentencing regardless of whether or 
not counts or charges were dropped in exchange for a guilty plea. 
Of course, it is possible that sentencing would have been even 
harsher if these extra counts or charges had not been dropped. 
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Nevertheless, compared to straight PG closings (almost all of which 
were single count cases), PG + Dis and PG + Not File had a sentencing 
disadvantage. 
The people charged with (and for the most part convicted of) 
Burg I wore a number of negative labels. Compared to the general 
population, they showed a high proportion of undereducation, unemploy-
ment or underemployment, prior criminal records, and drug or 
alcohol problems. Fifty-eight percent had less than four years of 
high school, and none had any college education. Fifty-four percent 
of the defendants were unemployed; 36 percent had only tenuous employ-
ment (had been employed less than six months and/or were employed 
either part-time or intermittently. Only 11 percent showed stable 
employment. Prior felony records were reported for 77 percent of the 
charged felons. Finally, the files indicated that 52 percent of the 
accused offenders had a drug or alcohol problem; for another 30 
percent there was no information on whether or not such a problem 
existed, and in only 18 percent of the cases was it stated in the 
file that there was no indication of a drug or alcohol problem. 
Additionally, the Burg I offenders defended by public 
defenders were predominantly male, young and white. Fifty-nine 
percent were between 17 and 20 years old, ana almost all (91 percent) 
were 27 or younger. Males comprised 94 percent of the group, and 
84 percent were white. However, blacks were over-represented 
compared to their representation in the county population (13 percent 
of the defendants were black, whereas blacks account for only 4 
percent of the total county population). 
Forgery I 
Forg I cases handled by the public defender system in the 
latter half of 1977 were most likely to be settled by a bargained 
guilty plea conviction. While there was only one charge reduction 
plea (the defendant plead guilty to Att Theft II and had a second 
count dismissed), pleas to the initial charge accompanied by some 
agreement to dismiss or not file other counts or charges were 
extremely common. Of all convictions, 58 percent were settled by 
bargained guilty pleas, and 32 percent were settled by straight 
guilty pleas. Table XXXVIII gives the frequency distribution of 
closing types for the Forg I cases. Nine of the ten cases with 
initial multiple counts ended in conviction on only one count. 
Thus, initial multiple count cases were highly likely to receive a 
dismissal offe~ in exchange for a guilty plea. 
TABLE XXXVIII 
TYPE CLOSING: PUBLIC DEFENDER FORG I CASES 
FROM JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977, 
BY PERCENT 
Type Closing Percent 
PG 26 
PG + Dis 8 
PG + Not File 23 
PG + Not File + Dis 13 
PGTL + Dis 2 
CBC/CBJ 8 
ABC 2 
Dis 18 
TOTAL 100 (39) 
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The majority of Forg I convictions (61 percent) resulted in 
non-incarceration sentences. Likewise, a sentence recommendation of 
non-incarceration was given in 61 percent of the cases. A positive 
relationship (significant at the .01 level) was found between 
recommendations of incarceration/non-incarceration and actual 
sentences of incarceration/non-incarceration. 
Only three types of incarceration recommendations were made: 
(1) no incarceration and probation; (2) no position or no opposition 
to non-incarceration; (3) withhold until after conviction and/or pre-
trial investigation. Of those cases in which there was a recommenda-
tion of non-incarceration, non-incarceration was given in 90 percent 
of the cases. Of cases which received one of the two other types of 
recommendations, 42 percent were sentenced to the penitentiary; 
42 percent were sentenced to jail, and only 17 percent were not 
incarcerated upon sentencing. Thus, when the prosecution took no 
position or withheld a position, the chances were high that the 
defendant would be incarcerated. In fact, of those cases in which 
the recommendation was withheld until after conviction and pre-trial 
investigation, all received incarceration sentences. 
Actual sentencing was a little harsher than the recommendations 
regarding misdemeanor status. Although all 14 recommendations for 
immediate misdemeanor treatment were granted, only 1 of the 7 
recommendations for deferred misdemeanor treatment was granted. 
Fourteen of the 15 recommendations for restitution were ordered by 
the judge. 
.~." 
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PG bargains appeared to be "better deals" for Forg I 
offenders than for Burg I offenders in terms of sentencing. 
Seventy-two percent of defendants who plead guilty with a bargain 
compared to 50 percent of defendants who plead guilty as charged 
were not incarcerated upon sentencing. The number of trials was 
small, but sentencing was the harshest for those defendants who 
were convicted at trial. 
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Defendant characteristic variables were also influential in 
terms of sentencing. Those who received incarceration sentences 
were more likely to have prior felony records, to have less than 
four years of high school education, and to be unemployed. Race was 
of noticeable importance. Whereas 70 percent of white defendants 
were not incarcerated upon conviction, only 38 percent of black 
de:endants were not incarcerated at sentencing. Sex was also of 
considerable importance in the sentencing statistics for the Forg I 
offenders; 80 percent of females compared to 44 percent of males 
were not incarcerated upon conviction. 
As was the case for Burg I, Forg I offenders had a number of 
strikes against them from the outset. Eighty-four percent 
had prior felony records; 44 percent had completed less than four 
years of high school. Unemployment was high (77 percent), and only 
5 percent showed stable employemnt. Also, 22 percent were black 
(again a considerably higher proportion than the 4 percent of 
blacks found in the county population). Thus, the findings 
suggested that individuals charged with Forg I entered the system 
with a number of disadvantageous characteristics, and that these same 
characteristics worked against defendants as they moved through the 
system. 
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The Forg I defendants tended to be older than the Burg I 
defendants. Only 33 percent of the former were 20 or younger. 
Also, the Forg I offenders were more likely to be female than were 
other types of offenders. Almost half (43 percent) of these public 
defender cases involved female offenders. 
CONCLUDING RE~1ARKS 
The findings from the Public Defender records supported many 
of the findings from the Criminal Court data. The proportions of 
cases settled with the different closing types were similar, as 
were the proportions of incarceration and non-incarceration sentences. 
Both sources indicated a relatively high proportion of trial 
closings for Burg I, Rob I and Theft I in the latter half of 1977. 
Burg I and Forg I offenders were characterized similarly in both 
data sets. 
New information was also offered. Another type of bargain, 
i.e., pleading guilty with an agreement not to file on other known 
charges, was found to be common for both Burg I and Forg I cases 
(although more common for the latter than the former). It is possible 
that the agreement-not-to-fi1e bargain is more advantageous than 
the agreement-to-dismiss bargain, since PG bargains were more 
advantageous in terms of incarceration sentences for Forg I than 
for Burg I offenders. Also, a positive relationship was found 
between sentence recommendation and actual sentence for both Burg I 
and Forg I. Finally, the data on race (not available from the 
Criminal Court records) indicated that blacks were proportionately 
more likely than whites to be incarcerated at sentencing. 
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The present and preceding chapters have yielded a detailed 
picture of the nature and outcome of felony cases processed through 
the court system in this county. In the next chapter, the focus is 
on the atittudes and opinions of key actors in the disposition 
process regarding both the substance and the process of case 
disposition without trial. The data source was the interviews 
with prosecutors, public defenders and judges working in the court 
system under study. 
CHAPTER VI 
ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS OF KEY COURT ACTORS: 
THE INTERVIEWS 
INTRODUCTION 
An integral part of the total picture of the case disposition 
process within the court organization is the attitudes and opinions 
of participating key actors. As noted earlier, attitudes and 
behaviors regarding the workings of a system may be inconsistent. 
However, the reality of the total system can only be fully under-
stood by including both attitudes and actions as component parts of 
the same system. The way in which system members perceive the 
system is likely to affect and be affected by the way in which they 
play their respective system roles. In similar dialectical fashion, 
attitudes and role behaviors are related to the overall operation 
of the system. 
Because the interviewees, i.e., prosecutors, public defenders 
and judges, play major roles in the case disposition process, their 
attitudes and opinions are of primary importance. Analysis of the 
~ . interview data was directed toward an assessment of (1) attitudes and 
opinions as independent as well as component parts of the system; (2) 
relationships between attitudes and actions; (3) relationships between 
and within the responses of the three different groups of key court 
actors. 
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The interviews yielded two data sets. The source of the 
first set was a questionnaire which called for written closed-end 
responses. The second source was a set of questions calling for 
verbal open-ended responses. The questionnaire form is found in 
Appendix D. In this chapter, the findings from the questionnaire 
are discussed first, followed by a discussion of the findings from 
the open-ended part of the interview. 
FINDINGS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
Consideration Given Various Factors in the Handling of Cases 
The first question was a multi-part one in which the respon-
dents were asked to rate on a five-point scale the amount of con-
sideration given to 24 separate factors by the Public Defender's 
Office and the District Attorney's Office when handling a given 
case. The response categories moved from very much consideration 
(coded as five) to no consideration (coded as one). The question 
read: 
In deciding how to handle a given case, how much 
consideration do you think the following factors are 
given by 
a) the Public Defender's Office; 
b) the District Attorney's Office? 
For analytical purposes, the 24 factors or variables have been 
placed in one of 6 categories as shown in Table XXXIX. 
The findings from the responses to this first question are 
discussed in narrative form in this chapter. For a statistical 
picture of these data, see Appendix J, in which the means, modes, 
ranges and standard deviations are presented. 
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-TABLE XXXIX 
CATEGORIES AND INCLUSIVE VARIABLES ON WHICH ANALYSIS 
OF DATA FROM QUESTION NUMBER ONE WAS BASED 
Nature of Case 
Nature of Defendant 
Criminal Justice Goals 
Functional Court Needs 
Within-System Input 
Strength of Prosecutor's Case 
Seriousness of Offense 
Typicality of Offense 
Prior Record 
General Character 
Attitude 
Due Process 
Actual Guilt 
Crime Control 
Victim Needs 
Defendant's Wishes 
Avoidance of Court Overload 
Conservation of Staff Resources 
Speedy Case Settlement 
Maintenance of Good Relations 
Report of Arresting Officer 
Tendencies of Juries 
Tendencies of Judges 
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Relationship with Opposing Attorney 
Office Policy 
Career Advancement Concerns 
Outside-System Input community Attitudes 
Political Concerns 
Special Interest Groups 
Nature of Case. Strength of prosecutor's case was the only 
variable on which there was high within and between group agreement 
that it was of extreme importance to both Offices. There was also 
high within and between group agreement that seriousness of offense 
was given very much consideration by the D.A.'s Office. While judges 
and public defenders also agreed that this variable was given a great 
deal of consideration by the P.D.'s Office, prosecutors felt that it 
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was only of medium importance to the P.D.'s Office. All groups did 
give seriousness of offense a higher rating in terms of its imp or-
tance to the D.A.'s Office than to the P.D.'s Office. Relative to 
other factors, strength and seriousness of case appeared to be 
perceived as very important in case disposition decisions. Here 
the opinions of key court actors were consistent with plea bargaining 
policy as well as observations of case disposition in action. 
Typicality of offense turned out to be a problematic variable. 
The majority of respondents asked for further explanation of the 
meaning of this variable. Even after it was explained, three 
prosecutors and four judges said that they did not know how to 
respond to this question and therefore chose not to respond at all. 
The explanation given by the researcher was that typicality of the 
offense referred to whether or not the patterns of a particular 
case, e.g., characteristics of the defendant, the manner in which 
the offense was committed, the place in which the offense took place, 
were typical or fit an overall pattern generally seen for that type 
offense (see Chapter I for a description of Sudnow's conceptualization 
of normal or typical crimes). The interviewer's impression was that 
the great majority of respondents were not able to grasp clearly the 
meaning of this notion, and thus any interpretation of the ratings is 
questionable. The ratings themselves offered very little information; 
means fell at the middle of the scale, and the response ranges were 
high. It is possible that the concept of "typical offenses" (or to 
use Sudnow' s label, "normal crimes") did exist in reality but that the 
researcher was simply unable to communicate the meaning of this concept 
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to the respondents. However, it is also quite possible that Sudnow's 
widely-cited claims that case disposition decisions are made based on 
the typicality of the offense do not reflect the reality of case 
disposition in this court system. This latter possibility was 
supported by the observational data, which were notable in their 
lack of reference to the concept of "typical" or "normal" crimes. 
Nature of Defendant. All groups agreed that prior record 
was given medium consideration by the P.D.'s Office and somewhat more 
consideration by the D.A.'s Office. Interestingly, the group means 
indicated that prosecutors and public defenders thought that prior 
record was given more consideration by their own Offices than did 
the other groups. 
The data indicated that judges did not think either general 
character or attitude of the defendant was given much consideration 
by either Office. Prosecutors believed that general character of 
the defendant was given very little consideration by their Office. 
Other than that, prosecutors and public defenders gave these two 
variables medium ratings in terms of its importance to both Offices. 
All groups gave higher ratings on general character and attitude 
of the defendant to the P.D.'s Office than to the D.A.'s Office. 
The nature of the defendant (in terms of prior record, general 
character and attitude) was generally seen to be only of medium 
importance in deciding how to handle a given case (although prior 
record was perceived as of above average importance to the D.A.'s 
Office). Public defenders and prosecutors did attach slightly more 
importance to character and attitude of the defendant than did judges. 
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Several public defenders commented that while the nature of the 
defendant was not particularly important in terms of type closing, 
it was important in terms of sentencing decisions. These findings 
were consistent with the findings from the Criminal Court case file 
data, indicating that the perceptions of key court actors reflected 
reality. 
Criminal Justice Goals. Judges believed that due process was 
given a great deal of consideration by both Offices. Public 
defenders and prosecutors also believed that due process was given 
a great deal of consideration by the P.D.'s Office, but both groups 
agreed that it was of somewhat lesser importance to the D.A.'s 
Office. Prosecutors, however, gave due process a higher rating 
for their own Office than did public defenders. In subsequent 
comments by attorneys on both sides, it was indicated that while 
due process' was a criminal justice goal for all, in fact it was 
public defenders who had the major responsibility for insuring due 
process. 
While idealistically the actual guilt of the defendant should 
be a very important factor in case disposition decisions, the data 
suggested some ambiguity over this variable. For all groups, there 
was fair within-group agreement regarding the amount of consideration 
given to actual guilt by both Offices. There was, however, consider-
able between-group disagreement. The data reflected a belief on the 
part of judges that the ideal was in fact reality, i.e., actual guilt 
was given a great deal of consideration by both Offices. Public 
defenders and prosecutors, on the other hand, believed that actual 
guilt was only of medium importance to the P.D.'s Office. Prosecutors 
~ ...• ti ,., .' 
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thought that actual guilt was given a great deal of consideration 
by their own Office. Public defenders, however, gave this variable 
a higher rating for their Office than for the D.A.'s Office. Looking 
at other data, it appeared that two factors were influential 
regarding these opinions on the importance of actual guilt. First, 
the great majority of accused offenders were believed to be actually 
guilty of something by attorneys and judges. This presumption of 
guilt must certainly lessen the amount of consideration given this 
variable in the case disposition process. Second, public defenders 
reported that a major goal for them was to defend a client to the 
best of their ability regardless of actual guilt. On the other 
hand, if a client maintained a position of total innocence (not 
guilty of the charge or of a related charge), trial was deemed by 
public defenders to be essential. Generally, however, the defense 
goal appeared to take precedence over the determination of guilt 
goal--one of several indications that the adversary system prevailed 
in this particular court system. 
Another ideal goal of the criminal justice system is crime 
control. It was generally felt that crime control was important 
to the D.A.'s Office but not so important to the P.D.'s Office. Of 
all groups, prosecutors gave crime control the highest rating in 
terms of its importance to their Office. On the other hand, public 
defenders thought that crime control was more important to their 
Office than did the prosecutors or judges. 
Like crime control, all groups believed that victim needs 
were not given much consideration by the P.D.'s Office. Prosecutors 
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maintained that victim needs were of great importance to their 
Office. However, public defenders and judges were inclined to 
think that victim needs were of only medium importance to the D.A.'s 
Office. 
Finally, as would be expected, all groups believed that the 
P.D.'s Office gave a great deal of consideration to the defendant's 
wishes regarding the way in which his or her case be handled. 
There was high within-group agreement among public defenders about 
the importance of this variable to their own Office, but considerable 
within-group disagreement between judges and prosecutors as to the 
amount of consideration the P.D.'s Office gave to defendant's wishes. 
All groups agreed that defendant's wishes were not very important 
to the D.A.'s Office. However, prosecutors expressed the belief that 
it was more important to their own Office than did public defenders 
or judges. 
The findings on the importance of criminal justice goals 
in the case disposition process, then, indicated that overall, 
public defenders and prosecutors believed that criminal justice 
goals were given more consideration by their own Office (either 
more consideration than by the other Office or more consideration 
than the other respondent groups thought). Judges were the most 
inclined to believe in the reality of the importance of the ideal 
goal of due process and the consideration given actual guilt. 
Functional Court Needs. All groups were of the opinion that 
court overload was not given much consideration by either Office. 
However, public defenders and judges gave court overload a higher 
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rating for the D.A.'s Office than for the P.D.'s Office, whereas 
prosecutors saw it as equally unimportant to both Offices. 
Judges believed that conserving staff resources was of medium 
importance to both Offices, but public defenders and prosecutors 
reported that it was not very important to either Office. The 
public defender group gave court overload the lowest rating for 
their own Office, and the prosecutor group rated it the lowest for 
their Office. 
Judges thought that speedy case settlement was of some 
importance to the P.D.'s Office but of greater importance to the 
D.A.'s Office. Public defenders felt it was of some importance to 
the D.A.'s Office but of very little importance to their own Office. 
Prosecutors did not think that speedy case settlement was given 
much consideration by either Office. 
A similar pattern was found in the ratings on the need to 
maintain good relations with others in the court system. Judges were 
of the opinion that this factor was given some consideration by both 
Offices. Public defenders also rated it of medium importance to the 
D.A.'s Office, but of little importance to their own Office. 
Prosecutors responded that it was of little importance to either 
Office. 
The patterns for this category of variables were quite consistent. 
Judges tended to think that these functional court needs were given 
greater consideration by the attorneys than did the attorneys. There 
I·: 
was overall agreement that these variables were more important to 
the D.A.'s Office than to the P.D.'s Office. However, prosecutors' 
ratings showed only slight variations for the two Offices. None 
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of th(~ respondent groups viewed functional court needs as playing 
a particularly important role in case disposition decisions. 
Two points should be noted. First, there was considerable 
within-group disagreement among judges regarding the importance 
of court overload, conservation of staff resources and speedy case 
settlement to either Office. Thus, individual judges perceived 
the role o'f functional court needs quite di fferently • Second, 
comments by attorneys indicated a belief that these variables need 
not be given much consideration by them because the court structure 
provided for these needs, e.g., resources were administratively 
distributed; case settlement was mandated.to take place within 60 
days. The attorneys openly recognized the importance of functional 
court needs, but maintained that they were not influential in their 
decisions as to how to handle a given case. 
Within-System Input. All groups believed that the report 
of the arresting officer was of slightly above average importance 
to the P.D.'s Office. Public defenders and judges felt that it was 
of somewhat greater importance to the D.A.'s Office. Prosecutors, 
however, gave it only a slightly above average rating for their own 
Office. This is a finding of some interest since prosecutors are 
generally expected by other court actors to x'ely heavily on police 
reports. 
Public defenders and judges thought that tendencies of juries 
were given a great deal of consideration by both Offices, whereas 
prosecutors felt that it was given medium consideration by both 
Offices. All, however, felt that tendencies of juries were more 
important to the P.o. 's than the D.A. 's Office. 
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Public defenders and judges believed that tendencies of 
judges were given over average consideration by both Offices 
(public defenders reported that tendencies of judges were extremely 
important to them). While prosecutors rated tendencies of judges 
slightly above average for the P.D.'s Office, they gave it a low 
rating for their own Office. 
Again public defenders and judges were in agreement over the 
amount of consideration given to the relationship between the two 
opposing attorneys handling a case, both groups giving it a slightly 
below average rating for both Offices. Prosecutors, however, 
believed that this variable was of little importance to either Office. 
The patterns for these four variables were also quite con-
sistent. Overall, public defenders and judges were inclined to 
think that these within-system input factors were given more 
consideration in case disposition decisions than did prosecutors. 
All groups felt that report of the arresting officer was more 
important to the D.A.'s than the P.D.'s Office, and all thought 
that tendencies of juries and judges were of greater importance to 
the P.D.'s than the D.A.'s Office. 
The consideration given office policy by the D.A.'s Office 
was rated high by all groups (means were 4.6 from the public 
defender ratings, 4.4 from the judge ratings, and 4.1 from the 
prosecutor ratings). Public defenders were in strong agreement 
that office policy (their own, not that of the D.A.) was of no 
importance to them in terms of decisions on how to handle a given 
case. Prosecutors believed that office policy was not very important 
to the P.D.'s Office, but judges rated it high in importance 
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(mean was 4.0) to the P.D.'s Office. Again it should be noted that 
within-group disagreement was high among prosecutors and judges 
regarding the amount of consideration given this variable by the 
P.D. 's Office. 
The factor of career advancement concerns rated very low 
in terms of its importance to the P.D.'s Office in making case 
disposition decisions. Prosecutors also gave this variable a very 
low rating in terms of its importance to their own Office. Public 
defenders, however, thought that career advancement was given above 
average consideration (mean was 3.4) by the D.A.'s Office. Judges 
also thought that it was of some importance to the D.A.'s Office 
(mean was 2.9). Both office policy and career advancement, then, 
were seen by public defenders and judges as being of greater 
importance to the D.A.'s Office than by the prosecutors themselves. 
Outside-System Input. All groups agreed that community 
attitudes were not given much consideration by the P.D.'s Office 
(of all groups, prosecutors gave the P.D.'s Office the lowest rating 
on community attitudes). However, all groups felt that community 
attitudes were given above average consideration by the D.A.'s 
Office (of all groups, prosecutors gave community attitudes the 
lowest rating for their own Office). 
The patterns were similar regarding the importance of 
political concerns. All groups agreed that political concerns 
were given almost no consideration by the P.D.'s Office. Public 
defenders gave political concerns a high rating for the D.A.'s Office, 
and judges gave this variable an above average rating for the D.A.'s 
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However, prosecutors believed that political concerns were of little 
consideration in their decisions about how to handle a case. 
Special interest group demands indicated similar patterns. 
All groups agreed that demands of special interest groups were of 
very little importance to the P.D.'s Office. Public defenders and 
judges thought that this factor was given above average consideration 
by the D.A.'s Office (the public defender group gave it the highest 
rating for the D.A.'s Office). Prosecutors, however, viewed 
special interest group demands as being of very little importance to 
them (actually, they thought it was slightly less important to them 
than to the P.D.'s Office). 
The data on this category of variables were clear and consistent. 
Everybody agreed that none of these variables was given much con-
sideration by the P.D.'s Office. Public defenders thought that they 
were of considerable importance to the D.A.'s Office, but the 
prosecutors thought they were of little importance to their own 
Office. Judges fell somewhere in the middle of these two extremes 
regarding the importance of these factors to the D.A.'s Office. 
Summary: Question Number One 
In the opinion of the respondents, strength of case and 
seriousness of offense were indtsputedly the most important variables 
to both Offices in terms of decisions as to how to handle a given 
case. The nature of defendants was seen as of lesser importance 
than the nature of the case. Judges were inclined to view due 
process, actual guilt and functional court needs as being of greater 
importance than did public defenders or prosecutors. Judges and 
public defenders tended to think that within-system inputs were 
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given greater consideration than did prosecutors. All groups agreed 
that outside-system inputs were of little importance to the P.D.'s 
Office, but only prosecutors felt that they were of little concern 
to their own Office. Each group of attorneys tended to play up the 
importance of criminal justice goals to their respective Offices, 
and to play down the importance of functional court needs and outside-
system inputs to their own Offices. 
Getting Something in Exchange for a Guilty Plea 
Public defenders were asked to respond to the second question, 
which read: 
If your client decides to plead guilty, how important 
is it to you that he/she receive some benefit in 
exchange for a guilty plea? 
As for all the questions, a five-point rating scale was used; the 
possible responses were: very important (coded as five); important 
(four); somewhat important (three); not very important (two); not 
at all important (one). 
The responses strongly indicated that a benefit in exch~1ge for 
a guilty plea was considered by the public defenders to be quite 
important. This finding supported the theoretical assumption that 
an exchange or negotiation process is functional for meeting 
participants' needs only if there is a real exchange, in which all 
parties believe they have received some tangible benefit. 
Knowledge of the Routinized Process: Anticipating Bargains 
The third question, asked of public defenders and prosecutors, 
had two parts: 
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After having studied a case assigned to you, how 
often do you feel that you can reasonably anticipate 
a) whether or not the case will be plea negotiated; 
b) what kind of a bargain will be made? 
The five possible responses to both parts of the question were: 
always (coded as five); usually (four); sometimes (three); not 
usually (two); never (one). 
The responses indicated that bargaining was routinized in 
this court system. OVerall, attorneys believed that they could 
usually tell from the outset whether or not a case would be plea 
negotiated and what kind of a bargain would result. As groups, 
public defenders expressed greater certainty than did prosecutors. 
None of the public defenders or prosecutors gave a "not usually" 
or "never" response to either part of the question. All public 
defenders and 10 of the 14 prosecutors responded that they could 
usually tell whether or not a given case would be plea negotiated 
after they had looked it over. The attorneys were only slightly 
less sure of what kind of a bargain would be made. Thirteen of 
150 
the 15 public defenders responded that they usually could anticipate 
what kind of a bargain would be made, and 9 of the 14 prosecutors 
also said that they could usually anticipate the bargain. Although 
no one gave an "always" responses to either part of this question, 
the predominance of the "usually" response was a strong indication 
of the existence of a routinized classification scheme which was 
understood by the key actors. 
ii 
Satisfaction with Disposition Outcomes 
Again, only public defenders and prosecutors were asked to 
respond to the fourth question: 
How often would you say you are satisfied with the 
disposition outcome of cases you handle? 
The same response categories were offered as for the preceding 
question. 
The majority of both groups of attorneys responded that they 
were usually satisfied with the disposition outcome. However, only 
60 percent of the public defenders compared to 86 percent of the 
prosecutors reported that they were usually satisfied. This 
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difference was consistent with other int,erview data, in which public 
defenders lamented their weaker position in the disposition process. 
Nevertheless, although no one reported that they were always 
satisfied, satisfaction with outcomes was more common than uncommon. 
There were no "never satisfied" responses, and only one "not usually 
satisfied" response. 
Presumption of Guilt 
The next two questions, asked of public defenders, prosecutors 
and judges, attended to the presumption of guilt issue: 
Approximately how many accused felons do you think are 
actually guilty, either of the formal charge or of some 
related charge? 
Approximately how many accused felons assigned to the 
Public Defender'S Office du you think are actually guilty, 
either of the formal charge or of some related charge? 
The possible responses to these two questions (again coded from a 
high of five to a low of one for statistical purposes) were: over 
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80 percent; 80 percent to 60 percent; 60 percent to 40 percent; 
40 percent to 20 percent; less than 20 percent. 
The findings confirmed previous research which has suggested 
that key actors in the disposition process assume that charged 
offenders are guilty of something prior to a legal finding of guilt 
or innocence. No differences were found regarding accused felons 
in general as opposed to accused felons defended by the public 
defender system. 
All judges and prosecutors were of the opinion that over 80 
percent of all accused felons (as well as those assigned to the 
P.D. 's Office) ~lere actually guilty, either of the formal charge or 
of some related charge. While 12 public defenders believed that over 
80 percent of all accused felons as well as their own clients were 
actually guilty of something, the remaining 3 felt that only from 60 
percent to 40 percent of all those charged were guilty. Thus, a 
minority of the public defenders were not so likely to presume guilt. 
Also, from comments made while responding to this question, it 
appeared that if the question had been limited to "guilty as charged," 
the ratings of public defenders would have been considerably lower. 
The Number of Guilty Plea CC'.ses Involving Bargains 
Using the same percentage categories as for the preceding 
question, public defenders, prosecutors and judges were asked for 
their opinion regarding thp. percentage of guilty plea cases which 
were accompanied by some kind of bargain: 
Of cases which are settled by guilty pleas, how many do 
you think involve some kind of bargain, however minimal? 
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All public defenders and judges believed that the majority 
of guilty plea dispositions involved some kind of bargain. Sixty-
seven percent of the public defenders responded that over 80 
percent involved some kind of bargain, and the remaining 33 
percent marked the 80 percent to 60 percent category. While only 38 
percent of the judges thought that over 80 percent involved bargains, 
the other 62 percent felt that the percentage was in the 80 percent 
to 60 percent category. The estimates of public defenders and 
judges were consistent with the findings from the Criminal Court 
data. 
The responses of prosecutors showed greater variation on 
this question than did those of public defenders and judges. On 
the one hand, 50 percent of the prosecutors interviewed were of 
the opinion that over 80 percent of guilty plea cases involved 
some kind of bargain. Five marked the 80 percent to 60 percent 
category. Yet one checked the 60 percent to 40 percent category, 
and another marked the 40 percent to 20 percent category. Some 
of the differences between the three groups (and within the 
prosecutor group) could have been due to differences in definitions 
of "bargains." However, taking into account other interview 
responses, it seems likely that some of the differences are real, 
i.e., public defenders were the most inclined of the three groups 
to view guilty plea cases as accompanied by some kind of bargain. 
Power Imbalance in the Exchange Process 
In an attempt to uncover opinions regarding the balance of 
power in the exchange process, all three groups of interviewees 
; 
, 
I 
f 
were questioned about their agreement/disagreement with the 
following statement: 
The district attorney has the "upper hand" in 
the plea negotiation process. 
The possible responses were: strongly agree, agree, neutral, 
disagree, strongly disagree (again coded from strongly agree [five]. 
to strongly disagree [one]). 
This question was purposely stated in very general terms in 
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order to get at an overall feeling that respondents might have about 
the balance of power in the negotiation process. As a result of 
this rather ambiguous phrasing, the researcher had anticipated 
some requests for explanations of the meaning of this statement. 
None, however, was forthcoming. Respondents were able to give an 
opinion with no apparent discomfort or hesitation (although it 
should be recalled that 9 of the 14 prosecutors filled out the 
questionnaire ~ in my presence, rendering an assessment of 
their feelings about the question impossible). 
Public defenders, as might be expected, showed the strongest 
agreement with this statement (mean was 4.2). None of the public 
defenders disagreed or strongly disagreed, and only one gave a 
"neutral" response. As a group, however, prosecutors also indicated 
agreement with this statement (mean was 4.1). One prosecutor did 
express disagreement. Judges, on the other hand, were less inclined 
to perceive of a power imbalance (mean was 3.3). Only one judge 
reported that he strongly agreed, and three judges said that they 
disagreed. From the conversational interview responses, it was 
apparent that judges tended to view plea negotiation in this court 
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system as an opportunity for attorneys and the defendant to discuss 
objectively the facts of a case in an attempt to make mutual and 
rational decisions regarding resolution. Within this context, power 
was not seen as a major factor. 
Concluding Remarks 
The questionnaire data provided a great deal of insight into 
the attitudes and opinions of the interviewees, all of whom play key 
roles in the case disposition process. Generally, these attitudinal 
data were consistent with the behavioral data collected from 
records and observation, indicating an understanding on the part 
of the key actors of the reality of the disposition process. There 
were between-group differences regarding the amount of consideration 
given certain factors by the P.D.'s and D.A.'s Offices, implying that 
perspectives do vary in accordance with one's status and role within 
the system. However, the responses showed that all groups shared 
beliefs that most accused felons were guilty of something and that 
the majority of guilty pleas were accompanied by some kind of bargain. 
Public defenders and prosecutors also agreed that bargains could 
usually be anticipated at the outset and that the negotiation process 
was prosecutor-dominated. 
RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Introduction 
The interviewees were asked to give open-ended responses to 
nine questions in terms of their own beliefs about plea bargaining 
and their respective roles in the case disposition process. In this 
section, the findings are discussed for each question separately. 
However, as is the case with the questionnaire data, these open-
ended responses are also presented in the final chapter as part of 
the overall picture of case disposition in one urban court system. 
156 
While all of the public defenders in this county and 11 of the 
13 judges in the county felony court were interviewed, it should be 
recalled that only 5 (a small minority) of the county prosecutors 
responded to this verbal part of the interview. The bias which 
could result from this under-representation of the prosecutor group 
was compounded by the fact that the interviewed prosecutors were 
selected by the D.A.'s Office and were all in positions at the upper 
level of the hierarchical structure of the Office. Thus, the 
prosecutor staff was not only under-represented but also non-
representative. On the other hand, the argument could be made 
that the responses of high-level prosecutors reflect most closely 
the attitudes and opinions which in turn reflect the operations 
of the D.A.'s Office. In the hierarchical structure of the D.A.'s 
Office, policies (which are generally carried out in actual 
operations) are set by top-level staff. With these considerations 
in mind, let uS now turn to a discussion of the conversational 
responses. 
Question Number One: In Your Opinion, What is Plea Bargaining? 
The responses of the three groups to this question indicated 
a fair amount of definitional agreement. A description often given 
initially by individuals in all groups was of plea bargaining as a 
negotiation between prosecution and defense whereby cases were 
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resolved through a guilty plea rather than a trial. Another 
common thread was that plea bargaining involved some sort of 
concession on the part of the prosecution in exchange for a guilty 
plea. Finally, there was general agreement that plea bargaining 
could take many different forms, e.g., charge reduction, dismissal 
of or not filing other counts or charges, sentence recommendations. 
Two prosecutors, however, pointed out that from the perspective of 
their office, plea bargains referred to charge reduction bargains. 
Public defenders expressed the belief that for prosecutors, plea 
bargains were charge reduction bargains. 
Each group did tend to emphasize different aspects of plea 
bargaining. Judges were inclined to point out that plea bargaining 
was better labeled plea negotiation conference. Six judges 
explicitly stated that in this state, plea negotiation was a process 
structured by the courts for the purpose of allowing prosecution and 
defense to discuss the facts of the case and to work toward a 
mutual agreement as to the proper resolution of the case. The 
definition of one judge was illustrative: 
The examination of the issues concerning the commission 
of a particular crime and the circumstances of the person 
charged with the crime--that's an examination conducted 
by the prosecution and the defense attorney and the 
defendant. Their determination, that is their agreement, 
as to what would be a proper disposition of the particular 
charge. 
Whereas the mutual examination of issues was emphasized by the 
judges as a group, implications of strategical game plans for 
bargaining were absent. From one judge: 
; 
t 
In the criminal justice system now [in this state], 
for example, we have open discovery. Everything 
essentially that the state has is an open file to the 
defendant. In other words, they're trying to take out 
the games involved • • • 
Although public defenders agreed with judges that plea 
bargaining in this court system was presently a formally structured 
process, they were less inclined to view it as a fair exchange. 
Eleven of the 15 public defenders interviewed emphasized that plea 
bargaining should be a negotiation process in which benefits were 
exchanged and concessions granted by both sides. The attorneys, as 
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adversaries, were to try to get the best deal for their client. From 
the perspective of one public defender: 
. . • you have a basic charge that your client 
is charged with and you negotiate with the D.A. to 
achieve some kind of end result that's favorable to 
your client. 
Under the present formalized system, however, it was felt that the 
bargaining position of the defense attorney had been severely 
reduced, resulting in an off-balance exchange: 
Plea bargaining is largely where we--the defendant 
and his attorney--hope that the state is going to 
offer us something. What the state can bargain in 
this county is so carefully described by rules in the 
D.A.'s Office that they in most cases have very little 
flexibility. And so there are few things that you can 
offer as an inducement that would be sufficient to break 
the rules. 
This belief may in part explain why public defenders also emphasized 
in their definitions that plea bargaining included any benefit, however 
minimal, that the defense attorney was able to get for his or her 
client: 
[Plea bargaining is] ga1n1ng anything of value in 
return for entering a plea • • • 
, , 
As might be expected, prosecutors emphasized in their 
definitions of plea bargaining the fact that it included 
concessions by the state: 
An agreement between prosecutor and defense which 
calls for some limitation on the part of the state 
other than those required by statute. 
The prosecutor has given up something he or she 
wouldn't have to. 
An incentive offered by the D.A. to encourage a plea. 
In their responses to this first question, different emphases 
159 
were noticeable between the three respondent groups. These emphases 
reflected their respective roles in the court system. Judges viewed 
plea bargaining as ideally a neutral, objective and cooperative 
process with the goal of arriving at a just decision. Public defenders 
saw it, again in ideal terms, as an adversary exchange in which both 
sides had some bargaining power. Prosecutors placed their emphasis 
on their belief that bargaining meant the state suffered somn cost. 
Question Number Two: What Features of a Case Would Make it Most 
Likely that the Prosecutor Would be Willing to Plea Negotiate? 
Judges, prosecutors and public defenders were all most likely 
to cite strength of case as the most important factor in a 
prosecutor's willingness to plea negotiate. This finding was 
consistent with the responses on the questionnaire form. 
Following the strength of case factor, economy was most often 
referred to by the judges. The comments of two judges were 
illustrative: 
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••• prostitution, drugs, marijuana offenses 
and things like that, you just haven't got the time. 
It isn't worth it. So you plea negotiate. 
Even though the state has iron-clad cases, if they 
get 12 burglary cases against the same defendant, 
ordinarily, just for the purposes of economy, they're 
not going to try the same person 12 times. 
This emphasis by the judges on functional needs was also seen in 
their responses on the questionnaire form. 
Prosecutors noted that bargaining decisions were guided by 
their Office policy. However, of all three groups, public 
defenders were the most vocal regarding the importance of D.A.'s 
Office policy. Rather than viewing it as a guiding factor, public 
defenders described it as a limiting factor in the prosecutors' 
ability to plea negotiate. However, the defense attorneys also 
suggested that policy could enhance the chances of plea negotiation 
when prosecutors had a weak case. This was due to their belief 
that the D.A,'s Office had an overriding concern with getting 
convictions. One public defender stated: 
Also, they certainly do evaluate cases in terms of 
can they win. I think from my perception it's accurate 
to say that the D.A.'s Office is much more concerned about 
winning and losing, for whatever purpose ••• I believe 
they're much more supervised there than we are; people 
are watched, and statistics are kept on wins and losses. 
I think we're also concerned with wins and losses; however, 
we don't expect to win. The cases that I have that are 
good to go to trial with, they give me offers that are 
just incredible. 
A related factor mentioned by several public defenders and one 
judge was that policy not to negotiate on certain kinds of cases 
had to be enforced in order for the D.A.'s Office to keep federal 
monies which had been given for the purpose of the reduction of plea 
bargaining. The judge stated: 
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You wouldn't negotiate out your career criminal 
cases where you are rewarded monetarily for not 
negotiating. 
Question Number Three: What Features of a Case Would Make It Most 
Likely that the Defense Attorney would be Inclined to Think the 
Defendant Should Plead Guilty? 
Only judges and public defenders were asked to respond to 
this question. The majority (7 of the 11) judges interviewed said 
that guilt of the defendant was the most important factor. One 
judge actually stated that there were no other factors than actual 
guilt which should be considered in plea decisions. Another judge 
believed that plea decisions should be the result of the objective 
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assessment of the facts of the case by all parties at the pre-trial 
conference. The responses of these judges indicated that they were 
talking about "what should be" rather than "what was." However, even 
with further probing, these judges held to their initial responses 
and were reluctant to attend to the interviewer's queries about 
differences between the ideal and the actual. The three remaining 
judges emphasized strength of case factors as influential in plea 
decisions on the part of the defense. 
Public defenders also said that the guilt of the defendant was 
an important factor in plea decisions. However, they tended to 
elaborate on this factor in the following way. Guilt of the 
defendant, in the majority view, was important in that the defense 
attorney could not allow a client to plead guilty if he or she was 
not able to say that he or she was guilty. On the other hand, an 
admission of guilt by the defendant did not necessarily lead public 
defenders to a belief that pleading guilty was the only or best choice. 
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Twelve of the 15 public defenders said that a primary concern for 
them regarding plea decisions was that their client get the most 
favorable outcome possible. The following statements of three 
public defenders reflect this point of view. 
The only circumstance in which I don't think it's 
appropriate for a client to plead guilty is when in 
fact they can't say that they are in fact guilty. 
My role is simply to get people through the criminal 
justice system as expeditiously as possible for them 
with the least impact possible upon their lives, the least 
adverse effect possible. Generally, plea negotiation 
results in that. 
A condition is that he acknowledge that he'S guilty. 
But it's not a factor in deciding whether to go that 
route. I don't care how guilty they are, or how 
contrite or non-contrite they are; if I think that I 
can beat the case, the thing to do is to beat the case. 
But on the other hand, if I can't beat the case and I know 
it, I still have to try the case if my client says that he's 
not guilty. 
As defense attorneys, we want to limit the exposure of 
the defendant to the authority of the state as much as 
possible. 
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Again, what came through clearly was a commitment on the part of the 
public defenders to their professional roles as advocates for the 
accused. 
Public defenders generally agreed that the defendant was the 
one who had to make the plea decision, and that their job was only to 
present to their client the facts of the case along with a description 
of the possible options and outcomes. One public defender did admit 
that it was not always easy for the defendant to make a plea decision 
without some advice from the attorney: 
To be truthful about that, the defendant often is not in 
a position to make the legal evaluations that are necessary 
to make decisions, and relies heavily on his lawyer's advice 
as to what the odds are of winning or losing, and in that 
sense it is false I think to say that the defendant is 
making an unfettered decision. 
; .. Question Number Four: What Features Make a Case Most Problematic 
or Difficult in Terms of Deciding How to Charge/Plea? 
Prosecutors were asked about problematic features in terms of 
charge decisions, and public defenders were asked about problematic 
features in terms of plea decisions. 
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Three of the five prosecutors interviewed said that the charge 
decision was not problematic in that the laws were quite straight-
forward in defining offenses. Another prosecutor responded that, 
although "problematic" wa~ probably too strong a word, careful 
consideration was required in order to make sure that the facts 
of the case did fit the statute. The fifth prosecutor admitted to 
a problematic or difficult situation which occurred "when the 
credibility of witnesses is difficult to ascertain or you can't 
get enough information." All of these responses relied on a 
legalistic framework for making charge decisions. 
Two of the prosecutors who said that the charge decision was 
not problematic did say that sometimes murder was problematic since 
it could be difficult to prove the defendant's mental state. One 
stated: 
Murder can be difficult because you have to prove 
what's in a guy's head. That's probably why we plea 
bargain murder. 
Problematic features nentioned by defenders, although expressed 
in slightly different ways, all had to do with the ultimate outcome 
for the defendant. All but one public defender referred to cases 
in which either there were possible defenses or the guilt of the 
defendant was unclear, but in which the likelihood of conviction 
and severe punishment were high if they went to trial. Expressing 
a concern for the least possible exposure for their client, the 
defense attorneys said that it was difficult to turn down "good 
offers" in such cases. 
There are cases obviously where there is a great deal 
of pressure to enter a guilty plea. For example, if an 
individual is charged with murder which bears a mandatory 
life sentence, and they're offered some attractive 
charge with basically a guarantee of probation, that's 
a difficult plea to turn down, and we agonize over those 
a great deal. 
Seven public defenders specifically stated that unpredictability 
of outcome was a problematic feature, adding that plea bargaining 
injected some certainty into the disposition outcome. 
Four public defenders said that plea decisions were 
particularly difficult when there was uncertainty about the mental 
or emotional state of the defendant. One of these commented: 
Maybe I think they're mentally ill, but it's nothing 
that I can demonstrate in court that would make them 
not responsible. 
Another pointed out that a defendant's state of mind was sometimes 
such that the individual was unsure about what actually happened. 
Again, the overall concern was over the consequences for the 
defendant of entering a guilty plea as opposed to going to trial; 
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that is, are the risks of going to trial too great for the defendant, 
even though a guilty plea may not be strictly appropriate? 
Question Number Five: Are There Certain Kinds of Cases for Which 
Charge Reductions are Fairly Standard? If So, Could You Give Some 
Examples? 
Although judges and prosecutors were especially inclined to 
object to the term "standard" (stating that no reductions were 
standard), all groups most commonly gave as examples of common 
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reductions certain offense types. Drug offenses (particularly 
marijuana possession) were most often cited as examples of reduction 
cases. Sex crimes, non-premediated murders and assaults were the 
other classes of offenses most frequently cited by the respondents. 
Here, the beliefs of the key actors were consistent with reality, as 
it was these classes of offenses which were most likely to be 
settled with bargained, reduced-charge pleas. The respondents 
expressed the belief (again in line with reality) that cases were 
usually reduced to attempts or lower levels of the initial offense. 
Further probing with the purpose of getting respondents to 
talk about case features (other than general offense types) which 
enhanced the likelihood of charge reduction yielded s'ome information. 
For instance, two prosecutors said that homicides resulting from 
traffic violations were commonly reduced from Manslaughter to 
Criminally Negligent Homicide. Another prosecutor said that sex 
cases in which the victim was unwilling or reluctant to testify 
were commonly reduced. 
There was agreement among public defenders that reducible 
Homicide and Assault cases usually were non-premeditated and often 
involved domestic quarrels or arguments between non-strangers. In 
the case of Assaults, it was pointed out, complainant and defendant 
might not be easily distinguished: 
In an assault case, there's often something that's 
happened between two individuals which provoked one of 
the individuals to strike the other, and it's usually the 
guy who gets hurt most who ends up running down to the 
courthouse and filing a complaint • • • 
Several public defenders talked about the importance of 
getting cases reduced to misdemeanors or at least to Class C 
felonies, both allowing in some instances for eventual expungement: 
Of course, we're always trying hard, especially on a 
first offender, for reductions to a Class C felony for 
purposes of expungement. 
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Another remarked that if it was not possible to get a reduction to a 
Class C felony or a misdemeanor, it was better to plead to an attempt 
(which reduces the offense one level) than to a lesser degree, e. g • , 
Assault I to Assault II, because an attempt looked better on the 
defendant's record. 
Public defenders agreed that charge reductions were less 
common than they had been prior to new policies instituted by the 
D.A.'s Office. Generally, however, they agreed that for non-
reducible offenses, bargains to dismiss, not file, or give favorable 
sentence recommendations were common. 
A complaint often expressed by public defenders was that the 
uniform and rigid charge reduction policies adhered to by the D.A.'s 
Office worked against the first offender but in favor of the more 
long-term criminal. Other kinds of bargains, uniformly applied, had 
the same effect. 
It is in fact true that in most Burg I in a dwelling and 
Rob I they have quit charge reduction. However, what they 
have done instead is--they have continued to offer people 
the chance to plead guilty to one charge in exchange for an 
agreement not to bring other charges. Of course that has 
the effect of taking the truly professional criminal--the 
one who has committed many crimes, and giving them one 
Class A felony; however, it takes the 18 year old who has 
committed his first offense, and he gets the same conviction 
as the more hardened criminal. 
Another complaint of the defense attorneys was that the placement 
of ~, individual in the Career Criminal unit (where all offenses 
are non-negotiable) was arbitrary, and depended in great part on 
whether or not the state had a strong case: 
I get appointed on cases every day that the client 
clearly qualifies as a career criminal--it's a felony, 
and it was committed while he was on probation or parole, 
where he has a significant prior record, has been to the 
pen before--all their criteria--but you look at the case, 
and it stinks, either in terms of the facts or there's 
just a glaring search and seizure problem, a clear psychiatric 
defense, or something like that where--you know, they won't 
touch them. I suspect they're concerned because their 
funding depends on their statistics, and if they come back 
getting a lot of not guiltys, or it it's thrown out because 
of a motion to suppress, or there are psychiatric defenses, 
it's going to hurt their statistics. 
Indeed, one public defender filed a motion intent upon proving that 
the Career Criminal Unit was unconstitutional in that it violated 
the individual's due process rights. The motion was not upheld, 
however, and the Career Criminal unit remains active. 
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Eight of the 11 judges responded to the question about routine 
charge reductions with essentially "don't know" answers. The 
following statements were illustrative: 
That's a hard question. I'm not sure that I can 
answer that very well. I don't know enough of their 
statistics. 
Well, I don't know. I'm really not prepared to give 
an answer to that. 
You'd have to look at the handbook with guidelines and 
the framework as to when they will do a plea reduction. 
My understanding is that they won't bargain on major 
crimes now. But I've seen it done. 
I do not believe there are any kinds of cases for 
which pleas to reduced charges are standard, nor do I think 
there should be. 
1'.· 
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In spite of these initial responses, further probing yielded examples 
of commonly reduced offense types from all but two judges. The 
examples were the same as those given by prosecutors and public 
defenders, i.e., drugs, certain homicides and assaults, and sex 
crimes. 
Five judges made references to the fact that agreements to 
dismiss or not file appeared to be common bargains at present. How-
eve~ none of the judges talked about sentence bargaining, although 
one judge did comment on his own role in sentence reduction: 
I reduce many cases--pure and simple shoplifts in which 
the shoplifter would try to run or something like that, 
they're charged with robbery, and although technically the 
facts might fit the statutory definition of robbery, it 
was still just a shoplift. In that situation, in that 
type of case, even though the conviction was for robbery, 
I don't reduce the charge--I reduce the penalty; I 
consider it as a misdemeanor instead of a felony. 
The interviewer's impression of the judges' responses to 
this question, as to others, was that they were reluctant to give 
opinions about anything that was going on in the system in which 
they were not formally involved or for which they did not have 
statistics. Another impression was that they were inclined to 
respond to questions in terms of how the system was formally 
structured and how it was to function ideally. Some judges seemed 
to think that what was wanted from the interview was a description 
of the court system similar to what one might get in a political 
science or law course. One judge, for example, asked why it was 
necessary to talk to so many judges, expressing the belif that 
one could get all the information from talking to just one judge. 
Another frequent comment was that one should talk to someone from 
> .• 
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the D.A.'s or P.D.'s Office in order to get information about those 
Offices. On the other hand, when the question was clearly an 
opinion question, e.g., what do you think are the main advantages 
and disadvantages of plea bargaining, the judges were more willing 
to give their opinions. 
Question Number Six: What Do You See as Your Primary Responsibilities 
or Goals in Your Role as Prosecutor/Public Defender/Judge? 
The responses of all three groups included references to the 
primary task or goal of handling cases as well as possible. As would 
be expected, the meaning of handling a case well varied in accordance 
with their respective roles. For judges, the general theme had 
to do with seeing that a fair trial was conducted from the standpoint 
of both the state and the defendant. For the prosecutors, handling 
a case well referred to convicting the guilty and thus protecting 
the community from crime. Public defenders were concerned with 
giving their clients the best possible legal representation and 
with reducing their exposure to the system. 
As advocates for the state, prosecutors believed that it 
was their duty to prepare their cases well and get convictions: 
Charge right. Prepare right. Present correctly and win. 
Convict all the guilty people you can find. 
They also spoke of their role in crime control: 
To try to help solve the crime problem--either by 
putting people in jailor scaring them about going 
to jail, or maybe just warehousing. 
Orderly process of holding people responsible 
for their anti-social acts; this serves rehabilitation 
and deterrence. 
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All public defenders interviewed stressed first and foremost 
their responsibility to provide good legal defense for their clients 
and to see that their clients got the best disposition possible--the 
best disposition being defined as that which resulted in the least 
severe exposure or punishment. Three public defenders made an 
interesting point when they said that their responsibilities were 
sometimes incompatible. On the one hand, they felt obliged to see 
that due process and other legal rights were upheld; on the other 
hand, they were committed to seeing that the individual client 
suffered the least severe consequences from the disposition. The 
incompatability surfaced when an attorney felt that a legal issue 
should be tested but that such a test might result in a less favor-
able disposition for the client should the attorney lose the case. 
Additionally, testing the legal issue could mean a longer period 
of pre-disposition incarceration (or at the least a longer period 
of exposure to the system) for the defendant. 
Six public defenders specifically stated that a major 
responsibility was to see that the system worked properly and 
honestly. One of these expressed the belief that although they 
" (public defenders) did not have any overwhelming impact on the 
outcome of the case, the fact that they were there as advocates for 
the defendants kept the system in line. 
Service to the client was seen by public defenders as 
including more than providing them with solid, proper defenses. 
All of the defense attorneys referred to their duty to make sure 
that their clients were totally informed about their case, their 
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rights, and the options available. Five of the respondents talked 
at length about their social role in relation to their clients: 
Beyond that [legal representation] I think we're also 
involved with dealing with human beings--our 
clients, our clients' families, even victims. And we try 
to help people out. I'm very much concerned about the 
particular life problems that my client might have, above 
and beyond and apart from the particular crime that he may 
or may not have committed. 
But going beyond the legal issues, I think we playa 
big social role to the client--probably a social worker role, 
because a lot of what we're doing is taking somebody who's 
off the track and trying to get them back on the track, 
going into the reasons as to why they're involved in 
criminal activity and trying to prevent them from re-involving 
themselvel'l. 
I think we do more than that [legal representation]; we 
handle the people too. I think we really contribute to 
keeping crime down in this community because of the good 
relationships that we try to foster with our clients. 
In their responses, judges referred to their responsibility 
of making sure that cases were resolved fairly from the standpoint 
of all involved. Six judges emphasized their responsibility to 
insure a "fair trial." Three judges, however, noted the fact 
that since many cases did not go to trial, their main job was to 
insure fair guilty pleas and accompanying negotiations. As one 
of these judges stated: 
I prefer to think of the judge's primary role as just 
presiding over the means of resolving the controversy, 
which in the criminal justice system, as in the civil 
system, means mostly by negotiation, because only a 
small part of either kind of case is ever tried. 
Another of these three judges, again noting the great number of 
guilty pleas, said that a primary responsibility was to make sure 
that guilty pleas were valid and to see that once it had been 
decided that a case should go to trial, it was not negotiated at 
the trial level. 
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Several judges cited administrative tasks as an important part 
of their role, and seven judges talked about sentencing duties. 
Finally, two judges discussed the enormity of the job in relation 
to the time available. One of these said: 
Unfortunately, under this present system, my main 
function is just to turn the business over. I'm not 
allowed the luxury of giving as much thought or time 
or effort to a particular case as I would prefer to give. 
Question Number Seven: What Makes You Feel Satisfied with the 
Disposition Outcome of a Case You Have Handled? 
Only prosecutors and public defenders were asked about 
satisfactions with cases they handled. Again, concomitant with 
their respective roles, prosecutors said they felt best about 
getting convictions, whereas public defenders felt most satisfied 
when they could get their clients off with as little exposure to the 
system as possible. 
Four of the five prosecutors said that they felt satisfied 
when they got a conviction. One of these said "when the defendant 
is convicted of the crime that represents what he actually did." 
Another mentioned "conviction on particularly heinous crimes." Two 
prosecutors said they felt good when dangerous offenders were 
incarcerated. The fifth prosecutor gave a more general response, 
saying that he was satisfied when "I've done the best I can." 
The responses of the prosecutors indicated that there was a 
distinction between deserving and underserving offenders. Two 
prosecutors commented that they got satisfaction from helping 
deserving offenders get into alternative programs, although one 
remarked that usually there was little feedback from this: 
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At times people just get caught up in the system, 
and they show remorse. When you can divert these 
people, it's also satisfying. 
Usually there's no follow-up on what happens say 
to a youthful first-time offender whom you've helped 
get into some rehabilitative program. 
Eleven of the 15 public defenders said that a not guilty 
verdict was extremely satisfying. Of these 11, 8 responded with 
this answer practically before the question could be asked. In 
a particularly candid response, one public defender said: 
There's nothing that even compares to the feeling of a 
not guilty verdict from the jury. There's just no 
emotion in the job that compares with it. And it's truly 
an ego-satisfying one in the sense of exhuberance you 
get from it; the sense of elation is, at least speaking 
for myself, totally unrelated to whether the man is innocent 
or guilty. It is purely a matter of them against me, and 
I won. 
In addition to a not guilty verdict, public defenders stated 
that dismissals, fair sentences, and keeping people out of jail/ 
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penitentiary were all very satisfying. Ten of the defense attorneys 
specifically mentioned that they felt very good when they could 
have some affect on their client's life, e.g., helping solve a 
problem, get into a rehabilitative program, stay out of the system 
in the future. Seven public defenders talked about the satisfaction 
from having a creative sentencing alternative accepted by the judge. 
In all of these responses, however, public defenders indicated 
that many of these things rarely happened, and that when they did, 
they were happily surprised. Some comments illustrate: 
The most satisfying thing of course is the acquittal 
or dismissal of a factually, legally innocent client. 
Not a terribly frequent occurrence, but that's the 
most satisfying. 
Actually I think the most honest answer is the few 
occasions when three years after the case was over, the 
I 
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defendant came back by and waS doing fine, and 
had really made some changes. That doesn't happen 
too often; if that was all you had to sustain you, 
you'd be in trouble. 
Getting positive feedback from the clients--that's 
satisfying, although that's not a major part of the 
satisfaction of the job. You can't expect a lot of 
gratitude from the clients. 
Winning is nice, but it happens very seldom, so that's 
not much of a source of gratification. 
I think the thing that's most rewarding for me is 
feeling that somebody who is not a hardened criminal 
gets a break a person deserves. Now whether that's by 
going to trial and getting a not guilty verdict--even 
though he may be guilty--or whether it's by entering a 
plea and having the good fortune of having the judge 
understand the point of view which you're presenting 
about that person--having the judge go along with that 
against all odds, and having this person come out of it 
with a second chance 
Perhaps due to the perceived infrequency of some of the most 
rewarding occurrences, public defenders were also inclined to 
state that it was very satisfying just to know that they had done 
as good a job as possible in representing their client, and that 
others (e.g., clients, attorneys, judges) gave them recognition for 
a job well done: 
When my clients feel good about how I've handled 
their case. When I know I did something well and 
that other people see it. 
Knowing that I've done all that I can do and that 
at least the client has been represented as well as he 
can expect to be represented. 
When you come up with something really creative, 
and the judge sees that 
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Question Number Eight: How Would You Characterize the Relationship 
of the District Attorney's Office with the Public Defender's Office? 
All three groups of respondents were asked how they would 
characterize the relationship between the D.A.'s and P.D.'s Offices. 
After their initial response, the interviewer probed by asking 
whether or not they thought there was cooperation between the 
two Offices. A further probe attempted to ascertain whether or 
not the respondents thought that the prosecutors and public 
defenders had divergent belief systems or world views which went 
beyond what was inherent in the adversary system. 
Generally, all three groups expressed the belief that 
relationships between attorneys in the two Offices were good, and 
that although there were at times conflicts between some individual 
attorneys, for the most part they got along quite well at the staff 
level. It was pointed out by many that although there was cooperation 
in the working relationship, cooperation was limited by the nature 
of the adversary roles of the attorneys. The responses to the 
question about belief systems were mixed, with some interviewees 
believing that they were similar and others believing that they 
were dissimilar. 
Prosecutors characterized the relationship between the two 
Offices with such phrases as "congenial," "good rapport," and "over-
all quite good." One prosecutor said that the relationship was 
"good in that we can communicate and healthy in that we're not the 
best of friends," suggesting that a certain distance should be 
maintained due to their divergent responsibilities within the criminal 
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justice system. Prosecutors' comments about cooperation were 
similarly qualified. One said, for example, that there was cooperation 
in that "we share what we're required to share," but that the 
adversary system was inherently not a cooperative one. Another 
prosecutor said that there was cooperation in the sense that both 
sides worked toward making the system run properly and effectively. 
Public defenders agreed with prosecutors that overall the 
relationship was good, using phrases similar to those of the 
prosecutors, e.g., cordial, respectful, generally pretty good. How-
ever, 12 of the 15 defense attorneys stressed that it was difficult 
to generalize and that relationships varied with different 
attorneys. Here, as in other responses, public defenders were 
more inclined than prosecutors or judges to take an individualistic 
rather than a systemic approach. 
They have so many people, and they run the gamut 
of personalities and abilities, that it gets complicated 
to generalize. 
There's respect for individuals on both sides, but it's 
selective. 
It's really a matter of individual relationships as a 
felony attorney. 
There is cooperation between individual attorneys. 
Eleven public defenders expressed the belief that there were strains 
in the relationship due to certain policies of the D.A.'s Office 
which severely limited the freedom of staff attorneys to make 
their own decisions. 
There's less to cooperate about because of the 
directives from the top it seems to me, and that is 
part of what the strains are. 
(', 
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Deputies have very little independence, exercise very 
little judgment on their own, because they're not 
allowed to. And frequently then you find that you're 
dealing with some guideline, or some office policy that 
there's really no way for us to attack. 
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Particularly frustrating to public defenders were the policies which 
disallowed or severely limited plea negotiation. Specifically 
singled out by three public defenders was the Career Criminal unit: 
There's some strain between attorneys in our office and 
attorneys in the Career Criminal Unit, and it's not because 
some of the attorneys in our office don't like those attorneys; 
it's because it's very hard to deal with the way they're 
handling cases. They have to follow their rules. 
That [working with the Career Criminal Unit) is just like 
beating your head against the wall. I mean they cannot 
negotiate the charge; they cannot give any sentence recom-
mendation prior to sentencing; so it's just a difficult 
situation 
Like prosecutors, public defenders were inclined to qualify 
their responses to the question about cooperation: 
There's not a great deal of cooperation because we do 
represent differing points of view. Within that fr~~e­
work we cooperate to the extent that we don't cause each 
other unnecessary trouble, and we attempt to make the 
system work. 
We work together on an ongoing basis, and I think more 
than cooperation I would be inclined to describe it as 
familiarity. You know the kinds of things this person is 
likely to do or think. 
Three public defenders expressed the belief that because it was an 
adversary system, it was not a good idea for the two sides to become 
too cordial. However, these same respondents also felt that it was 
necessary for them to have a good working relationship with the 
deputies in order to benefit their clients. 
I think there should always be a barrier between the 
defense and the prosecution. I think it's dangerous--
and you see this in small counties--for the D.A.'s and 
the defense attorneys to be all buddy-buddy. I think that 
I 
I 
takes away part of your fighting spirit. I try to be 
very pleasant to all of them, even at great strain, 
because I think that's part of the job. 
It's extremely cordial, and at times I think perhaps 
too cordial ••• Obviously we work together constantly, 
and it's necessary to benefit my client that I have a 
relatively good working relationship with the D.A.s and 
the courts because you get more play out of the system. 
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Judges also expressed the belief that the relationship between 
the two Offices was good, while reiterating that nevertheless they 
remained adversaries. The following comments illustrate: 
A lot of compatability without compromise. 
I think they get along very well, although they 
maintain an adversary position. To the extent that there 
can be cooperation in an adversary procedure, yes. 
Cooperative arms length relationship; thoroughly 
professional and in the public interest. 
Seems to operate with a minimum of friction. I'm 
not sure the word is cooperation because they represent 
different parties and have different responsibilities. 
Excellent; they have great respect for each other, at 
least this is demonstrated in court. Cooperation in the 
sense of complying with the law as far as adhering to 
their respon,sibili ties, but never at any time diminishing 
or ignoring their responsibilities to their respective 
clients. You know, it is an adversary system. 
Judges, then, strongly maintained that the relationship between the 
opposing attorneys conformed to the ideal adversary relationship. 
Only one judge even sopke of a possible problem of too much 
cooperation: 
Sometimes there's been criticism because of this, through 
the idea that you have two large offices constantly doing 
business together and that the individual case or client 
could suffer. 
Also, one judge specifically mentioned friction over the Career 
Criminal Unit: 
, 
'I 
I'm sure there is strong feeling between them as to 
this idea of the Career Criminal Unit, that is, the D.A.'s 
flat denial to negotiate on any of certain cases; there's 
sharp disagreement in that area. other than that I don't 
see them at odd points very often. 
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Seven judges remarked in their responses to this question that both 
Offices had very competent, able staffs, and that the legal represen-
tation was of the highest quality. 
Six public defenders said they did not think there were really 
any major differences in world views between prosecutors and defense 
attorneys beyond that inherent in their adversary roles, although 
three of these six said that there were individual exceptions: 
I think that our attitudes are very similar with the 
exception of some D.A.'s who say that they could never 
defend someone. 
I think there are shared beliefs in general. I think 
there are some prosecutors and some defense attorneys who 
have widely divergent views, but there are also some 
defense attorneys who have widely divergent views. 
Eight public defenders said that there were noticeable differences 
in the belief systems or world views of the prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, although five of these eight believed that the differences 
came about as a result of their respective job experiences: 
You do get a mind set that fits in with what you're 
doing, and this is necessary to do it well. 
I think it's a question of experience, and how the 
experience shapes your view of cases. 
The comments of two public defenders suggested that public defenders 
saw themselves as fighting for the underdog (both of these respondents 
said that they could never be prosecutors): 
I think maybe it's kind of the underdog mentality that we 
have here. You know, it's hard to be a public defender in 
that you never have the marbles in your pocket; you're 
always fighting an uphill battle and filing motions 
which you know you have a 2% chance of winning • • • 
I enjoy having the state on the other side of wherever 
I am because there is a certain anarchistic romance to 
that • . • My ego satisfaction would not be as great 
if I were on the side of all the odds. 
Among those public defenders who believed that there were basic 
differences in world views, the comments held to a similar theme: 
I think a prosecutor is more inclined to be law and 
order oriented, and a defense attorney is more liberal in 
terms of getting at what are the causes that caused this 
person to commit crime. 
People in our office at least start out dedicated to 
the idea of trying to do something to help out people 
who really had a bad shake from the beginning; D.A.s 
see themselves as protecting society from criminals. 
I think there is a feeling that the public defender 
has a more sympathetic, human point of view. 
None of the prosecutors felt that there were widely divergent 
belief systems beyond what was inherent in the adversary system: 
Generally there are shared beliefs and goals. Most 
of the public defenders would make good prosecutors. 
There's a shared belief about criminal justice although 
we come at it from different sides. Both view crime as 
something negative; both believe that the criminal justice 
system ought to be administered by the rules. 
One prosecutor did say that prosecutors, like judges, may tend to 
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become more conservative over time as a result of their job experience. 
Another said that the nature of the public defender's job was such 
that a pro-client orientation was paramount, leaving little time for 
a concern with overall criminal justice goals. 
Judges agreed with prosecutors that generally the only 
difference in belief systems was that which was inherent in the 
adversary system: 
I 
In general, no; both are committed to the same legal 
system. In a specific case, of course, because they 
are adversaries, they do take a contrary position, a 
contrary point of view on the specific case. 
No, I don't think it's very dramatic. There are 
some differences in orientation, but most could switch 
from one office to the other and be just as effective. 
Question Number Nine: What Do You See as the Main Advantages and 
Disadvantages of plea Bargaining? 
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All respondents were asked what they saw as the main advantages 
and disadvantages of plea bargaining. Probing further, the inter-
viewer also asked them who they thought were the major beneficiaries 
of plea bargaining. Although there were some within-group differences, 
the most notable differences in opinions were between the three groups 
or respondents. Prosecutors were inclined to think that there were 
few advantages to plea bargaining, but were able to state a number 
of disadvantages. Public defenders, on the other hand, felt that 
plea bargaining was a positive and essential part of the criminal 
justice system, citing the individualization of justice as a major 
advantage. Judges generally stated that plea bargaining was an 
inevitable part of the present criminal justice system and that the 
major advantage was the reduction of court overload. 
Although none of the prosecutors felt that there were any 
major advantages of plea bargaining, two did say that it was useful 
when there was a case in which a victim didn't want to have to 
testify at trial. Another said that in a case in which the defendant 
was guilty but would be difficult to convict because of loopholes in 
the case , it was probably "better to get him fOl:' something than 
nothing. " A fourth said: 
If there is an advantage, I guess its expediency--
unclogging of the courts. But I don't think there 
are any real advantages. I guess it does give us a 
lot of leverage to get a conviction. 
The fifth prosecutor said that plea bargaining didn't really make 
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any difference one way or the other, either in terms of court needs 
or in terms of the eventual outcome of the case. This prosecutor 
refrained from giving an opinion about the advantages or disadvantages 
of plea bargaining, simply stating that it was a long-time tradition 
which had become routinized. The four prosecutors who did express 
an opinion said that a major disadvantage was that plea bargaining 
led to dispositions which didn't really reflect reality--didn't 
reflect what kind of a person the defendant really was or what he 
or she really had done. Two said that with plea bargaining the 
defendant learned to manipulate the system and that thus the 
integrity of the system was reduced. One said that it was a waste 
of time, that more time was spent on negotiating than on preparing 
for a trial. Another said that the state gave up too much of its 
case. A final negative comment was that the victims usually didn't 
understand and were unhappy about it. 
All public defenders expressed the belief that plea bargaining 
was a positive part of the system in that it individualized justice 
and gave defendants a chance of having their exposure to the criminal 
justice system reduced. Four public defenders did say that sometimes 
the benefits for defendants were illusory in that they ended up with 
the same sentence that they would have without the bargain. However, 
it was emphasized that a reduction from a felony to a misdemeanor did 
have the advantage of allowing for record expungement even if the 
sentence was the same. 
Public defenders often referred to justice goals when citing 
the advantages of plea bargaining: 
it would be impossible to see that justice was 
done if cases couldn't be individualized, if modifi-
cations couldn't be made in the law, which requires 
equality regardless of circumstances, situations. 
I think oftentimes a more just and certain result 
occurs with the benefit of plea negotiation than 
would otherwise occur without it. I can almost liken 
it to any kind of arbitration in a labor union dispute 
or a contract dispute; you have attorneys representing 
the interests of whoever's involved. You negotiate, and 
out of that comes the best result. 
The system is fine in general, but it provides very 
broad justice. And when it gets down to the individual, 
it can provide some very definite injustices. And that's 
where plea negotiation, along with the charging discretion 
of the D.A. and the judges' sentencing discretion--all of 
these help to humanize the system. 
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Twelve public defenders mentioned as an advantage that plea bargaining 
served functional needs in that it conserved resources and allowed 
for an efficient processing of a large number of cases. Four of the 
defense attorneys pointed out that speedy disposition was not merely 
an advantage for the courts but that it was also a fairness to 
defendants. 
There was also consistency in the responses of the public 
defenders concerning the disadvantages of plea bargaining. Dis-
advantages were primarily seen in terms of injustices to the defendants 
that could result from a poorly or improperly administered negotiation 
system. Among injustices to defendants, seven public defenders said 
that plea bargaining could put undue pressure on defendants to plead 
guilty in exchange for the certainty of a reasonable disposition, 
even though the individual might not be guilty of the charge and/or 
might have a good chance of getting an acquittal or dismissal. 
-_11--.---.............  
It strikes me that the worst thing about negotiating 
is that people end up pleading to things that they 
didn't do and/or they plead to things that couldn't 
be proven • 
• • • the real possibility that when a person's 
charged with a very serious crime, and he is not guilty, 
but there's a lot of evidence against him, circumstantial 
or whatever, there's strong pressure to enter a guilty 
plea to a lesser charge when the D.A. offers a plea 
bargain. 
Two noted that the plea negotiation option in this sytem was 
discretionary in that certain types of offenders who were charged 
with certain types of offenses were not given this option. Again 
the Career Criminal Unit was used as a primary example of such 
unfair discretion. Another two remarked that plea bargaining 
did violate due process rights by circumventing the trial process. 
However, most of the public defenders expressed the belief that 
going to trial was a difficult and trying experience for the 
defendant, and that it carried with it higher risks than did 
disposition through negotiation. One public defender pointed out 
that an admission of guilt and an expression of remorse with the 
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entry of a guilty plea were valuable in obtaining a lighter sentence 
from the judge: 
If the purpose of sentencing is rehabilitation, and 
you have a defendant that won't even admit that he's guilty, 
and he compounds that by getting on the stand and lying about 
his guilt, then you're more likely to treat him more 
severely than a person who comes and says, "I've made a 
mistake; I'm pleading guilty. Please deal with me leniently." 
Three defense attomeys said that a potential disadvantage of 
plea bargaining was that it could lead to a situation in which defense 
attorneys tended to anticipate and accept routinized bargains without 
carefully considering possible defenses for individual cases: 
I think that I have perceived, especially if you have 
a case which you know will fall into a typical plea 
negotiation pattern, it will make you less apt to really 
search the case, and prepare the case, do the legal 
research., _ and so discover possible defenses. 
• • • a potential danger is that the needs of the 
court system take priority and that cases would not be 
seen on their individual basis. 
All but one of the judges talked about the advantages of 
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plea bargaining in terms of court and criminal justice system needs. 
For example: 
• • • without it, the system would be in turmoil; 
it allows us to streamline the system. 
It's practical; there are not enough resources to 
try all cases. 
cutting down on the number of cases that go 
to trial. The whole criminal justice system is over-
crowded. 
Without it, the costs would simply be staggering. 
I think it's absolutely essential in order to dispose 
of cases. 
The one dissenting judge said that "there was a mistaken belief 
that the system would be bankrupted without plea bargaining." The 
elimination of plea bargaining, in the opinion of this judge, would 
increase the integrity of the system without increasing court over-
load because prosecutors would be forced to consider carefully the 
charging decision and guilty offenders would thus be likely to plead 
to the charge. One judge supported the contention of one of the 
public defenders by saying: 
If a person is guilty, an acknowledgement of guilt 
is an essential precondition to any kind of rehabili-
tation. Insofar as rehabilitation is one of the goals 
of the criminal justice syste, it is to that extent 
facilitated by plea negotiation. 
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The responses of the judges to the question about dis-
advantages of plea bargaining varied. Three said that it was mis-
understood by the public, who often saw it as a way in which criminal 
justice goals were compromised. Four stated that a negative aspect 
was that the reality of the crime was not accurately reflected as a 
result of plea bargaining. Two believed that a potential danger 
was that defendants could be pressured into pleading guilty, and 
three mentioned the possibility of prosecutorial overcharging in 
anticipation of bargaining. Finally, two said that because of a 
bargain, offenders might be given lighter sentences than they 
deserve. 
Of the 11 judges interviewed, 5 did not either strongly 
support or oppose the plea bargaining process, but rather claimed 
that it was essential to meet functional needs. Three did not 
approve of plea bargaining, and three thought that properly 
administered, plea bargaining was a positive component of the 
criminal justice system. 
It can be fundamentally fair if it's structured and 
under the supervision of the court. 
Plea negotiation carefully controlled, using recognized 
standards published by the prosecutor's office and 
available to defense counsel and closely supervised 
by the court is, in my judgment, a legitimate, effective 
and necessary component of the criminal justice system. 
without such controls, it would pose a serious hazard to 
the integrity of the system. 
There must be standard, open procedures. I'm very 
much in favor of it; properly administered, it 
benefits all. 
And on the other side: 
l. 
I don't like it; I'm uncomfortable with it. We 
should try people on what we think they're guilty 
of. Society and the whole judicial system 
suffer because of the acceptance of it. 
I don't believe in it ••• You either stand 
trial or the case is dismissed. Individuals 
ought to be tried for what they're indicted for. 
While judges agreed that the plea negotiation process should 
be structured and supervised by the court, no judge expressed the 
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belief that judges ought to take part in the actual plea negotiation 
process. Three specifically stated (although they were not asked 
this question) that judges should definitely not play a role in the 
actual negotiation. 
Responses to the question of who were the major beneficiaries 
of plea bargaining indicated that the way in which major beneficiaries 
were perceived was related to a general acceptance or rejection of 
plea bargaining as a positive process. Prosecutors emphasized that 
the defendant was either the major or sole beneficiary of plea 
bargaining (although one said that whether or not the defendant 
actually benefited depended on individual cases). One prosecutor 
expressed the opinion that no one benefited. Public defenders 
consistently stated that everybody benefited from plea bargaining, 
i.e., the court system, the attorneys, the public and the defendant. 
Those judges in favor of plea negotiation were inclined to believe 
that it benefited all, and those opposed that it benefited the 
defendant or no one. The judges who were neutral in their assess-
ment of plea bargaining emphasized the public as a major beneficiary 
due to the cost benefits for the taxpayer. 
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CONCLUDING REf.1ARKS 
Data from the interviews indicated that there was overall 
agreement among key court actors regarding the reality of the case 
disposition process in this urban court system. Additionally, their 
responses about factors given the most consideration in disposition 
decisions, about what kinds of offenses were typically bargained, 
and about the power of the prosecutor in the bargaining exchange 
were consistent with the objective data. Each group of attorneys, 
however, perceived their own Offices in a more favorable light in 
terms of working toward ideal goals. Judges showed some tendency 
to idealize the system's operations in general. 
The data resulting from the conversational part of the inter-
view offered clear evidence of the between-group variations in 
attitudes toward the plea bargaining process and exchange. These 
differences undeniably reflect the system status of prosecutors, 
public defenders and judges in the court system. 
Judges, the group farthest removed from the actual plea 
negotiation process, viewed this process as a well-structured, open 
examination and discussion of the facts of a case. They did not 
talk about the existence of game plans, strategy calculations, trade-
offs, etc. in their descriptions of plea bargaining. They 
expressed the opinion that, ideal or not, plea negotiation was 
necessary to meet functional needs. They believed that the relation-
ship between the P.D.'s and D.A.'s Offices was professional and 
cordial, but cooperative only within the limits of the adversary 
system. 
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Prosecutors, on the other hand, held negative attitudes 
toward plea bargaining in general. They believed that plea 
bargaining distorted the reality of the crime (or the criminal), 
presenting a less negative picture than was actually the case. 
Like judges, they did not refer to the existence of game plans, 
strategy calculations or trade-offs. Also like judges, they 
expressed the opinion that the relationship between the two sets of 
attorneys was professional and friendly, but cooperative only to the 
extent that the rules of the adversary system allowed. 
Public defenders strongly advocated case disposition through 
a negotiation process in which individual adversary attorneys were 
responsible for making decisions about individual cases. They 
believed that plea negotiation benefited all, and could think of few 
disadvantages in an open, above-board plea bargaining process in 
which all parties were committed to obtaining justice on an 
individualized basis. They believed, however, that the present 
policies of the D.A.'s Office left little room for individual 
decision-making and therefore curbed the individualization of 
justice. Although prosecutors were confined by a strict set of 
rules regarding plea negotiation, plea bargaining, in the view of 
public defenders, still included an element of game-playing. An 
example often given by the defense attorneys was that good deals were 
offered on capes which differed from non-reducible cases on only 
one variable, i.e., strength of case. Concerned about not getting 
a conviction, the prosecutor offered good deals on those very cases 
which the public defender felt stood a good chance at trial. Since 
public defenders felt that they had little to offer the state in 
190 
the bargaining process, their need to calculate, anticipate, and 
weighicosts and benefits to their client was continual. Public 
defenders indicated that at the staff level, the relationships between 
the two sets of attorneys was generally good. They, too, noted that 
cooperation was of a professional nature and that the adversary 
orientation was maintained. strains were most apparent when the 
public defenders worked on cases which were totally non-negotiable 
within D.A. policy. 
The interviews, then, fulfilled the research endeavor to 
include the perceptions of key court actors regarding the case 
disposition process in the system in which they worked. The next 
chapter presents the findings from observations of the case 
disposition process in action. The two activities for which a 
standard set of observations were recorded were the pre-trial 
conference (in which plea bargaining took place) and the Chief 
criminal Court hearings (in which guilty pleas were entered, 
accepted and sentenced). 
CHAPTER VII 
FELONY CASE DISPOSITION IN ACTION: 
OBSERVATIONS OF THE PROCESS 
INTRODUCTION 
The findings from the final data source--observations of case 
process--are presented in this chapter. An observational methodology 
is obviously extremely useful in uncovering the behavioral reality 
of the case disposition process. Additionally, it yields information 
on the attitudes of the individuals participating in the process. 
It also allows for an assessment of the setting in which the activity 
takes place. Finally, by combining the observations of all these 
components--behaviors, attitudes and setting--the researcher is 
better able to form a picture of the whole. 
Two of the several activities in the case disposition process 
were selected for standardized observations. The first was the pre-
trial conference, which was the formal setting for plea bargaining. 
This conference did appear to be the setting in which most of the 
plea bargaining actually (not just ideally) took place. Thus, its 
relevance to the research topic is paramount. The second was the 
plea and sentence hearings in Chief Criminal Court--the setting in 
which the great majority of felony cases were adjudicated. Since all 
guilty pleas were entered and accepted or rejected in Chief Criminal 
Court, the relevance of this activity is also obvious. 
I 
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THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
with the agreement of the participating attorneys and the 
defendant, the researcher was able to observe five pre-trial 
conferences from beginning to end. The conferences took place in 
one of two locations in the Courthouse. Two rooms separated from 
one another by a divider and located adjacent to the courtroom of 
the Chief Criminal Judge (the only entrance to these rooms was 
through the courtroom) were designated as the pre-trial conference 
rooms. However, since there were more scheduled conferences than 
could be handled by these spaces, a number of conferences took place 
in private offices in the D.A. Office complex. One of the observed 
conferences was in the former designated rooms, and four took place 
in the D.A. Offices. The shortest of the observed conferences took 
ten minutes, the longest thirty minutes. Following is a summary of 
the conversations carried on during the conferences. 
Conference 1 
Initial charge: UUV/DWS/Failure Yield Right-of-Way. 
Conversation summary. 
Prosecutor explained what would take place in conference. 
Prosecutor presented his case. 
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and 
investigative reports. 
Prosecutor talked about strength of his case. 
Prosecutor questioned defendant about prior record. 
Defendant responded about prior record. 
Prosecutor talked about strength of his case. 
Prosecutor asked defendant if he had questions about the 
purpose of the conference. Defendant responded that 
he had no questions. 
Public defenders asked defendant if there were witnesses. 
Defendant answered that there were no witnesses. 
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public defender explained what would take place in conference. 
public defender talked about strength of case. 
Prosecutor asked defendant if he had opinion as to sentence. 
Defendant answered he did not. 
Prosecutor asked defendant if he committed the crime. 
Defendant answered he was guilty of ULV. 
Public defender asked defendant about prior record. 
Defendant responded about prior record. 
Prosecutor asked defendant for information about himself. 
Defendant responded. 
Prosecutor offered to dismiss the DWS count, but said 
he was hesitant to dismiss the Failure to Yield count. 
Prosecutor asked defendant about employment situation. 
Defendant responded. 
Public defender, prosecutor and defendant discussed the 
nature of the offense. 
Public defender asked prosecutor if he would dismiss the 
Failure to Yield count if there were no civil problem. 
Defendant said he would be willing to pay damages and that 
he didn't want to have to go to jail. 
Prosecutor said he would dismiss Failure to Yield count if 
the victim would agree to this. 
Prosecutor set time limit on the plea offer. 
Prosecutor said sentence recommendation would be made after 
the pre-sentence investigation. 
Public defender asked prosecutor if state would recommend 
misdemeanor treatment. 
Prosecutor said that state would oppose immediate misdemeanor 
treatment. 
Public defender told prosecutor deferred misdemeanor 
recommendation was no bargain since this would 
probably occur anyway. 
Prosecutor again asked defendant if he had any questions. 
Defendant responded he did not. 
Public defender again questioned the prosecutor about 
sentence recommendation. 
Prosecutor and public defender discussed restitution for 
the victim. 
194 
All participants in Conference 1 contributed to the discussion. 
The prosecutor spoke slightly more often (22 comments) than did the 
public defender (18 comments) or the defendant (15 comments). The 
prosecutor, however, directed the conversation. He opened the 
conference by explaining what was to take place, and he opened 
each new topic of conversation. Both prosecutor and public defender 
made statements to and asked questions of the defendant, who as a 
result was not excluded from the conversation. This conference took 
place in the i).J\.. Offices and lasted for fi fteen minutes. 
Conference 2 
Initial :::harge: r.1anslaughter II. 
Conversation Summary. 
Prosecutor explained what would take place in conference. 
Prosecutor presp.nted his case. 
Prosecutor questioned defendant about her alcohol status 
at the time when the crime took place. Defendant responded 
with uncertainty. 
Public defender gave information about nature of the offense. 
Prosecutor asked defendant about prior record. Defendant 
responded that she had no prior record. 
Prosecutor again questioned defendant about her alcohol status 
at the time of the crime. Defendant again responded with 
unce.rtainty. 
Prosecutor talked about strength of his case. 
Prosecutor and public defender discussed strength of case. 
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and 
investigative reports. 
Public defender gave prosecutor information about 
defendant's family. 
Defendant gave prosecutor information about her family. 
Prosecutor offered to reduce charge from Manslaughter II 
to Criminally Negligent Homicide. 
Prosecutor said state would recommend confinement, but 
would not oppose work release. 
Prosecutor and public defender explained state's offer 
to the defendant. 
Prosecutor asked defendant for more information about the 
offense. Defendant gave information. 
Public defender asked prosecutor about strength of his 
case. Prosecutor responded. 
Prosecutor asked defendant if she had any questions. 
Defendant said she did not have questions. 
Prosecutor and public defender again discussed strength 
of case. 
Defendant commented about strength of case. 
Public defender asked for further information about state's 
offer. Prosecutor repeated earlier statements regarding 
the offer. 
Defendant asked about retrieving her car and its contents. 
Prosecutor, public defender and defendant discussen such 
retrieval. 
Prosecutor asked defendant if she had other questions. 
Defendant responded that she had no other questions. 
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In Conference 2, the prosecutor was the most prolific speaker, 
making 24 comments as opposed to 14 comments by the public defender 
and only 7 comments by the defendant. Much of this conversation 
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focused on the strength of the case. Other than asking about the 
retrieval of her car, the defendant's only comments were responses 
to questions directed to her. Again, the prosecutor opened and 
directed the conversation. This conference took place in the 
designated pre-trial conference room and lasted ten minutes. 
Conference 3 
Initial Charge: Burglary II. 
Conversation Summary. 
Public defender explained what would take place in conference. 
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and 
investigative reports. 
Public defender made comment about strength of case. 
public defender made comment about nature of offense. 
Prosecutor asked defendant about nature of offense. Defendant 
gave information about nature of offense. 
prosecutor questioned defendant about his residential status. 
Defendant gave information about residential status. 
public defender gave opinion that initial charge did not 
fit offense. public defender and prosecutor discussed 
this issue. 
Prosecutor offered sentence recommendation of immediate 
misdemeanor treatment. 
Prosecutor set time limit (48 hours) for acceptance of the 
offer. 
Prosecutor commented on strength of his case. 
public defender questioned strength of prosecutor's case. 
Prosecutor reiterated his belief that case was strong. 
Prosecutor and public defender discussed time limit on 
offer. 
Prosecutor and public defender again discussed strength 
of case. 
Prosecutor asked defendant about prior record. Defendant 
responded about prior record. 
Prosecutor and public defender discussed legal issues of 
case. 
Public defender raised issue of testing the legal issues 
without harming defendant. 
Prosecutor and public defender discussed legal issues of 
case. 
Conference 3 seemed to be directed more by the public 
defender than the prosecutor even though the number of comments 
was about the same (31 for the prosecutor and 29 for the public 
defender). The public defender went into this conference feeling 
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that this was one of the few cases for which he had good bargaining 
leverage. He was convinced that a legal issue (the nature of the 
offense did not coincide with the legal description of the charge) 
weakened the state's case. Indeed, most of the conference centered 
around a discussion of this legal issue. The defendant was neither 
asked for or offered many comments. This conference took place in the 
D.A. Offices and was the longest of the five observed conferences 
(30 minutes). 
Conference 4 
Initial Charge: Burglary I. 
Conversation Summary. 
Prosecutor explained what would take place in conference. 
Prosecutor presented his case, expressing the opinion that 
the defendant was lucky the charge was Burg rather than Rob. 
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and 
investigative reports. 
Prosecutor asked defendant about prjor record. Defendant 
and public defender responded about prior record. 
Prosecutor asked defendant about employment and education 
statuses. Defendant responded about his employment and 
education statuses. 
Prosecutor asked defendant about his relationship with 
co-defendant. Defendant responded about this relationship. 
Defendant expressed remorse for crime, intention not to 
repeat. 
Prosecutor advised defendant of his right to trial. 
Prosecutor commented that his decision not to charge 
Rob was a good deal. 
Prosecutor said state would recommend one year in jail 
with work release and would also ask for restitution. 
Prosecutor and defendant discussed victim's needs and 
restitution. 
Defendant's mother commented on unfairness of disparate 
offers for defendant and co-defendant. 
Public defender gave legal explanation of disparate 
offers. 
Defendant and defendant's mother again commented on 
unfairness of severity with which defendant was to be 
treated. 
public defender and prosecutor gave further descriptions 
of court processes. 
Prosecutor commented that sentence recommendation 
was light in view of potential severity for the offense. 
Prosecutor advised defendant of his right to trial. 
Defendant expressed opinion that his chances at trial 
were slim. 
Prosecutor spoke to defendant about "evils" of crime, 
consequences of participating in crime, and criminal justice 
goals. 
Prosecutor said sentence recommendation might be better 
if pre-sentence report turned out to be favorable. 
Defendant's mother asked for explanation of pre-sentence 
report. public defender gave such explanation. 
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Defendant gave explanations of why he participated in 
the crime. 
Prosecutor set time limit for acceptance of the offer. 
Public defender commented on more favorable offer given 
co-defendant. 
Conference 4 had a fourth participant, i.e., the defendant's 
mother. She provided considerable support for the defendant, 
possibly accounting in part for the earnest participation of the 
defendant in this conference. While the prosecutor opened and 
directed the conversation in the first part of the conference, the 
defendant and his mother directed the conversation in the latter 
half of the conference. The prosecutor was still the most prolific 
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speaker, making 28 comments as opposed to 13 comments by the defendant 
and 10 comments by the public defender. This conference took place 
in the D.A. Offices and lasted 15 minutes. 
Conference 5 
Initial Charge: Theft I (nine counts)/UUV 
Conversation Summary. 
Public defender explained what would take place in 
conference. 
Prosecutor asked defendant if he had questions about 
conference. Defendant responded he had no questions. 
Public defender asked prosecutor why defendant was 
arrested when agreement had been made that defendant would 
turn himself in. Prosecutor and public defender discussed 
this situation, with prosecutor saying that the police had 
taken charge. 
Public defender gave defendant explanation of the arrest. 
Prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and investi-
gative reports. 
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Prosecutor questioned defendant about prior record. 
Defendant responded with ambiguity. Prosecutor, public 
defender and defendant tried to clarify prior record 
situation. 
Prosecutor and public defender again referred to police 
reports. 
Prosecutor expressed hope that case could be settled 
during the conference. 
Prosecutor said state willing to drop all but one count 
of Theft I in exchange for guilty plea to Theft I. 
Prosecutor pointed out that a great deal of money was 
involved in the theft. 
Prosecutor expressed opinion that charges would not 
merge. Public defender expressed opinion that there was 
a good chance they would merge. 
Prosecutor commented on strength of state's case. 
Prosecutor questioned defendant about employment status. 
Defendant responded about employment status. 
Public defender raised the possibility of an illegal 
search issue. Prosecutor expressed opinion that this was 
not viable issue. 
Prosecutor asked how offer of PG to one count of Theft I 
sounded. 
Public defender pointed out that defendant had no prior 
record for last six years. Defendant confirmed this point. 
Prosecutor pointed out possibility of severe punishment 
if offer was not accepted. Public defender commented 
that defendant was concerned about this possibility. 
Prosecutor commented on particular judge who would 
sentence. 
Public defender asked about restitution recommendation, 
saying that defendant was not totally responsible for 
restitution (a co-defendant was involved). 
Prosecutor expressed opinion about sentencing judge's 
strict view of individual responsibility. 
200 
Prosecutor commented that state didn't have evidence to 
ask for total restitution of all reported missing, but 
that further evidence could appear making state less 
willing to negotiate if case had to be re-indicted. 
Prosecutor reiterated offer, adding state would not 
object to five years probation and restitution. 
Prosecutor set short time limit on offer, again pointing 
to possibility of re-indictment if offer were not 
accepted. 
Prosecutor again asked what they thought of offer. 
Public defender said he would have to discuss it with 
defendant. 
Public defender said offer sounded reasonable if judge 
would actually give probation se~tence. 
Prosecutor commented that if case were settled immediately, 
sentencing would be by less severe judge (who was about to 
end his turn as Chief Criminal Judge). 
Public defender asked prosecutor how co-defendant's 
case was being handled. Prosecutor said they were waiting 
to see what took place there. Defendant commented about 
co-defendant. 
As in the other conferences, the prosecutor made the most 
comments (40) in Conference 5, followed by the public defender 
(17 comments) and then by the defendant (7 comments). Again, the 
prosecutor directed the course of the conversation. The public 
defender, however, did point to several possible weaknesses in 
the state's case. The defendant's comments were responses to 
direct questions. In this conference, anticipation of sentence was 
a prime topic of conversation. In particular, the sentencing 
judge appeared to be used as a leverage to encourage acceptance of 
the plea offer (it appeared that the judge who was about to leave 
the position of Chief Criminal Judge was considered a less severe 
sentencer than the judge who was about to assume the role of Chief 
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Criminal Judge). In addition, the prosecutor used the possibility 
of re-indictment as a reason why the defense should accept the 
present offer. This conference took place in the D.A. Offices and 
lasted 25 minutes. 
Concluding Remarks 
Although it was recognized that the very small number of 
observed conferences made it unwise to offer unequivocal conclusions 
about the pre-trial conference in general in this jurisdiction, there 
was no reason to suspect that the conferences observed were not 
typical of the confet:ences in general. What these observations 
did suggest was that the pre-trial conference was (l) routinized in 
terms of procedure; (2) an open exchange of the facts of the case; 
(3) an exchange of strategic moves with each side trying to get the 
best bargain possible; (4) prosecutor-dominated. The routinized 
procedure began with an explanation to the defendant of the conference 
and was usually followed by the prosecutor presenting his or her 
case against the defendant. At some point in the first part of the 
conference, the prosecutor and public defender exchanged police and 
investigative reports. Also at various points, the prosecutor 
directed questions to the defendant regarding the nature of the 
offense and the nature of the defendant. All defendants were 
questioned about their prior record. The prosecutor then explained 
what offers the state would make in exchange for a guilty plea. In 
all cases observed, an assumption of guilt was standard. Defendants 
were told that nothing they said in the pre-trial conference could 
be used against them at any other point in the disposition process. 
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While an admission of guilt was thus a protected piece of information, 
it would seem to give the prosecutor additional leverage. None of 
the defendants in the observed cases denied that they had been 
involved in the criminal incident in some way. The question, then, 
centered around what would be done with the accused offender, with 
the public defender arguing for the least severe punishment possible. 
Many of the comments of the public defenders were either (a) 
questions to the prosecutor regarding strength of case or the plea 
offer or (b) explanations and clarifications to the defendant. The 
public defender, however, was not completely without bargaining 
leverage. In most cases, he or she was able to point to weaknesses 
in the state's case. In Conference 3, where the public defender felt 
that he had a strong legal issue in his client's favor, the public 
defender played an aggressive role in the conference and was more 
inclined to direct the course of the conversation than in the other 
conferences. While the defendant was not excluded from the conversa-
tion, his or her input was minor in comparison to that of the 
attorneys. 
The researcher was struck throughout the observations by the 
business-like but almost jovial attitude of the attorneys as the 
atmosphere for the conference was set. The attorneys initially 
greeted one another; the defendant was then introduced to the 
prosecutor if they had not met before, and the defendant was 
referred to as Mr. or Mrs. ------- Pleasantries were likely to be 
exchanged, and notes of humor were injected by the attorneys. The 
conference was explained as though it were to be a business 
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transaction in which the three people were going to take care of 
a routine pending matter. The severity of the situation remained 
in the background. Such an atmosphere might be introduced by the 
attorneys in order to attempt to put the defendant at ease. But the 
defendants did not seem to be at ease and were certainly not "light-
hearted." Many appeared to be confused as to what demeanor they 
should take. They were in the presence of authority figures who had 
a great deal of power in determining their fate, and yet they were 
being treated initially as one of three individuals who were going 
to sit down and mutually decide a matter to the satisfaction of all. 
As the conference proceeded, however, it became clear that this was 
not really the situation. The definitive statements of the prosecutor 
as the conference progressed, indicated that the defendant's fate 
was not going to be mutually necided to the satisfaction of all. 
HEARINGS IN CHIEF CRIMINAL COURT 
For the judge sitting on the bench in Chief Criminal Court 
the work day is best described as continually busy. Beginning at 
9:30 each morning, the judge must make decisions throughout the day 
which may drastically affect the lives of a number of individuals. 
Although the number of cases on the daily docket varied, two or 
three dozen cases were usually heard each day. Since the daily 
docket was so large, time was of the essence. Most cases were 
presented and concluded within five minutes. No observed cases were 
in front of the bench for more than fifteen minutes, and some were 
settled in two or three minutes. The judge in Chief Criminal Court 
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was not hearing trials. Rather he was hearing guilty pleas, and 
making judgments on a variety of other kinds of hearings (e.g., 
parole or probation revocation, bailor recognizance requests, 
change of attorney requests, motions for setovers). 
Since the majority of cases were settled by guilty pleas, 
Chief Criminal Judge had the major responsibility for accepting 
these pleas and sentencing the defendant. Over a two month period, 
the researcher sat in the spectator section of Chief Criminal Court 
and recorded observations of this part of the court process. 
Twenty-five cases were recorded in detail (the entire conversation 
was written down as it took place). While most of the observed cases 
were either the hearing or sentencing of guilty pleas, a few 
arraignments and other hearings were also observed. 
Defendants who had decided to plead guilty filled out a 
petition to enter a guilty plea which had to be accepted by the 
judge of Chief Criminal Court. The first business of the judge 
hearing the guilty plea was to ask the defendant if he or she had 
read and understood the petition. The judge might or might not 
question the defendant further about an understanding of the meaning 
of pleading guilty, e.g., that the right to trial had been waived, 
that an admissison of guilt had been made. The judge then accepted 
or rejected the guilty plea (in only one observed case did the judge 
reject the guilty plea). If the defendant was pleading guilty to a 
misdemeanor, he or she could either waive postponement of sentence 
and be sentenced on the spot or ask for a separate sentencing date. 
In all observed cases, the defendant asked to be sentenced immediately. 
;, 
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The judge then informed the defendant of his or her right to appeal 
the sentence and the right to have a court-appointed attorney for such 
an appeal should he or she be indigent. If the defendant was 
pleading guilty to a felony, a pre-sentence investigation was 
required by law prior to sentencing. Such an investigation was 
taking, at the time of the research, from four to six weeks. 
Following are some typical examples of the daily business in 
Chief Criminal Court. 
Case 1 
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was initially 
charged with CAID but had agreed to plead guilty to 
Att CAID. 
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty 
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the 
plea and granted immediate misdemeanor treatment. 
The defense attorney (a public defender) told the judge 
that the defendant was very young (had just turned 18), 
and that although he didn't have a job at present, he 
was seriously looking for employment. The actual 
offense, reported the attorney, involved the existence 
of a marijuana plant in the defendant's garden. The 
plant was not being cultivated. 
The prosecutor told the judge that the defendant had 
an extensive juvenile record, but that he had no record 
of drug offenses. 
The judge asked the defendant why he didn't go back 
to school. 
The defendant responded that he had been thinking of 
going to the local community college. 
The judge said that he thought that this would be a 
good idea, telling the defendant that "you're going 
to have to learn to do something sometime. You have 
to be able to support yourself." 
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Case 2 
The defendant waived sentence postponement and was 
sentenced to three years on probation. 
The hearing.was completed in four minutes. 
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was 
initially charged with one count of Assault II and 
one count of Criminal Mischief II but had agreed to 
plead guilty to one count of Assault IV. 
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading 
guilty and advised him of his rights. The judge 
accepted the plea. 
The defense attorney (a public defender) told the 
judge that the defendant was 23 years old, that he was 
presently employed, and that he had no prior record. 
The attorney also told the judge that the crime was a 
result of a lovers' quarrel and that the defendant and 
the complainant were living together at the time of 
the crime. Since arrested, the defendant had been kept 
by court order from the shared residence and thus had 
been without his personal possessions. 
The judge asked the defendant if he had anything to 
say. 
The defendant responded that it was a lovers' quarrel, 
and that he had hit the complainant with his hand--
not with a weapon as the complainant had reported. 
The defendant pointed out that the complainant showed 
no evidence of any injury inflicted with a weapon. 
The judge said to the defendant: 
If that's the way you love someone, I'd sure 
hate to have you mad at me. Let me give you 
some advice; never fight with a woman. If 
you win, you're a bully. If she whips you, 
you're a bum. 
The judge paused, then continued with: 
You had an argument with the person you 
love so you belted her (comment followed by 
the judge's disapproving head shake). 
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case 3 
The defendant waived sentence postponement and was 
sentenced to two years on probation. 
The hearing was closed in six minutes. 
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was 
initially charged with Forg I and had agreed to plead 
no contest to Forg I. 
The judge questioned the defendant about his under-
standing of the no contest plea and advised him of 
his rights. The judge accepted the plea. 
The judge asked the prosecutor for the state's 
position on sentencing. 
The prosecutor responded that the state recommended 
immediate misdemeanor treatment, probation and 
restitution. 
The judge told the defense attorney (a public 
defender) that he was prepared to accept the state's 
recommendation and thus the attorney need not say 
anything on his client's behalf. 
The defendant waived sentence postponement and was 
sentenced to two years on probation and restitution of 
the amount received through the forgery ($55). 
The judge asked the defendant if he had the money to 
pay the restitution. 
The defendant responded that he had just been laid 
off his job and that he had to go and see about 
getting his job back. 
The judge asked the defendant how much he made on 
this job. The respondent responded. After considering 
the defendant's salary, the judge told the defendant 
that he had two months to pay the restitution. The 
judge added that if the defendant couldn't pay back 
the money in this time, he was to inform the court. 
The hearing was completed in six minutes. 
208 
r I: 
Case 4 
Case 5 
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was 
initially charged with two counts of CAlD, but had 
agreed to plead guilty to one count of Criminal Drug 
Promotion. 
The prosecutor said that the state took no position 
on sentencing. 
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading 
guilty and advised her of her rights. 
The defense attorney (court-appointed from the private 
bar) told the judge that this was the defendant's first 
contact with the criminal justice system. He added that 
the offense occurred through her involvement with a boy-
friend who was presently an ex-boyfriend. The defendant, 
continued the attorney, was living with her parents. 
She was presently being treated for injuries resulting 
from a recent automobile accident. The attorney told 
the judge that this experience had been an awakening for 
the defendant, and that, in his opinion, she wouldn't 
be back (re-involved in crime). 
The judge asked the defendant if she had anything to say. 
The defendant responded that she had learned her lesson 
and that she was not involved in drugs. She also said 
that she had epilepsy, for which she was presently under 
treatment. 
The judge told the defendant that he understood that 
treatment for the epilepsy was necessary, but that that 
other stuff (street drugs) was not going to help her. 
The defendant waived sentence postponement and was 
sentenced to two years on probation. The judge told the 
defendant that probation involved no rules which were 
too difficult to keep. 
The judge advised the defendant not to "get messed up 
in something like this again." 
The hearing was completed in five minutes. 
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant was initially 
charged with Burg I and had agreed to plead. guilty to 
Burg I. 
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Case 6 
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty 
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the 
plea. 
The judge informed the defendant that since the plea was 
to a felony, a pre-sentence investigation which would 
take from four to five weeks was necessary. 
The judge asked if the defendant was presently out on 
his own recognizance and was informed that he was. 
The judge asked if this was the defendant's first time 
in the criminal justice system and was informed that it 
was. 
The defense attorney (a public defender) told the judge 
that the defendant had been a reliable, trustworthy 
client. 
The judge asked about the defendant's living situation 
and was informed that the defendant was living with his 
brother, who had said that he would be responsible for 
him. 
The judge asked about the defendant's employment status 
and was informed that the defendant was working with his 
brother, but that he was going to start a new job recycling 
tires. 
The judge stated that he would continue the recog release 
until sentencing. 
The hearing was completed in three minutes. 
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant had been 
initially charged with two counts of Theft I and had agreed 
to plead guilty to one count of Theft I. 
The prosecutor said that the state would not oppose 
probation. 
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty 
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the 
plea. 
The defense attorney (court-appointed from the private 
bar) told the judge that the defendant was recently married 
and had a young child. The attorney added that the 
defendant had been looking for a job, that he had found a 
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Case 7 
job as a cook which he could have, but that he hadn't 
decided whether to take this job or to keep looking for 
a better one. 
The judge pointed out that the defendant originally 
had two theft counts listed and asked the defendant if 
he was sure he only got $25 from the thefts. The defendant 
responded that he only got $25. 
The defendant waived sentence postponement and was sentenced 
to three years on probation, the only condition being that 
the defendant get employment. The judge advised the 
defendant to "take the job that you were offered." 
The defendant asked the judge where he should go to 
check in for probation. The judge responded that his 
attorney would tell him what to do. 
The hearing was completed in five minutes. 
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant had been 
initially charged with Rape I but had agreed to plead 
guilty to Attempted Rape I. 
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty 
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the 
plea. 
The judge informed the defendant that since the plea was 
to a felony, a pre-sentence investigation which would 
take from four to five weeks was necessary. 
The judge said that he was rescinding bail release and 
that the defendant was to be in jail custody pending 
sentencing. 
The defense attorney (privately retained) expressed the 
belief that this was a good case for pre-sentence release. 
The attorney added that the psychological report on the 
defendant was good, and that the defendant had held a 
job for 11 years. 
The judge reiterated his decision to have the defendant 
held in pre-sentence custody. 
The hearing was completed in four minutes. 
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case 8 
case 9 
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant had been 
initially charged with Burg I and had agreed to plead 
guilty to Burg I. 
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty 
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the 
plea. 
The judge informed the defendant that since the plea was 
to a felony, a pre-sentence investigation which would 
take from four to five weeks was necessary. 
The judge asked the defendant if he would be able to 
retain his position in the military police under the 
circumstances. 
The defendant informed the judge that he was still in 
and that he thought they would let him stay in. He added, 
however, that he realized that this would depend on what 
happened at sentencing. 
The judge asked the defendant about the length of his 
enlistment, and the defendant responded that it was a 
three year enlistment. 
The judge advised the defendant to tell his commanding 
officer that he would be contacted during the pre-sentence 
investigation. 
The hearing was completed in four minutes. 
The prosecutor introduced the case: defendant had been 
initially charged with CAID (possession of over an ounce 
of marijuana) but had agreed to plead guilty to CAID 
(possession of less than an ounce of marijuana) • 
The judge questioned the defendant about pleading guilty 
and advised him of his rights. The judge accepted the 
plea. 
The defense attorney (privately retained) explained to 
the judge that the defendant was stopped for a traffic 
violation at which time his car was searched and the 
marijuana found. The attorney added that the defendant 
had not put the marijuana in the car but was aware that 
it was there. The defendant, reported the attorney, was 
employed, but had just begun his job and therefore a fine 
would be a har~ship on him. 
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The defendant waived sentence pestponement. The judge 
suspended the impesitien ef sentence and erdered the 
defendant to. pay his atterney, saying: 
Yeu pay yeur lawyer. A man who. retains and 
pays his atterney is net all bad. When yo.u pay 
yeur atterney, step and remember that yeu were 
lucky to. get eut ef what is a serieus charge. 
The hearing was cempleted in five minutes. 
Case 10 
The presecuter intreduced the case: defendant had plead 
quilty to. Attempted CAID but had net been granted mis-
demeaner status. The pre-sentence investigatien had been 
cempleted, and this hearing was fer sentencing. 
The presecuter teld the judge that the state recemmended 
deferred misdemeaner status, three years en prebatien, 
and a $200 fine. 
The judge infermed the defendant ef his pest-sentence 
rights. 
The defense atterney (a public defender) asked the 
judge fer immediate misdemeaner treatment. He 
reperted that the defendant had a minimal prier recerd 
(ene theft in 1975). He explained that the defendant 
was feund with a small ameunt ef cecaine, which was 
ebvieusly fer persenal use. The defendant, accerding to. 
the atterney, was net a drug pusher er anything like that. 
The defendant was presently living with his aunt and 
uncle and was werking fer his uncle. These relatives 
were censidering a meve to. anether state and weuld like 
to. be able to. take the defendant with them. 
The judge asked the defendant if he had anything to. say, 
and the defendant respended that he did net. 
The judge stated that he was net geing to. treat the 
case as a misdemeaner at that time. If the defendant 
successfully cempleted a three year prebatien sentence, 
misdemeaner status weuld then be granted. 
The judge asked the defendant if he weuld agree to. a 
waiver ef his feurth amendment rights as a cenditien 
ef prebatien. The defendant respended that he weuld agree 
to. this cenditien, adding: 
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You can search me anytime, every day, 
because I've quit using drugs. Drugs are 
no good; they've caused me a lot of trouble. 
I'm off them completely. 
The judge responded: 
I'm glad to hear that. I want to help insure 
that this is true. That's the reason for the 
waiver of the right not to be searched. You're 
not a bad guy, not a bad record. But listen to 
this (judge read a statement written by the 
defendant admitting to the use of a variety of 
drugs). I just want you to quit. 
The hearing was completed in six minutes. 
Concluding Remarks 
All of the preceding cases were heard by one judge. While 
the researcher did sit in on a few hearings and trials heard by 
other judges, standardized recordings were not made of these 
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observations. One impression, however, was that there were definite 
variations in the style in which judges addressed the defendants. 
The Chief Criminal Judge presiding over the example cases was 
comparatively informal in his approach to the defendants. He often 
gave the defendants advice about how to behave; he was at times stern 
in his reprimands and admonishments; yet his manner with the 
defendants was extremely personalized. There was no question, 
however, regarding his authority status. The judge was the "boss" 
(a standard observation of all court processes in which any judge 
was involved), and he was deferred to by everyone in the courtroom. 
His dominant position was expected and accepted by all (defendants, 
attorneys, other court personnel, and the judge himself), for it is 
the judge who makes the ultimate decision on the outcome of the case. 
The findings from the observations of guilty plea hearings 
and sentencings indicated that this part of the court process was 
routinized and swift. Although a certain amount of time and 
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effort had been spent on each case prior to these hearings (e.g., 
preliminary hearings, investigative reports, pre-trial conferences), 
the final decisions of the judge to accept or reject guilty pleas 
and to sentence the guilty were made within a few minutes. As 
several judges stated in the interviews, efficiency needs severely 
limit the time and effort they can put into anyone case. Guilty 
pleas were rarely rejected by the judge; it was apparently assumed 
in most cases that the issue of guilt had been satisfactorily decided 
by the defendant and attorneys. Defendant characteristics, e.g., 
prior record, age, employment, family ties, residential status, 
were used by attorneys to influence the judge's sentencing decision. 
Although these variables appeared to influence sentencing and thus to 
some extent individualize justice, it was quite apparent that 
there was a fair amount of routinization in the way in which 
individual judges related defendant profiles to sentencing. 
Attorneys must learn the particular relationships which particular 
judges make. 
In general, then, the observations of guilty plea and 
sentencing hearings supported prior research contentions (Blumberg, 
1967) that the great majority of criminal cases in the American 
system are subjected to assembly-line justice. In the court 
,system under study, however, although ultimate decisions were made 
routinely and swiftly, the formal structure did provide some 
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mechanisms which mitigated the assembly-line picture of the final 
steps in the disposition process. The mandated pre-trial conference 
and pre-sentence investigation were two such mechanisms. 
This chapter on the findings from observations of felony 
case dispositions in action concludes the presentations of the data 
collected for this research project. In the final chapter, the 
findings from all data sources are used to construct a model of 
felony case disposition without trial in one urban court system. 
CHAPTER VIII 
FELONY CASE DISPOSITION THROUGH NEGOTIATION: 
A MODEL OF ONE URBAN COURT SYSTEM 
At the beginning of this study, the research problem was 
delineated in the form of four propositions and eight exploratory 
areas. The ultimate goal was to present a model of the social 
reality of case disposition without trial in one urban court 
system which could be analyzed in terms of its theoretical relevance 
as well as its relationship to previous studies. 
It was anticipated that the findings would yield support for 
the four propositions in a very general way. However, exploration 
was deemed necessary to determine the specific nature of case 
disposition without trial in the court system under study. In 
regard to the propositions, exploration included an examination of 
(a) the way in which bargains were related to punishment reduction; 
(b) the way in which case disposition through negotiation was 
routinized; (c) the way in which the negotiation process involved 
cooperation among key court actors; (d) the way in which the 
negutiation process provided for the needs of key court actors. 
Additionally, an examination was made of relationships between 
the formal and informal organization, the behaviors and beliefs 
within the organization, and functional needs and ideal goals. 
Finally, policy changes in the District Attorney's Office of the 
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court system under study provided an opportunity for the examination 
of the effects of attempts to limit plea bargaining. 
The above areas, then, set the framework for the development 
of the analytical model which follows. 
NEGOTIATING THE GUILTY PLEA AS THE DOMINANT 
METHOD OF CASE SETTLEMENT 
Both the Criminal Court population and sample statistics 
indicated that the great majority of cases which resulted in formal 
charges were settled by guilty pleas. Of those cases which ended 
in convictions, over 80 percent were settled by guilty pleas. Of 
guilty plea dispositions, about 70 percent involved bargains in the 
form of charge reduction or charge/count dismissal. Data from 
the Public Defender files indicated that a third type of bargain, 
i.e., agreement not to file on other known charges, was also quite 
common. Sentence recommendations--an integral part of the formal 
bargaining procedure--were made in the overwhelming majority of 
guilty plea dispositions. The plea bargaining process was given 
formal recognition both in the policy and procedural rules of the 
court system. A pre-trial conference in which the facts of a case 
were to be mutually examined and negotiations were to take place 
was mandatory for all felony cases. The interviewed public 
defenders agreed that it was very important to them that their 
clients get some kind of a bargain in exchange for a guilty plea. 
The evidence, then, strongly supported the argument that negotiating 
for a guilty plea was the dominant method of case settlement in 
the court system under study. 
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ROUTINIZATION THROUGH FORMALIZATION 
The plea negotiation process was given open and formal recog-
nition by the court system as was specified in state procedural law 
and in the policy manual of the District Attorney's Office. The 
policy of the District Attorney's Office, which restricted bargaining 
on certain offenses (and was more restrictive than statutory policy) , 
dominated the decision-making process. The formal delineation of both 
the procedures for the exchange and the substance of bargains might 
account for the fact that an informal bargaining process separate 
from the formal process was not indicated by the data. As would 
be expected in any organization, individual exchanges between 
opposing attorneys regarding a given case suggested attitudinal 
differences from those expressed in formal policy. However, the 
negotiation outcome usually followed the dictates of the District 
Attorney's Office policy. If an exception was to be made (and 
exceptions were given formal recognition in the policy manual), it 
required the approval of top-level staff in the D.A.'s Office. The 
Public Defender's Office had no formal plea bargaining policy; 
however, the defense attorneys were compelled to negotiate within 
the confines of the District Attorney's policy. The formal and 
adhered-to policy also contributed to the fact that the key actors 
in the bargaining process were extremely familiar with the negotiation 
process. Public defenders indicated that they usually knew, after 
an initial look at an assigned case, whether or not it was a bargain-
able case, and that they were more likely than not to know what 
the substance of the bargain would be. 
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Observations of the pre-trial conference indicated that the 
negotiation process was highly routinized in terms of procedure. 
The procedure did include a mutual examination of police and other 
investigative reports regarding the case. The conference also 
included a bargaining format in which the prosecutor and defense 
attorneys attempted to negotiate with one another to get the best 
deal for their respective sides. Generally, however, it was the 
prosecutor who dominated the conference--questioning the defendant 
about himself/herself and about the offense, and describing the 
state's offer should the defendant be willing to plead guilty. The 
offer, decided in advance by the prosecutor, appeared not to be 
modified much as a result of the conference. 
CONTAINED COOPERATION WITHIN AN ADVERSARY FRAMEWORK 
The social reality of plea bargaining in this court system 
was notable in its emphasis on formalization, rigidity and restric-
tion. Formalization reduced the need for key actors to cooperate in 
the development of an informal system to guide the negotiation process. 
Rigidity also inhibited the responsibility of key actors for decision-
making. Restrictions on bargaining reduced the power of the defense 
attorney in the exchange relationship. In addition, both the formal 
structure and the philosophies of the District Attorney's Office 
and the Public Defender's Office were at odds. The D.A.'s Office 
was characterized by hierarchy, specialization and equality of 
justice. The P. D.'s Office was characterized by lack of hierarchy, 
generalization and individualization of justice. A careful analysis 
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of the findings, however, indicated that the negotiation process 
operated quite smoothly, with the prosecutors and public defenders 
behaviorally cooperating and complying with the system. On the 
other hand, a commitment to the ideal adversary roles was supported 
by the findings from the observations of and interviews with 
prosecutors and public defenders. It is the author's contention that 
certain features of the court system under study encouraged a 
disposition process characterized by functional cooperation within 
an adversary framework. 
While formalization of the negotiation process did r.educe the 
need for key actors to cooperate in the development of an informal 
system, it also enhanced functional cooperation by (a) allowing the 
attorney to focus on the effectiveness rather than the efficiency of 
the system and (b) providing the attorneys with a clear understanding 
of the process. The formalized structure of the negotiation process 
provided in great part for the efficiency need of the system. 
Indeed, attorneys agreed that a consideration of efficiency needs 
was built into the formalized structure and that they shared with 
the opposing attorneys a commitment to the effectiveness of the 
overall system. Additionally, they reported a clear understanding 
of the process and expressed the belief that the formal process 
coincided with the informal process. 
Although generally formalized and rigidified, the negotiation 
process with its mandatory conference did allow for active partici-
pation of the attorneys. Data from interviews and observations 
indicated that in handling a given case, attorneys were necessarily 
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involved in a process of mapping out strategies, anticipating actions 
and attitudes of the opposing sides, and calculating the strengths 
and weaknesses of both sides in terms of potential bargains. However, 
the nature of the D.A.'s policy left but one across-the-board 
negotiable commodity--the strength of case factor. The D.A.'s 
policy, which outlined which offenses were bargainable as well as 
the substance of the bargain permissible for different offenses, 
forced the defense attorney to turn to the legal issues of the case 
in search of a commodity with bargaining power. In turn, the 
prosecutor was also attentive to the strength of case factor. This 
focus on legal issues also strengthened the attorneys' commitment to 
their professional roles as legal representatives of their respective 
clients. Observations of the pre-trial conferences supported this 
emphasis on the strength of case factor. Also, attorneys agreed in 
the interviews that strength of case was of primary importance in 
deciding how to handle a given case. The other two factors which 
were consistently reported as important in bargaining decisions 
were the policy of the District Attorney's Office and the serious-
ness of the offense, both of which were based on a legalistic 
referent. Finally, when asked what their main role or responsibility 
was, both sets of attorneys consistently referred to their profes-
sional role as legal representatives of their respective clients, 
i.e., the state and the defendant. 
A further example of this legalistic framework was found in 
the data on the nature of charge reduction bargains. Charge 
reductions were overwhelmingly made to lower levels of the initial 
charge. Although statutory law in the state declared that charge 
reductions need be only "reasonably related" to the original 
charge, in fact most reduced charges were necessarily included 
in the original charge. 
The findings from this study, then, led to the conclusion 
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that prosecutors and public defenders in this felony court maintained 
the adversary roles and that cooperation existed only within the 
limits of the adversary system. The attorneys did interact frequently 
in their professional capacities; they knew one another and had 
formed certain opinions about each other which made anticipation of 
exchanges more certain. However, an awareness that they represented 
different sides was reflected in a certain distanc'e and lack of 
spontaneity observed in their interactions. Interactions among 
public defenders and among prosecutors appeared to be much more 
casual and personal. Certain factors facilitated this separate-
ness: prosecutors and public defenders maintained offices in 
different buildings; technically the Public Defender's Office was 
independent of the public court system; plea negotiation inter-
actions were formally structured; bargaining focused on legalistic 
factors. While both sets of attorneys believed that they had a 
commitment to see that the adjudication process worked within the 
law, they recognized that the immediate interests of the opposing 
sides were at odds. Prosecutors worked toward convictions, and 
public defenders worked toward limiting the exposure of their 
clients in terms of punishment. 
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BENEFITS AND COSTS IN THE EXCHANGE PROCESS 
The findings from this research suggested that the plea 
negotiation process was prosecutor-dominated. Throughout the 
case disposition process, the balance of power was highly in 
favor of the prosecutor. The prosecutor had command of the charging 
decision as well as the bargain offer. The rigidity of the District 
Attorney's bargaining policies left the public defender with little 
leverage in the bargaining process. Prosecutors could and did 
respond to public defenders' counter offers simply by referring to 
policy restrictions. Beyond formal policy, prosecutors had other 
bargaining commodities. For example, if the defense did not accept 
an offer, they could threaten re-indictment on a new charge uncovered 
by subsequent investigation; they might also rescind an offer if 
the defense would not accept it within a certain time period 
(possibly a day or two). The only real baragining power of the 
public defender came when he or she was able to find a legal 
loophole in the prosecutor's case. Prosecutors, however, were aware 
of the importance of settling the majority of cases by guilty pleas. 
In all observed conferences, the prosecutor made some kind of an 
offer with at least a suggestion that the potential severity of the 
sentence could be reduced. However, because maximum sentences were 
uncommon, some bargain offers did not actually benefit the defendant. 
Nevertheless, in that the data indicated a positive relationship 
between sentence recommendation and actual sentence, the prosecutor's 
sentence recommendation was another commodity reflecting his or 
her power. Although all groups indicated agreement with the 
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statement that "the prosecutor has the upper hand in the plea 
negotiation process," public defenders were the most adamant in 
their agreement with this statement. This is to be expected, as 
it is the defense attorneys (and of course their clients) who bear 
the brunt of this power imbalance. 
Public defenders expressed the belief that getting convictions 
was the major concern of the District Attorney's Office. Indeed, 
prosecutors interviewed said that one of their major goals was to 
convict the guilty. This appeared to present a definite dilemma 
for the public defenders. A common lament of the public defenders 
was that when the prosecutor had a weak case, he or she was more 
, 
, . likely to offer the defendant an extremely "good deal." The 
defense attorney, while seeing a good chance of getting a not 
guilty verdict should the case go to trial, had to weigh the risks 
of going to trial against the good deal offered by the prosecutor. 
In these cases, the responsibilities of the public defender proved 
incompatible. On the one hand, he or she felt it was his or her 
duty to subject a weak case to a legal test through a trial; on the 
other hand, it was also his or her duty to settle the case with the 
most favorable outcome for the client. The other side of the coin 
was that on very strong cases, the prosecutor was not, according to 
public defenders, likely to offer any bargain of substance. Without 
some benefit, the public defender was not anxious to see his or her 
client enter a guilty plea. Thus, in the words of one public 
defender, "we end up going to trial on the losers." Indeed, the 
j'; .. :. '/. 
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risks of going to trial are high; only a very small number of 
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defendants were acquitted at trial. In addition, the sentencing of 
offenders convicted at trial was harsher than of those who were 
convicted by guilty pleas. 
From the preceding discussions, it appears that the exchange 
process provides rewards for the prosecutor but not for the defense 
attorney. Yet there were compensations for the defense attorney. 
The pressure to "win" was not so great due to the perceived (and 
actual) power imbalance. Also, the public defenders got satisfaction 
from small achievements, i.e., obtaining benefits for their clients 
short of acquittal, since they were accomplished in spite of perceived 
adversity. Public defenders expressed the greatest dissatisfaction 
with the prosecutors' Career Criminal Unit, as cases placed in this 
unit were generally not open for any kind of bargaining. Finally, the 
public defenders' commitment to and belief in the importance of their 
adversary role provided them with a source of satisfaction. The fact 
that they were a part of the system--that they were there providing 
legal counsel to poor defendants who were up against the state--was 
seen as an essential safeguard against dishonesty and injustice 
developing in the system. 
Thus, the freedom to bargain and at least have a chance to 
obtain some benefit for their client which explicitly or implicitly 
involved punishment reduction was functional in terms of meeting 
the needs of public defense attorneys. Fortified by a belief in the 
importance of their role and a recognition that they were "fighting 
for the underdog" as well as fighting from an underdog position, the 
public defenders appeared to be able to accept the inequality of the 
exchange relationship as long as some exchange was at least possible. 
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PERCEPTIONS OF KEY COURT ACTORS: AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT 
REGARDING THE SOCIAL REALITY OF THE DISPOSITION PROCESS 
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Overall, prosecutors, public defenders and judges agreed that 
the reality of case disposition through negotiation coincided with the 
formally-outlined process. The informal and formal structure and 
procedures were seen as consistent. Regarding the nature of bargains, 
all groups of actors agreed that generally the policy of the District 
Attorney's Office was in fact followed. Specifically, all agreed 
that the strength of case factor was very important in deciding how 
to handle a given case (this factor was also stated as important in 
the policy manual of the District Attorney's Office). However, 
whereas prosecutors tended to limit their descriptions of important 
factors to those included in formal policy, public defenders were 
likely to refer additionally to strategical game plans required in 
the decision-making process. Compared to the prosecutors and public 
defenders, judges tended to be slightly more idealistic in their 
assessments of important factors in the attorney's decision regarding 
the handling of a case. 
Prosecutors expressed the opinion that the charging decision 
was generally not problematic for them, as it was delineated quite 
specifically in substantive law. It was mentioned, however, that 
a charging decision could be problematic on cases in which the 
mental state of the defendant was questionable. The observational 
data indicated that more discretion was used by prosecutors in the 
charging decision than the interviewees suggested. For example, a 
decision to charge a defendant with one of several degrees of Burglary, 
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or a decision to charge Burglary rather than a more serious Robbery 
or less serious Criminal Trespass required discretion. The impression 
of the observer was that these decisions were based in large part on 
the prosecutor's perception of the strength of the case. Generally, 
interviewees did not believe that overcharging was a common activity 
in this court system. 
Moreso than public defenders, prosecutors and judges were 
inclined to think that standard charge reductions did not exist in 
this court system. However, all respondents did believe that 
standard reductions were more common for Drug cases (particularly 
marijuana possession) and for non-premeditated Assaults and Homicides 
than for other offenses. Also, it was suggested that Homicides 
resulting from traffic accidents were commonly reduced from Man-
slaughter to Criminally Negligent Homicide. The statistical data 
were consistent with these opinions about common charge reductions. 
The relationship between the prosecutors and public defenders 
was generally characterized by all groups of respondents as amicable, 
professional and cooperative within role restraints. The relationship 
between attorneys at the staff level was often described as better 
than between the Offices per~. Respondents in all groups did 
point out that there were occasions of conflicts and tensions 
between particular individual attorneys. Public defenders expressed 
some dissatisfaction with the structure and policies of the District 
Attorney's Office. They believed that the D.A.'s Office was 
structured in a way that limited the decision-making responsibility 
of the staff prosecutors. Policies intended to curb plea bargaining 
i 
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were viewed by the public defenders as particularly destructive to 
the working relationship of the Offices and the attorneys within 
them. The interviewees supported the contention that prosecutors 
and public defenders worked toward settling cases in a functionally 
cooperative manner while maintaining an adversary perspective. 
PERCEPTIONS OF KEY COURT ACTORS REGARDING PLEA 
BARGAINING AND SYSTEM NEEDS AND GOALS 
Public defenders believed that plea bargaining satisfied 
system needs and advanced the achievement of ideal goals. They 
suggested that everybody--defendants, attorneys, the court, and 
the public--benefited from above-board plea negotiation. Defendants 
benefited by having their cases settled in an individualized manner 
and by having the severity of punishment reduced. Perceiving 
individualized justice as an ideal goal of the system, public 
defenders viewed plea negotiation as furthering the justice goal. 
Prosecutors benefited by getting convictions, and public defenders 
benefited by being able to reduce the exposure of their clients 
to the criminal justice system. Both sets of attorneys benefited 
from active participation in the case disposition process. The 
public defenders expressed the belief that restrictions on plea 
bargaining implemented by the District Attorney's Office limited the 
extent to which the attorneys could play an active role in case 
disposition and reduced the decision-making responsibility on a 
case by case basis. The major disadvantage of plea bargaining, in 
the opinion of the public defenders, had to do with possible 
injustices to the defendant should the process not be properly 
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administered. For example, plea bargaining could put pressure on 
a defendant to plead guilty even though he or she was not guilty 
or was unsure of his or her guilt. Several public defenders also 
mentioned the potential danger of a situation in which defense 
attorneys began thinking in terms of routinized bargains rather 
than possible defenses for the client. Overall, however, public 
defenders were inclined to think that the advantages of properly 
administered plea bargaining outweighed the potential disadvantages. 
Prosecutors, on the other hand, were considerably less inclined 
to view plea bargaining in a positive light. None of those prosecutors 
interviewed felt that there were any major advantages to plea 
bargaining. They expressed the opinion that plea bargaining 
worked against criminal justice goals in that cases were compromised, 
and dispositions did not reflect the reality of what the defendant 
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had actually done. Prosecutors did suggest that plea bargaining 
could be useful for getting a conviction on a case in which a 
[ 
victim had been traumatically involved and felt unable to testify. 
It should be noted that the five prosecutors interviewed represented 
only a small proportion of the prosecutorial staff. In addition, 
they were all top-level deputies and therefore close to the policy-
making process. Since current policy in the District Attorney's 
Office was aimed at limiting plea bargaining, it might be expected 
that these prosecutors would take a negative view of the bargaining 
concept. 
Overall, judges tended to take a more neutral position on 
plea bargaining than did public defenders or prosecutors. Most 
.~~ .. -- .. ···.t,~:: ..;.---
judges believed that it was a necessary part of the system in that 
it did meet functional court needs for efficient production. They 
also emphasized that it provided benefits for the taxpayer. 
While there was high within-group agreement among both prosecutors 
and public defenders regarding the advantages and disadvantages 
of plea bargaining, the responses of judges varied considerably. 
Some judges believed that properly-administered plea bargaining 
did not work against the achievement of ideal goals and could be 
beneficial to all involved. Others were more inclined to share 
the opinion of prosecutors that plea bargaining resulted in an 
inaccurate picture of what the defendant had actually done and thus 
worked against the achievement of justice and crime control. 
These findings, then, further indicated that prosecutors 
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and public defenders were not a single-minded body reflecting shared 
views as a result of their shared membership in the public court 
organization. Since their definitions of justice were at odds 
(,'lith prosecutors emphasizing equality and public defenders 
emphasizing individualization), their opinions regarding whether 
or not plea bargaining worked toward the achievement of ideal 
goals were also at odds. Also, each set of attorneys was inclined 
to think that their own Offices gave greater consideration to the 
achievement of ideal goals and less consideration to functional 
needs. Judges, on the other hand, ch~se to emphasize their belief 
that plea bargaining diq attend to functional court needs, thus 
eschewing the issue of ideal goals. 
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PLEA NEGOTIATION AND EFFICIENT PRODUCTION 
The data strongly supported the contention that case disposition 
through guilty pleas advances efficient production within the court 
system. The findings further suggested that efficient production 
is an essential requirement for the stability and viability of the 
court system. Finally, the case disposition process had been 
formally structured in this court system with an eye toward meeting 
·the efficient production need. 
The data on total disposition time indicated that disposition 
by trial was unequivocably the most time-consuming of all closing 
types. While straight guilty plea closings had the highest proportion 
of cases settled within 30 days, very few bargained or non-bargained 
guilty plea cases took over 60 days. Although closing with a straight 
guilty plea might be slightly more efficient than closing with a 
bargained guilty plea, the findings also suggested that on cases in 
which bargaining was prohibited from the outset, the likelihood 
of going to trial was greater. For example, of the non-negotiable 
Career Criminal cases settled in 1977, 60 percent were closed by 
trial. Also, while charge reductions were effectively curbed on 
certain offenses in 1977, these same offenses showed an increase in 
the proportion of trial closings from 1976 to 1977. However, overall 
proportions of closing types showed little variation (with only a 
very slight increase in trials) prior and subsequent to the 
institution of policies which rigidified and expanded the "curb 
plea bargaining" position. A balancing factor appeared to be at 
work according to the data on cases closed following the policy 
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changes in 1977. Whereas charge bargaining decreased for the non-
reducible offenses, it increased for a number of offenses not 
included in the non-reducible category. Similarly, while trials 
increased for the non-reducible offenses, they decreased for other 
offenses. Thus, overall stability in terms of the proportion of 
guilty plea dispositions to trial dispositions was maintained. 
The case disposition process was formally structured to 
promote efficient production. The newly-instituted Speedy Trial 
Act which requires that barring unusual circumstances, cases must 
be settled within 60 days or dismissed appeared to be effective. 
Between 1976 and 1977, there was a significant decrease in the 
number of cases which took over 60 days to settle. Likewise, the 
number of setovers decreased from 1976 to 1977. Additionally, 
the formalization of plea bargaining, i.e., the designation of a 
time and place for a negotiation conference, as well as a statement 
of produces and guidelines, removed the responsibility for organizing 
the negotiation process from the attorneys. The formalized system 
was highly routinized in terms of procedure and substance. 
The negotiation conferences were notably brief (those observed 
took less than a half hour to complete). Guilty plea hearings and 
sentencings were even briefer (few took over five minutes to 
complete). Large numbers of cases (both in terms of absolute 
numbers and in terms of the ratio of cases to attorneys and judges) 
were run through the felony court system on a daily basis. The 
need to move along quickly was compelling due to the rapid timing 
of events (attorneys often had several negotiation conferences and 
_~ __ .r".-........... ·. 
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several plea or sentence hearings in one day). Functional cooperation 
between the key actors in the process was obviously essential for 
the completion of tasks within time constraints. The above description 
certainly fits the picture of assembly line justice set forth in 
previous research on the American court process in large organizations. 
However, in the court system under study, case disposition was 
formally and carefully structured to include both a consideration of 
functional needs and ideal goals. Emphasizing a legalistic frame-
work, disposition without trial in this court system appeared to be 
judicially proper in comparison with characterizations of assembly 
line processes in other court systems. 
PLEA NEGOTIATION AND IDEAL GOALS 
An assessment of the way in which disposition through 
negotiation does or does not work toward the achievement of the 
larger criminal justice system goals of crime of crime control, 
protection of the public and maintenance of rule by law was not 
possible from the present research findings. However, key court 
actors interviewed did express a commitment to these larger goals. 
The way in which disposition through negotiation works toward the 
achievement of justice and due process (ideal goals of both the 
overall system and the court subsystem) could be assessed on the 
basis of the present research. 
A common criticism of disposition by guilty plea (with or 
without negotiation) is that it violates the due process rights 
of the defendant. One such right is the right to presumed 
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innocence until guilt has been proven. Indeed, the findings from 
this study supported the contention that an assumption of guilt 
precluded the settlement process. All interviewed prosecutors and 
judges expressed the opinion that over 80 percent of accused felons 
were guilty either of the formal charge or of some related charge. 
Twelve of the fifteen interviewed public defenders also agreed with 
the over 80 percent figure. Generally, the issue at hand in the 
pre-trial conferences was punishment rather than guilt/innocence. 
Additionally, several interviewees stated that guilty plea 
convictions were functional in a rehabilitative sense in that an 
admission of guilt on the part of the offender was an essential 
initial step toward rehabilitation. 
Another criticism of disposition by negotiation is that 
defendants may be coerced into forfeiting rights to presumed 
innocence, to trial, to face accusers and to not self-incriminate 
by the offering of reduced punishment for pleading guilty and by 
the threat of severe punishment for not pleading guilty. The 
present research did not uncover any incidences of formal or 
explicit coercion aimed at getting defendants to plead guilty. 
At the beginning of each guilty plea hearing, the judge asked 
for written and verbal assurances from the defendant that he or she 
(a) was pleading guilty willingly and without coercion and (b) 
understood the consequences of the guilty plea. Additionally, all 
bargains regarding the charge were presented to the defendant and 
the court in written form. Sentence recommendations (also presented 
in writing) were not, the judge informed the defendant, binding on 
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the court, and if the defendant had been led to believe otherwise, 
he or she could retract the guilty plea. These formal safeguards, 
however, cannot insure against implicit coercion. An admission of 
guilt as well as a description of the defendant's involvement in 
the offense was sought (and often received) in the pre-trial conference. 
While such admissions and descriptions could not be used should 
the defendant decide to go to trial, the very fact that the attorneys 
who would be trying the case had this information was likely to be 
perceived by the defendant as working against his or her chances 
at trial. In fact, the risks of going to trial were indeed high 
for the defendant. An extremely small percentage of cases (4 percent) 
ended in trial acquittal. Also, according to the defense attorneys, 
the ordeal of trial was a perceived and real concern of defendants 
when making a plea decision. Finally, statistics showed that 
sentencing was more severe following trial convictions than guilty 
plea convictions. According to public defenders, inducements in 
the form of "good deals" were offered by prosecutors when the state's 
case was weak; thus, rewards for pleading guilty were increased 
when the risk of trial was decreased. On the other hand, the 
emphasis placed by the public defender on his or her role as a 
legal representative of the defendant did appear to be an important 
safeguard in terms of the rights of the accused to a fair and just 
disposition process. While admittedly the guilty plea disposition 
requires that the defendant surrender some due process rights, the 
public defender system in this county appeared to work toward the 
preservation of defendants' rights which were not circumvented by the 
inherent nature of the guilty plea disposition. 
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Whether or not a given case disposition process works toward 
the achievement of justice depends initially on one's definition of 
justice. The present research uncovered differences in the meaning 
of justice from the perspectives of prosecutors versus public 
defenders. Prosecutors tended to believe justice was being achieved 
when guilty offenders were convicted of the same offense with which 
they were charged and when similarly-charged offenders were given 
equal treatment. Public defenders, on the other hand, emphasized 
the importance of individualizing justice through a consideration 
l of all aspects of a given case. Public defenders maintained that 
l 
similarly-charged offenders were not necessarily deserving of 
equal treatment. In line with their respective roles, prosecutors 
held to a hard line on punishing offenders in the interests of 
justice for the state, whereas public defenders believed that severe 
punishment was often unjust in view of mitigating circumstances. 
There was also a tendency toward a prosecutorial view of punishment 
severity as facilitating crime control and a defense view of the 
reduction of punishment severity as facilitating crime control. 
Regarding charge and bargain decision~ the data indicated that 
the prosecutorial position of equal treatment was favored. That 
is, charges appeared to be made based upon the legal facts of the 
case, and bargains appeared to be offered in accordance with the 
offense classification scheme set up by the Office of the District 
l. Attorney. Characteristics of the offender, e.g., age, sex, employ-
ment, education, did not appear to be influential in the prosecutors' 
charging and bargaining decisions. On the other hand, one could 
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argue (as public defenders often did) that the classification of 
offenses as negotiable, non-reducible or non-negotiable in any way 
was arbitrary and therefore unjust. The classification scheme was 
not based on seriousness of offense (some Class C felonies were non-
reducible and some Class A felonies were fully negotiable). A 
distinction was made between Property offenses and Crimes against 
the Person, all of the latter being fully negotiable. The most 
arbitrary, however, was the Career Criminal classification which 
was not based either on the nature of the offense or the serious-
ness of the offense. The single shared characteristic of cases 
placed in this category was the recidivism of the defendant. All 
of these cases were non-negotiable. The overall result of the 
classification scheme was that defendants charged with Crimes against 
the Person or Drug offenses were those most likely to be offered 
the chance to plead guilty to a lesser charge. In fact, the majority 
of charge reduction pleas were in the Crimes against Person or Drug 
offense categories. An additional influential factor in the decision 
to offer or not offer a bargain was, according to the interview and 
observational data, the strength of the state's case. Thus, unequal 
treatment of similarly-charged offenders could result from the 
state's perception of the strength of the case. 
The data on sentencing indicated that punishment decision, 
relative to charge and bargain decisions, reflect a concern with 
the individualization of justice. While type offense and type closing 
were related to sentencing severity, characteristics of offenders 
were also influential factors. 
Overall, punishment was less severe than its legal potential. 
Only about half of those cqnvicted received an incarceration 
sentence in either 1976 or 1977. Additionally, a large proportion 
of those initially charged with a felony plead guilty to a mis-
demeanor. Convictions on Homicides, Kidnaps, Robbery I, Escape 
and Ex-Con in Possession of Firearm had the highest proportions 
of incarceration sentences. In contrast, those convicted of 
reducible Drug and Property offenses were the least likely to 
receive incarceration sentences. While the above findings 
indicated that sentence severity was related to seriousness of 
offense, other findings indicated that this relationship was not 
clear-cut. First, changes in sentence severity for certain 
239 
offenses occurred between 1976 and the latter half of 1977. 
Incarceration sentences for Burg I convictions ( a Class A felony), 
while common in both years, decreased in 1977. On the other hand, 
incarceration for Theft I and Forg I convictions (both Class C 
felonies) increased considerably in 1977. All three of these offenses 
were Impact 0ffenses classified as non-reducible, the governing 
pOlicies of which were strengthened 'as of June, 1977. Still another 
difference occurred for CAID convictions (a Class B felony); 
while the number of incarceration sentences for CAID was not high 
in either year, the incarceration percentage decreased considerably 
in 1977. 
Second, the findings showed a clear relationship between type 
closing and sentencing. The great majority of those defendants who 
plead guilty to a lesser charge were not incarcerated upon sentencing. 
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Pleading guilty to a lesser plus having counts and/or charges 
dismissed was the next most advantageous closing in terms of the 
likelihood of incarceration. There was almost no variation in 
the proportion of straight guilty pleas and guilty pleas to the 
original charge with a dismissal of counts and/or charges which 
resulted in incarceration sentences. Both of the above were less 
advantageous than either PGTL or PGTL + Dis, but were more 
advantageous than conviction by trial, the latter having the highest 
proportion of incarcerations of all closing types. Since the 
offenses which were most likely to close with PG + Dis were not 
the offenses with high likelihood of incarceration, it appeared 
that PG + Dis was not a good bargain in terms of sentencing. Being 
charged with multiple counts--whether or not they were dismissed--
worked against the defendant at the time of sentencing. The relation-
ship bebleen type closing and sentencing was examined controlling 
on four offense types--Burg I, Forg I, Theft I and CAID. The 
findings from this examination showed the same patterns described 
above; additionally, these statistics offered evidence that a 
[ 
I relationship existed between type closing and sentencing independent 
of offense type. 
Finally, the statistical data offered some support for inter-
view and observation findings that characteristics of defendants were 
influential variables in sentencing. Having a prior felony record 
worked against a convicted offender in terms of sentence leniency. 
There were also indications that offenders who were older, female, 
undereducated and unemployed were at a disadvantage in terms of 
light sentencing. 
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A RE-EVALUATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE 
PROPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM THAT FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework on which the present study was 
based was functional in nature. It was suggested that the court 
be viewed as a formal organization dedicated to the achievement of 
ideal criminal justice goals and to the achievement of functional 
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needs to maintain organizational stability and viability. The argu-
ment was that case disposition through a routinized and cooperative 
process of obtaining guilty pleas worked toward the satisfaction 
of the functional need for efficient production while allowing 
for a consideration of ideal goals. Exchange theory was used to 
explain the ways in which negotiating for the guilty plea con-
tributed to the stability and viability of the court organization by 
attending to the needs of key court actors involved in the disposition 
process. 
Based on this theoretical framework as well as previous 
research, four general propositions were set forth. The findings 
from this study unequivocably supported the first two propositions, 
which read as follows: 
PROPOSITION I. 
The majority of felony cases which result in 
formal charges are settled by guilty pleas, and 
the majority of guilty plea dispositions are 
the result of some kind of bargain which 
explicitly or implicitly involves punishment 
reduction. 
\' 
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PROPOSITION II. 
Case disposition through negotiation is 
routinized, i.e., there are identifiable 
patterns both in the substance of the 
bargain and in the procedures for the 
exchange which are known to and accepted 
by key court actors. 
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The model which emerged from the research offered a picture of 
a court organization in which case disposition through negotiation 
for guilty pleas was the dominant method of case settlement, was 
formally structured, routininzed and well-known to key court actors. 
The data indicated that case disposition witnout trial met 
the efficiency needs of the court system and thus helped maintain 
the stability and viability of the functional organization. Key 
court actors generally agreed that settlement prior to trial worked 
toward the achievement of efficiency needs of the court. Further 
support for the argument that settling the great majority of cases 
through guilty pleas is necessary for efficient production carne 
from a comparison of percentages of closing types in 1976 and 1977. 
Although trials increased for certain offenses on which bargaining 
was more severely restricted in 1977, trials decreased for other 
offenses in 1977. Thus, overall the trial versus non-trial rates 
remained stable in both years. 
Based upon the theoretical assumption that cooperation of key 
actors was necessary for organizational stability and on prior research 
which suggested that case disposition through negotiation promoted 
cooperation between key actors, Proposition III was constructed as 
follows: 
PROPOSITION III. 
Key actors in the negotiation process, the 
prosecutor and the defense attorney, work in 
cooperation with one another and interact 
frequently. 
The findings from the present study called for some modification of 
this proposition. The negotiation process in this court system was 
characterized by formalization both procedurally and substantively. 
The mandatory pre-trial negotiation conference--with a designated 
time and setting--removed the need for attorneys to cooperate 
in constructing an informal system. It also limited the need for 
frequent interaction of attorneys beyond that which was formalized 
(although this one formalized interaction was mandatory for every 
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felony case). The rapid timing of events also reduced the possibility 
for attorneys to engage in informal negotiation exchanges on anyone 
case. Other factors helped maintain the adversary as opposed to the 
cooperative nature of the attorneys' relationship. Relevant factors 
appeared to be: the structural independence of the Office of the 
Public Defender; the differences in both the structure and philosophy 
of the Offices of the District Attorney and the Public Defender; the 
rigidity and restrictiveness of the plea negotiation policies of the 
District Attorney's Office; the emphasis on legal factors in the 
bargaining exchange. The data indicated that prosecutors and public 
defenders shared an attitudinal commitment to the adversary system 
which was generally reflected in their behaviors. While dissatis-
factions were expressed by all groups of key actors with certain 
aspects of the case disposition process, all expressed a commitment 
to the efficient and effective operation of the overall system. 
Compliance was facilitated by this commitment, but also appeared to 
be facilitated by a commitment to the adversary system. 
Case disposition through negotiation, then, was carried out 
in formalized interactions between attorneys in an atmosphere of 
contained cooperation, with attorneys perceiving themselves as 
representing opposing sides while working toward a shared goal of 
case resolution. Although professional cooperation between 
prosecutors and public defenders existed, the adversary framework 
remained intact. 
The research findings also showed some support but some need 
for modification of the fourth proposition: 
PROPOSITION IV. 
The negotiation process provides for the 
needs of key actors to be active partici-
pants, to work toward ideal goals, and to 
receive rewards for their work. 
The data indicated that an open exchange process in which the key 
court actors were allowed to be active participants helped provide 
for the actors' needs. Public defenders expressed the greatest 
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dissatisfaction with the handling of cases designated by the District 
Attorney's Office as non-negotiable. Although the prosecutorial 
bargaining policies were rigid, public defenders continually 
searched cases for some commodity (usually a legal factor) which 
would give them the power to be active participants in the 
negotiation process. 
Another theoretical assumption was that the negotiation 
provided rewards both for the prosecutor and the defense attorney 
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through an exchange in which benefits and costs were not zero-sum. 
However, the findings from this study indicated that the balance of 
power in the exchange process was highly-tipped in favor of the 
prosecutor. Although public defenders reported that it was important 
to them that their clients receive some benefit in exchange for a 
guilty plea, benefits were not always easy to come by. One result 
of this dilemma was that public defenders tended to broaden the 
definition of benefits. Small gains and achievements, perceived 
as accomplished in spite of adversity, provided satisfaction. Also, 
public defenders gained satisfaction from their belief that they were 
playing an essential role as legal representatives of defendants in 
need of public aid. Fighting for the underdog from an underdog 
position can provide psychological rewards regardless of the out-
come. While they stated that the "ultimate" in rewards was winning 
an acquittal, public defenders gained satisfaction from winning 
any benefit for their client through the negotiation process. 
Although a failure to achieve benefits was mitigated by their role 
and system perceptions, a chance to achieve benefits through 
negotiation worked toward the achievement of public defenders' 
needs. 
A final theoretical assumption was that the routinized process 
of case disposition through negotiation would allow key actors to 
consider ideal criminal justice goals as they worked toward case 
settlement. The data did indeed indicate that the case disposition 
process allowed court actors to work toward ideal goals. However, 
prosecutors and public defenders had different perceptions of the 
ideal goals and thus different perceptions of the impact of plea 
bargaining on ideal goals. In line with prosecutorial policy aimed 
at curbing plea bargaining, prosecutors were not inclined to view 
plea negotiation as working toward justice or crime control. 
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Justice was perceived by prosecutors as treating similarly-charged 
defendants equally and convicting the guilty as they were charged. 
Additionally, they believed that crime control was undermined by 
allowing defendants to "cop a plea." Thus, they believed that the 
policies of their Office (which were in fact adhered to in bargaining 
decisions) to restrict and equalize bargaining offers worked toward 
ideal goals. Public defenders, on the other hand, generally believed 
that plea negotiation advanced ideal goals by allowing for individual-
ized justice and offering deserving defendants a chance at sentence 
leniency. Bargaining policies which closed off active decision-
making on a case-by-case basis and which used only type offense 
and strength of case as bases for bargaining decisions were seen 
by public defenders as working against the justice goal. 
The findings from the present research generally supported 
the theoretical argument that case dispOSition without trial 
attends to the functional needs of the court while allowing for 
a consideration of ideal goals. Negotiating for the guilty plea, 
however, appears to be more functional in meeting defense attorney 
than prosecutor needs. However, if the public defender can get no 
benefits for his or her client in exchange for the guilty plea, his 
dissatisfaction may work against the prosecutors' need to get 
. convictions in an efficient manner. Thus, professional cooperation 
is necessary. 
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THE PRESENT STUDY: 
A COMPARISON OF FINDINGS 
The research findings from the present study supported some 
findings from previous research on case disposition through 
negotiation. However, there were findings which refuted some of 
the claims of other researchers. In this section, these 
similarities and differences are discussed. 
Data from the present study were consistent with previous 
studies in which it was found that plea bargaining is the dominant 
method of criminal case disposition in American court systems. 
The present research also supported previous studies which found 
that the strength of case factor was extremely influential in 
determining the way in which a case would be handled (McIntyre, 
1967; Alshuler, 1968; Mulkey, 1974). Seriousness of the offense 
was also found in this study and others (Mulkey, 1974) to be an 
influential factor in the negotiation process. The suggestion that 
plea bargaining is prosecutor-dominated (Newman, 1956; Mulkey, 
1974; Neubauer, 1974) was also strongly supported by this research. 
While a highly-routinized plea negotiation process was 
indicated by the present research, some findings differed from 
those previous studies regarding the nature of the routinized 
process. Obviously, plea bargaining is structured differently in 
different court systems. While the present findings cannot be 
generalized beyond the court system under study, the data did 
suggest that as plea bargaining gains formal status and open 
recognition, it may undergo certain changes. 
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In this court system, the plea negotiation process was given 
formal recognition. Plea negotiation in reality deviated very 
little from formal procedure and policy. In addition, plea 
bargaining did not appear to conflict with substantive law. The 
findings of Sudnow indicating that offenses were often reduced to 
lesser crimes which were not necessarily or situationally included 
in the initial charge were not supported in the present study. 
Sudnow suggested that social rather than statutory referents 
were used when deciding what a given case would be reduced to. 
In the present study, the majority of charge reductions were found 
to be to lower levels of the initial offense. Although statutory 
law in the state declared that charge reductions need he only 
"reasonably related" to the original charge, in fact most reduced 
charges were necessarily included in the original charge. 
The present research did support the contention of other 
researchers (Heumann, 1975; Rosett and Cressey, 1976) that the 
plea neogtiators were likely to assume some guilt at the outset, 
and that thus their focal concern was on the punishment issue. 
Thus, when the state's case was strong and the punishment not 
severe (Mather's dead-bang cases), disposition by guilty plea was 
common. However, defnese attorneys interviewed in this study 
indicated that it was important to them that their client receive 
some kind of benefit in exchange for a guilty plea. In fact, the 
number of trials increased for those offenses which became non-
reducible in 1977. Although the majoirty of these offenses were 
still settled by guilty pleas, it does appear that the likelihood 
of trial increases when defendants are offered no benefits in 
249 
exchange for guilty pleas. The fact that offenses placed in the 
non-reducible category in 1977 showed an increase in dispositions 
with other kinds of bargains over the previous year suggested that 
prosecutors were aware that some bargain offer may be helpful in 
obtaining a guilty plea. 
The data provided some support for previous research indicating 
that court actors perceived of plea bargaining as fulfilling the 
efficiency needs of the court (Mulkey, 1974; Rosett and Cressey, 
1976). However, this court system was so-structured that efficiency 
needs were provided for within the formal structure. Thus, it 
[ 
I appeared that the court actors themselves felt less pressured to 
consider efficiency needs in the day-to-day handling of cases. 
Prosecutors, working in line with Office policies to curb plea 
bargaining, were less inclined than suggested by previous research 
to believe that plea bargaining was essential to the stability and 
viability of the court system. 
Previous research indicates that there are conflicting 
opinions regarding the extent to which plea bargaining serves 
ideal criminal justice goals (Neubauer, 1974). In the present 
study, conflicting opinions were found regarding this issue 
between prosecutors and public defenders. Public defenders believed 
(similar to the conclusions of Rosett and Cressey) that plea bargain-
ing helped achieve justice on an individualized basis by allowing 
for a personalized ;oapproach to the treatment of offenders. On 
the other hand, prosecutors believe~ that plea bargaining distorted 
the reality of the crime and thus worked against criminal justice 
".< goals. 
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Attributes of the offender have been suggested to be important 
in charge, plea and bargain decisions (NeWman, 1956; Sudnow, 1965). 
In the present study, offender characteristics, e.g., prior record, 
sex, age, education, employment, were not strongly related to 
whether or not a case was closed with a bargained plea. However, 
defendant characteristics did appear to be influential in the type 
of sentence recommendation as well as in the actual sentence. 
Being a repeater, over age 21, under-educated, and unemployed 
seemed to work against a defendant in terms of sentence severity. 
In previous research it has been suggested that plea 
bargaining works against the ideal adversary concept of forcing 
opposing attorneys to work as cooperative members of the same 
formal organization (Sudnow, 1965; Blumberg, 1967; Rosett and 
Cressey, 1976). In the present study, both an attitudinal and 
a behavioral commitment to the adversary system were indicated. 
While the need for a good working relationship was recognized, the 
attorneys in the study maintained their adversary roles. Again, 
the fact that the negotiation process was formalized in this court 
system (with a required time and setting designated for exchanges) 
reduced the need for attorneys to engage in informal exchanges out-
side of the formal structure. Additionally, the adherence of 
prosecutors to formal Office policy inhibited the growth of 
prosecutor/defense attorney relationships in which cases were 
handled on a personal level. Overall, then, the formal structure of 
plea negotiation in this court system facilitated the maintenance of 
the adversary system. 
-~--... ,--,., ..... 
,. 
! 
,. 
i' 
I, 
251 
The role of t~e judge in the plea negotiation process has also 
been researched by social scientists. In his study, Church (1976) 
found that when bargains on the charge were not allowed, bargains 
on punishment occurred in which the judge became a focal actor in 
the exchange process. Others have suggested that the judge must 
necessarily cooperate with attorneys if the guilty plea system is to 
work (Cole, 1970; Rosett and Cressey, 1976). In the court system 
under study, the judge was not a participant in the actual 
negotiation of guilty pleas on felony cases. In addition, formal 
policy was adhered to by the judge in his statement to the defendant 
that sentence recommendations are not binding on the court. If a 
defendant plead guilty because he/she was led to believe that 
he/she would be given a certain sentence in exchange for a guilty 
plea, he/she was informed of the right to rescind this plea. However, 
the data strpn,]ly indicated a positive relationship between sentence 
recommendations and actual sentences. Attorneys expressed the 
opinion that certain judges were more likely than others to follow 
the sentence recommendations of the District Attorney's Office, and 
thus the tendencies of individual judges were considered by 
attorneys in planning their prosecution and defense strategies (all 
respondent groups believed that tendencies of judges were more 
important to defense attorneys than to prosecutors). Yet, overall, 
the data did indicate that the judges tended to go along with the 
state's recommendations for punishment more often than not. 
The present study has been primarily exploratory in nature. 
The findings were consistent with theory and with previous research 
in many major areas. However, some findings suggested a need for 
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theoretical modification and for further research to clarify 
inconsistencies between the present study and previous literature. 
In the concluding section, suggestions for further research are 
offered. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The researcher believes that a court system in which the plea 
negotiation process is given formal recognition and formal 
structure operates differently than one in which participants must 
develop informal processes for disposition by negotiation. Since 
it is only recently that plea bargaining has been given formal 
status, the need for further studies of court systems in which plea 
bargaining has been formally structured is imperative in order to 
assess the generalizability of the findings from the present study. 
Of particular interest would be comparisons of court systems in 
which the informal process conformed to the formal process (as 
was the case in this study) with court systems in which the informal 
process deviated from the formal process. 
Another research problem which calls for further study has 
to do with the unsettled question of the cooperative versus 
adversary models of the plea negotiation process. This study 
suggested that the adversary system can be maintained within a case 
disposition process in which negotiation plays a dominant role. On 
the other hand, several defense attorneys interviewed in this study 
warned of the danger that, over time, a negotiated guilty plea 
system may lead to a reduction in the adversary concerns of the 
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opposing attorneys. Over-time studies of the same court system 
would be useful to assess this possibility. 
Further information is also needed on the way in which changes 
in bargaining policies produce changes in (a) the substance of 
bargains and (b) the outcome of bargains. The policy of the 
District Attorney's Office in the present study was aimed at 
reducing (and for certain offenses eliminating) charge reduction 
bargaining. The data indicated that this policy has been effective. 
However, a negotiation conference was mandatory for all felony 
t: 
cases, and most often the state offered something in exchange for a 
t . guilty plea. An increase in other kinds of bargains, e.g., count 
I' . 
f 
~ . dismissals, agreements not to file--was concomitant with a decrease 
in charge reduction bargains. However, agreements to dismiss counts 
and/or nct file on other known charges did not appear to be good 
bargains in terms of sentencing. A follow-up study on the actual 
time served by defendants whose cases were settled with different 
kinds of bargains would shed some further light on the extent to 
which various bargains resulted in actual punishment reduction. 
Although difficult to assess, an important research question 
concerns the way in which the plea negotiation process does or 
does not work toward the achievement of ideal criminal justice 
goals. In this study, prosecutors and defense attorneys expressed 
conflicting opinions regarding this question. In part, this appeared 
to be due to their respective roles, in which emphases were placed 
on different aspects of criminal justice. A case study approach to 
." 
~. this research question would be useful in order to obtain objective 
information on plea negotiation and criminal justice goals. 
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The present study began with a broad format, attempting to 
examine a number of specific research questions along with presenting 
a model of the total field of study. It is the researcher's opinion 
that one of the major contributions of this kind of study is in its 
empirically-based suggestions for future research. Through this 
exploration of a relatively new field of study, the researcher has 
identified patterns which might be usefully subjected to refined 
testing. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMMENTS ON THE FIELD RESEARCH MODEL 
Previous discussions of the field research model and the 
specific methodology for this study (see Chapter II) indicated that 
this type of research was no small undertaking. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that a number of criticisms have been leveled against this 
methodological model. In this appendix, criticisms are confronted, 
and advantages of the field research methodology for this kind of 
study are discussed. 
MULTIPLE TECHNIQUES FOR DATA COLLECTION 
The use of multiple techniques of data collection furthers 
the field research goal of examining the totality of the field of 
study. In the present study, in which formal and informal attitudes 
and activities were examined, different techniques were required to 
retrieve different kinds of information. Also, by using independent 
measures, both validity and reliability are strengthened. The 
comments of two methodologists are appropriate: 
Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or 
more independent measurement processes, the certainty 
of its interpretation is greatly reduced. The most 
persuasive evidence comes through a triangulation of 
measurement processes. If a proposition can survive 
the onslaught of a series of imperfect measures, with 
all their irrelevant error, confidence should be placed 
in it (Webb, 1971: 3). 
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In short, the very large number of observations and 
kinds of data an observer can collect, and the resulting 
possibility of experimenting with a variety of procedures 
for collecting them, means that his final conclusions can 
be tested more often and in more ways than is common in 
other forms (Becker, 1970: 52). 
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The use of the data sources selected for the present study 
has been common in other similar studies. Sudnow used observations, 
interviews and case records to examine the way in which cases were 
judged to be typical of given classes of offenses and treated in 
routinized ways based upon their typicality or normalcy (Sudnow, 
1965). Rovner-Pieczenik used these same sources to uncover the 
way ill ;.;~i.ch felony cases were adjudicated in an urban court by 
a labeling process which regularized the adjudication process 
(Rovner-Pieczenik, 1976). Several other studies used observations, 
interviews and case records to identify and analyze important 
factors in decisions to charge, plea and bargain (Cole, 1970; Mather, 
1973; Neubauer, 1974). 
Observations and interviews complement one another and act 
upon one another in a "check and balance" fashion. According to 
Olson: 
Interviews and what might more correctly be called 
conversations are interlocked with observations. They 
provide access to information that would be otherwise 
unavailable. They also provide the chance for 
elaboration and validation of your observations and 
interpretations of events. In a similar manner, 
observations supplement and guide material gained 
through interviews and conversations (Olson, 1976: 51). 
Formal records provide another independent check on the validity and 
reliability of field research. Formal records may be used to 
corroborate the findings from observations and interviews; additionally, 
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they may be used to ascertain the way in which the perspectives 
of key actors do or do not coincide with the statistical facts 
of case disposition. In her field research on the adjudication 
process in an urban court, Rovner-Pieczenik found the use of 
court records to be helpful: 
Although I could observe "bargain justice" on a 
case-by-case basis, quantitative data concerning the 
outcome of the bargaining sessions was not available in 
either the legal or the sociological literature. I 
concluded that the statistics on dispositions and 
sentences actually represent the outcome of bargainings, 
since the majority of cases was resolved by a plea of 
guilty. It was at this point in my observational 
experience that I decided to collect statistical 
information about the processing and outcome of a large 
number of individual cases. These statistics collectively 
would represent what was too difficult to observe directly; 
how, in fact, different case types were adjudicated by the 
courts (Rovner-Pieczenik, 1976: 470). 
It was the conclusion of this researcher that the use of 
multiple methods of data collection leads to a more accurate 
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depiction of the case disposition process and strengthens both the 
validity and reliability of the research. It is also a partial 
response to the critics of field research who express a concern about 
the lack of objectivity in such research. 
MULTIPLE TECHNIQUES FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
The controversy over the use of quantitative versus qualitative 
methods for data analysis is indeed an old one. Proponents of 
quantitative methods have argued strongly that numerical representa-
tion provides the objectivity necessary for reliability. Without 
quantification, theY'continue, findings cannot be standardized, and 
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they therefore rely heavily on the judgment of the researcher. 
Further, critics suggest that only through a statistical analysis 
can relationships be assessed in terms of their significance. 
Those who support qualitative analysis argue that for certain 
kinds of research, e.g., in-depth, exploratory, ethnographic--
the meaning of social relationships can best be understood through 
a qualitative analysis of the findings. They also point out 
that the benefits of quantification, e.g., standardization, 
precision, comparability, statistical probability, may be out-
weighed by the costs of losing important information. 
• • qualitative analysis is more likely to 
explain relationships in terms of social meanings, 
social realities, social norms, and definitions of 
the situation. Such understandings are not readily 
quantified (transformed into numbers), and, if they 
were, they might lose their sense and complexity 
(Sanders, 1974: 164). 
Others have argued that quantitative analysis requires judgmental 
decisions initially, as qualitative data must be transformed into 
numerical codings in much research (Cavan, 1972). Kaplan states 
that "certain things are necessarily omitted in the numerical 
description, for this is always based on a determinate set of 
properties and relations to the exclusion of others" (Kaplan, 1964: 
207). Kaplan further suggests that the argument over qualitative 
versus quantitative methods of analysis may be a false one in that 
the two methods per se are not antithetical: 
The point is that both quality and quantity are miscon-
ceived when they are taken to be antithetical or even 
alternative. Quantities are of qualities, and a measured 
quality has just the magnitud;-expressed in its measure • 
In a less metaphysical idiom, we could say that whether 
something is identified as a quality or as a quantity 
depends on how we choose to represent it in our 
symbolism (Kaplan, 1964: 207). 
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Even if one believes that qualitative and quantitative analyses are 
not as easily fused as Kaplan suggests, it would be difficult to 
argue against incorporating both methods into a data analysis model 
for this particular type of study. Like the use of multiple methods 
for acquiring data, the use of multiple methods for analyzing data 
can only strengthen the validity and reliability of the research. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS-TESTING 
The theoretically-based propositions provided the conceptual 
framework within which the phenomena under study were to be explored. 
Within this focal framework, flexibility was allowed as the research 
process progressed. Since the purpose was to explore a particular 
social reality, the testing of well-formulated hypotheses was 
inappropriate. Becker has pointed out that having well-formulated 
hypotheses in advance may bias or limit the field researcher'S 
attempt to examine social reality as it actually exists: 
[Field researchers] attempt to make their research 
theoretically meaningful, but they assume that they 
do not know enough about the organization ~ priori to 
identify relevant problems and hypotheses and that they 
must discover these in the course of the research 
(Becker, 1970: 26). 
While in the present study general problems were identified, the 
precise nature of these problems was not clearly understood prior 
to the research undertaking. Thus, the research process itself led 
to further development of and modifications in the theoretical frame-
work. This process has been referred to as the discovery of grounded 
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theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The purpose of the research was 
not merely descriptive; rather, it was to make theoretical sense 
of the circumstances. However, the descriptive data could not be 
ignored when they did not fit into the initial theoretical 
perspective. According to Nash: 
The theory strives for a nomological form--it 
attempts to state laws, but it must account for the 
facts gathered. That is, it is an uneasy mixture 
between deductive and inductive nomological theories 
(Nash, 1966: 10) • 
Becker's description of the field research process reflects the 
analytical approach taken in the present study: 
. • . the observer characteristically begins by 
constructing models of parts of the organiz~tion as 
he comes in contact with them, discovers concepts and 
problems, and the frequency and distribution of the 
phenomena these call to his attention. After construct-
ing a model specifying the relationships among various 
elements of this part of the organization, the observer 
seeks greater accuracy by successively refining the model 
to take account of evidence which does not fit his previous 
formulation (Becker, 1970: 34). 
The final stage of analysis consists of "incorporating individual 
findings into a generalized model of the social system or organization 
under study or some part of that organization" (Becker, 1970: 33) • 
A number of studies are illustrative of the research process 
described above. Sudnow used this process to generate a model of 
the classification scheme which guided charge, plea and bargain 
decisions in case disposition. Sudnow examined individual cases 
to describe the way in which classes of offenses were categorized 
according to their "typical features." From this description, he 
moved to an analysis of the total bargaining phenomenon (Sudnow, 1965). 
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In her study of skid row alcoholics, Wiseman sought to understand 
the social world of a particular deviant community by examining 
the perspectives of those involved in the social world of the 
skid row alcoholics. Wiseman reported that as the study progressed, 
important concepts and constructs emerged (Wiseman, 1970). In 
two separate studies, Cavan attempted to apprehend the social 
world of specific groups by observing them in their natural 
settings. In her ethnographic study of bar behavior, Cavan focused 
on activities in the bar setting which gave meaning to the total 
social reality of the social system. The descriptive data focused 
on three categories of activities: seating and spatial distribution, 
internal movement, and face-to-face interaction. After identifying 
the frequency and distribution of regular behavior patterns, Cavan 
moved to the analytic stage, suggesting that the data indicated 
the existence of a well-defined social system in which rules for 
behavior were informally established and consequences of particular 
actions and attitudes were readily anticipated by participants 
(Cavan, 1966). In her study of hippies in San Francisco, Cavan 
used a similar research process--describing everyday life, social 
exchange, social trouble and social control as relevant phenomena 
in the hippie subculture (Cavan, 1972). These studies covered 
a variety of topics and differed in their conceptual frameworks; 
however, they all were directed toward the exploration of the 
social reality of a social system by examining the way in which 
the parts gave meaning to the whole. 
I 
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OBJECTIVITY 
One of the basic concerns of methodologists is how to insure 
that the findings from a research undertaking are objective. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that a variety of meanings 
have been attached to the term objectivity. 
While objectivity is certainly not synonymous with validity 
or reliability, issues regarding validity and reliability are 
often raised in discussions of the objectivity of a given research 
project. A carefully constructed field research design is every 
bit as capable of attending to validity (the study measures what 
it purports to measure) as any other kind of research design. In 
the present study, content and construct validity were checked 
by referring to previous similar studies and consulting with 
experts regarding the construction of the measurements. Although 
controls required to insure internal validity after the instruments 
have been constructed are not as easily applied in field research 
as in experimental research, the field researcher compensates by 
continually assessing and reassessing internal validity throughout 
the research process (Johnson, 1975). Field research is especially 
strong in external validity (generalizability of the findings) since 
the research takes place in a natural rather than contrived setting. 
The reliability issue is more problematic. In order to insure 
reliability (the study can be repeated under the sarne circumstances 
with the same results), controls can be introduced in a true 
experiment which cannot be introduced in field research. In a 
true experiment, variables are manipulated, and attempts are made 
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to insure that all variables extraneous to the hypothesis being 
measured are controlled. In field research, however, the purpose 
is to consider all variables as they occur in the natural setting. 
Admittedly, there are fewer guarantees that a field study can be 
replicated in the same way that an experimental study can be 
replicated. Becker suggests that we should not expect identical 
results from different field studies of the same organization but 
only that the findings be compatible (Becker, 1970). 
The present study had to contend with another reliability 
problem. Due to the fact that the data were collected by a single 
researcher, reliability could not be checked by making inter-
observer comparisons. There were, however, compensations. 
V 
Observation and interview schedules were structureed with standard-
ized lists of activities and attitudes to be measured. Experts were 
consulted throughout the research process regarding data collection 
and analysis. Finally, the use of multiple data sources provided 
for a variety of measurements of the same phenomena. 
A specific criticism of field research focuses on lack of 
objectivity due to the obvious intrusion of the researcher into 
the research process (reactivity). The field researcher, who is 
often a participant in or at least a direct observer of the 
phenomenon under study must deal with the possibility that 1) his 
or her presence is influencing the way in which respondents react 
and/or 2) his or her involvement is leading him or her to be 
judgmental or biased in the collection and analysis of the data. 
Field researchers have had much to say on these issues. 
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First, it is generally accepted that reactivity can be a 
problem in all research in which people are the objects of study. 
Becker argues that field research may actually reduce respondents' 
inclinations to respond "falsely" since they are being observed 
in a natural setting in which "business must go on as usual." 
Experimenters neutralize external constraints by 
isolating the subjects of their experiments from their 
usual surroundings, by experimenting on topics 
unconnected with any strong beliefs held by the subject, 
and by assuring the subject that his behavior in the 
experiment, however, he performs, will have no influence 
on his life outside the experimental laboratory. To 
precisely the degree that these aims are achieved, 
subjects are free to shape their words and deeds in 
accordance with cues unwittingly given off by a biased 
experimenter (Becker, 1970: 45-46). 
In the present study, lack of objectivity in terms of respondent 
bias was checked through the use of multiple data sources. However, 
because of the research goal to understand the total social 
reality, the researcher was interested in attitudes and opinions 
of respondents regardless of whether or not they coincided with 
"objective" truth. If only actions are considered to constitute 
objective truth, field research does have an objectivity problem, 
for it is well-documented that words and deeds are not necessarily 
consistent with one another (LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969; Deutscher, 
1973). However, objectivity does not have this meaning for most 
field researchers. Rather, it means an accurate description of an 
entire phenomenon--including both words and deeds. It is, of 
course, recognized that attitudes and actions constitute two 
classes of data which must be separated analytically. Although 
one purpose of the present study was to make comparisons between 
attitudes and actions, the central focus was on the way in which 
both fit into the social reality of the case disposition process 
within the court setting. 
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Although respondent bias is recognized as an objectivity 
problem in all types of research, researcher bias has been claimed 
to be a more serious problem for field research than for other 
types of research. Observation methods, it is alleged, lead to 
descriptions and interpretations which depend on subjective 
judgments of the field researcher. Field researchers deny these 
claims, pointing out that the use of structured schedules, the 
recording of specific events, and the use of multiple data sources 
all work toward observer objectivity. 
On the other hand, it has been recognized that the notion of 
science as a totally objective, value-free enterprise is a myth. 
Based upon the seminal work of Karl Mannheim (1952), the realization 
that knowledge itself is socially-constructed and subjectively-
based calls for a reassessment of the meaning of objectivity. If 
the arguments of Mannheim and others are accpeted, it follows that 
the perceptions of researchers are biased in the sense that they 
are influenced by subjective experiences and world views which 
are a part of their life history. The fact that subjectivity 
cannot be entirely eliminated does not mean that the objectivity 
criterion must be abandoned. The research design can incorporate 
techniques previously referred to which strengthen objectivity. 
Additionally, an awareness of the possible intrusion of subject-
ivity leads to a more careful consideration of biases and judgments 
which may be influencing the findings. 
l 
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Another perspective is that subjectivity and objectivity are 
both useful in arriving at scientific truth in field research. 
In uncovering the social reality of a given phenomenon, it is 
suggested that the subjective experiences of the researcher may 
actually enhance the research endeavor. In his discussion of 
naturalistic observation as a research methodology, Matza concludes: 
Naturalism must choose the subjective view, and 
consequently it must combine the scientific method 
with the distincitve tools of hurnanism--experience, 
intuition, and empathy-. Naturalism has no other 
choice because its philosophical commitment is 
neither to objectivity nor subjectivity, neither to 
scientific method, nor humanist sensibility. Its 
only commitment is fidelity to the phenomenon under 
consideration (Matza, 1961: 8). 
Finally, a comment on subject-object dualism seems 
appropriate. The traditional scientific view is that bias can 
be eliminated (or at least reduced) by maintaining a strict 
separation between the subject and object of study. Recently, 
social scientists have rejected this dualism and argued that 
subject and object must be considered in terms of their relation-
ship to one another (Johnson, 1975). To consider the subject and 
object as interdependent parts of a total phenomenon does not in 
itself reduce objectivity. Kaplan states: 
All measurement yields, not a property intrinsic 
to the object being measured taken in isolation, but 
a relation between that object and the others serving 
as standards of measurement. When the relation is 
to other human beings, or even to the observer himself, 
it is not therefore a subjective one (Kaplan, 1964: 
212) • 
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SAMPLING 
In an exploratory study, traditional sampling techniques are 
not always appropriate as "it is difficult to know in advance just 
what the sample should be representative of" (Wiseman, 1970: 282). 
Yet representativeness is exactly what is being pursued in examining 
the frequency and distribution of phenomena under study. To satisfy 
the exploratory purpose, some sampling flexibility must be allowed 
during the course of the collection of data. However, an initial 
description of units to be sampled along with procedures for 
sampling is necessary to strengthen reliability and to reduce the 
possibility of mistaking idiosyncratic findings for representative 
ones. In this study, there were three levels of sampling units 
which corresponded with the sources of data: events observed; 
respondents interviewed; felony cases recorded in criminal files. 
Two specific events (pre-trial conferences and plea hearings) 
were selected for observation. These events were selected due to 
their direct relevance to the phenomenon under study. It was not 
possible to take a random or representative sample of pre-trial 
conferences. Since access to these conferences was not readily 
available, the researcher had to take whatever she could get. 
Conclusions from this set of observations, therefore, had to be 
described as tenuous and only suggestive. The researcher sat in 
on plea hearings on a number of different days. On these days, 
all hearings which took place were recorded. Thus, there is no 
reason to suspect that the observed hearings did not constitute a 
representative sample. However, observations of hearings took 
L------.. -.... -..... 
place during a time period in which only two different judges 
were on the bench in Chief Criminal Court. In this respect, the 
findings are limited. 
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Since the entire verbal content of these two events was 
recorded, bias which may result from recording only selected aspects 
of events was non-existent. More casual observations were made 
of other events in the case disposition process (trials, other 
hearings, meetings). Data from these latter observations were 
used to corroborate or expand upon the findings from other data 
sources. 
The populations to be interviewed were selected for the 
purpose of 1) examining the perspectives of key actors in the case 
disposition process who were members of the same public court 
system; and 2) comparing the perspectives of groups who played 
different roles in the case disposition process. The original 
intent was to interview the total populations of these groups. 
This was accomplished for the public defender group, and fell only 
slightly short of the mark for the felony judge group. As 
indicated earlier, however, the prosecutor group consisted only of 
individuals selected by the District Attorney's Office. Only 
about half of the total population of felony prosecutors was 
represented in the questionnaire responses, and less than one fifth 
was represented in the open-ended p~rt of the interview. 
Traditional random samples were taken of all felony cases 
settled in the time periods under study. There is no reason to 
suspect, therefore, that error contained in the data from these 
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samples was not random. Summary statistics on type closing of the 
total populations from which these samples were drawn indicated 
that, on this one important variable, the samples were representative 
of the total populations. 
ETHICAL ISSUES 
When doing a field study, the researcher must take into 
consideration the implications and consequences that the research 
might have on those being studied. There are several ethical 
issues which are relevant for this particular study. 
The first issue has to do with disclosure. Members of an 
organization are likely to be wary of outside investigators; 
such potential participants are increasingly seeking an answer to 
the question of whose side the researcher is on (Becker, 1970; 
Glazer, 1972). The researcher may answer this question by referring 
to the tenet of scientific objectivity. However, regardless of 
techniques for objective data collection and analysis built into 
the research design, the selection and conceptualization of the 
problem reflects a political point of view • 
• . research, like all other human activities, is 
political; that it supports one point of view and 
vested interest at the expense of others (Gans, 1962: 
56-57). 
Increasingly, social scientists are openly advocating that research 
be used to bring about social change in programs and policies. 
Not only is a commitment to social "progress" seen as an appropriate 
part of the researcher role, but further, a neutral stance is 
seen as fostering the myth of value-free research (Seeley, 1961). 
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Obviously, the political perspective of the research/researcher has 
implications for the object of study. Political perspectives aside, 
the "exposing" or "unmasking" nature of the exploratory field study 
may have political or professional consequences for the organization 
and/or its members. While ethics demand that the researcher explain 
to those being studied the general nature of the research, as well 
as its possible implications, there are several factors which work 
against full disclosure. 
First, in order to gain access to the organization and thus 
to the desired data, it is essential to gain the trust and cooper-
ation of the organization members (Becker., 1970; Wiseman, 1970; 
Glazer, 1972; Sanders, 1974; Johnson, 1975). Trust and cooperation 
are facilitated by developing rapport. 
Generally, rapport is a matter of being non-
critical, interested in what the subjects do and say, 
and, most important, genuinely open to an under-
standing of how they see and experience their social 
world (Sanders, 1974: 159). 
However, rapport may not be easily established if full disclosure 
suggests to the participants that their organization may be 
described in ways which work against their interests. The 
researcher, then, may be tempted to withhold information which he 
or she feels may inhibit cooperation. When the participants are 
mdividuals or organizations with power and influence (as was the 
case in this study), the researcher may be even more likely to lose 
accessibility by full disclosure (Glaser, 1972; Barber, 1973). 
Administrators in government, business, and the 
unions who pass on requests for research funds or who 
must acquiesce before field workers can study their 
own organizations are reluctant to assist those who 
might expose their decisions in an unfavorable light 
(Glazer, 1972: 150) • 
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In addition to the researcher's own vested interest in gaining 
accessibility in order to complete a research project, the 
researcher should have a commitment to uncovering the reality of 
all aspects of society--especially those aspects in which great 
power to influence social decisions and activities is vested. 
Those in power, whether in public or private positions, 
have been defined as fair game by social scientists. 
This is as it should be. Their position often includes 
the expectation of accountability. Social scientists, 
among others, have and should continue to strive to 
ensure that those who control vast administrative 
organizations are not shielded from the appropriate 
limelight (Glazer, 1972: 172). 
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The approach in the present study was to attempt to develop 
a relationship of trust, cooperation and rapport with the partici-
pants in the study by reassuring them that there was a genuine 
interest in their perspectives and in depicting their organization 
accurately and objectively. Participants in the study were in 
fact extremely cooperative. All public defenders of whom an inter-
view was requested agreed to be interviewed. Of the judges who 
were approached, only one declined to be interviewed (this judge 
offered time constraints as an explanation of his refusal). Three 
judges, however, declined to fill out the questionnaire form, 
commenting on their lack of trust in data obtained from question-
naire forms. The District Attorney's Office proved to be the 
least accessible (the District Attorney stated that time constraints 
were responsible for this inaccessibility). However, all of the 
public defenders and prosecutors who were eventually interviewed 
were cooperative and willing to take the time to respond to all 
questions (the interviews ranged in time from a half hour to an 
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hour and a half). Overall, the interviewed judges were cooperat 
personable and open in their responses. Yet, as a group, the 
judges were the most difficult to interview. The authority 
status of the judges was reflected in their demeanor and in 
their actual verbal responses. Additionally, the judges' offices 
(in which the interviews took place) confirmed by their spaciousness, 
opulence and formal decor the powerful and authoritative position 
of the occupant. Finally, compared to attorneys, judges were 
more inclined to confine their comments to descriptions of the 
ideal, formal system and less inclined to comment on informal 
processes in which they were not directly involved. 
Overall, the respondents seemed to be satisfied with the 
brief explanation given them of the nature and purpose of the 
study. They did not express concern about the consequences or 
implications of the research project either for themselves or 
! 
for the system. When interviewees did ask for further explanations 
I 
of the nature or purpose of the study, an elaboration of the initial 
introduction was given. Care was taken, however, not to bias 
I 
:- responses by indicating what the researcher expected to find by 
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asking a particular question. The validity and reliability of the 
findings depends upon something less than full disclosure of what 
particular observations or interview questions are attempting to 
explain (Blalock, 1970; Glazer, 1972). 
Another ethical issue has to do with the protection of the 
rights of individual respondents to privacy. In this study, these 
rights were protectsd by guaranteeing anonymity to the interviewees 
and observed. Respondents were referred to only by the label 
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which designates their status in the court system, e.g., prosecutor, 
public defender, judge. In addition, care was taken not to include 
information which would reveal identities of respondents. The 
study was concerned with attitudes and actions of individuals only 
as they were representative of a group or of a system. Likewise, 
names or other imformation which might reveal identities of defendants 
whose cases were researched were carefully excluded. Finally, since 
information on formal structure and procedure of the court process 
is open to the public, the use of such information was not believed 
to be an invasion of privacy. 
It should be noted that while anonymity of individual 
participants can be guaranteed, confidentiality regarding responses 
cannot really be provided. To insure total confidentiality 
would require that the research findings not be released. Viewing 
confidentiality in this light, it appears that social scientists 
talk somewhat erroneously about providing confidentiality of research 
findings. Samuels comments: 
Where the research findings to applied goals would 
be rendered useless if true confidentiality is main-
tained, the researcher must assume the responsibility 
of either entirely withholding the findings from 
publication or releasing them at a time when the 
informants can no longer be harmed by such disclosures 
(Samuels, 1976: 22). 
The ethical issues in social research are not easily resolved. 
However, these issues must be carefully considered as the researchers 
weigh commitments to the scientific endeavor on the one hand and to 
those being studied on the other. 
Perhaps most significantly, field workers have to 
confront one of the most pressing issues of social 
science research; how to resolve the profound tension 
between exposure of what is beyond the fc.cade of social 
conduct and avoidance of harm to those we study 
(Glazer, 1972: 150) • 
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APPENDIX B 
VARIABLE CODINGS: CRIMINAL COURT FELONY CASE SAMPLE DATA 
Variable Coding 
1. Initial most serious charge 
2. Initial charge: 2nd count 
3. Initial charge: 3rd count 
4. Initial charge: 4th count 
5. Settled most serious charge 
6. Settled charge: 2nd count 
7. Settled charge: 3rd count 
8. Settled charge: 4th count 
9. # initial counts 
10. # initial felony counts 
11. # settled counts 
12. # settled felony counts 
13. No contest plea 
14. Type closing 
15. # setovers 
16. Type attorney 
17. Judge 
18. Pre-trial custody status 
19. Sentence: incarceration 
Offense by name and level, 
e.g., Forgery I, Attempted 
Assault II. 
Actual number counts, 
e.g., 1, 2, 3. 
Yes/No. 
PG/PGTL/PGTL+Dis/PG+Dis/CBJ/ 
CBC/ABJ/ABC/DIS 
Actual number setovers, 
e.g., 1, 2, 3 
Public defender/court-appointed 
from private bar/privately 
retained. 
Number substituted for name, 
e.g., Judge A, Judge B. 
Recognizance/bail/jail. 
Penitentiary 5 years or morel 
Pen less than 5 years/Jail 
and probation/Jail only/No jail 
and probation/ No jail and no 
probation. 
Variable 
20. Fine 
21. Drug or alcohol program 
22. Mental health program 
23. Restitution 
24. Community service 
25. Month arrest 
26. Total disposition time 
27. Sex of defendant 
28. Age of defendant 
29. Prior record of defendant 
30. Education of defendant 
31. Employment of defendant 
32. Residence of defendant 
33. DA unit 
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Coding 
Yes/No. 
Actual month, e.g., January, 
February. 
1-30 days/31-60 days/6l-90 
days/over 90 days. 
Male/Female. 
l7-20/2l-30/31-40/over 40. 
Felony record/No felony record/ 
No record. 
No high school/Less than 4 
years high school/4 years high 
school/Some college/College 
graduate. 
Unemployed/Employed less than 
6 months/Employed over 6 months. 
N.E./S.E./N./N.W./S.W./Out city/ 
Out state/Transient 
Actual unit, i.e., A, B, C, D, 
E, U. 
APPENDIX C 
VARIABLE CODINGS: 
PUBLIC DEFENDER FORGERY I AND BURGLARY I DATA 
Variable 
l. Most serious settled charge 
2. # initial counts 
3. # initial felony counts 
4. # settled counts 
5. # settled felony counts 
6. Type Closing 
7. Judge 
8. Sentence recommendation by 
prosecutor: incarceration 
9. Sentence recommendation by 
prosecutor: other conditions 
Misdemeanor status 
Fine 
Restitution 
Drug or alcohol program 
Mental health program 
Community service 
10. Sentence: incarceration 
Coding 
Offense by name and level, 
e.g., Burglary II. 
Actual number counts, e.g., 
1, 2, 3. 
PG/PGTL/PGTL+Dis/PG+Dis/ 
PGTL+Not file/PG+Not file/ 
PGTL+Dis+Not file/PG+Dis+Not 
file/CBJ/CBC/ABJ/ABC/DIS. 
Number substituted for name, 
e.g., Judge 1, Judge 2. 
Penitentiary 5 years or morel 
penitentiary less than 5 years/ 
Jail and probation/Jail only/ 
No jail and probation/No jail/ 
No position or not oppose/ 
After conviction/COnfinement. 
Immediate/deferred/no. 
Yes/No. 
Penitentiary 5 years or morel 
Penitentiary less than 5 years/ 
Jail and probation/Jail only/ 
No jail and probation/No jail. 
------------_.-. -
variable 
11. Sentence: other conditions 
Misdemeanor status 
Fine 
Restitution 
Drug or alcohol program 
Mental health program 
Community service 
12. Sex of defendant 
13. Age of defendant 
14. Prior record of defendant 
15. Education of defendant 
16. Employment of defendant 
17. Race of defendant 
18. Defendant drug or alcohol 
problem 
19. Dismissal reason 
20. Offense in dwelling 
(Burglary only) 
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Coding 
Immediate/deferred/no. 
Yes/No. 
Male/Female. 
l7-20/2l-30/3l-40/over 40. 
Prior felony record/No felony 
record. 
No high school/Less than 4 
years high school/4 years high 
school/Some college/College 
graduate. 
Unemployed/Employed less than 
6 months/Employed part time or 
off and on/Employed less than 
6 months and part time or off 
and on/Employed over 6 months 
and full time. 
White/black/other. 
Yes/No. 
PG to other charge/State 
unable sustain burden of 
proof/Civil compromise/Speedy 
trial violation/Remand juvenile/ 
other. 
Yes/No. 
':.' 
APPENDIX D 
QUESTIONNAIRE FORM 
For the following questions, please circle the number which 
most closely approximates your opinion. 
1. In deciding how to handle a give case, how much consideration 
do you think the following factors are given by 
a) the Public Defender's Office; 
b) the District Attorney's Office: 
Very 
Much Some None 
Strength of prosecutor's case 
a) Public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Seriousness of offense 
a) public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Prior record of defendant 
a) Public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Actual guilt of the defendant 
a) Public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Typicality of the offense 
a) public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
General character of the defendant 
a) Public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Very 284 
Much Some None 
Attitude of the defendant 
a) Public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
Defendant's wishes regarding handling 
of case 
a) Public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
Report of arresting officer 
a) public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
Tendencies of juries 
a) Public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
Tendencies of presiding judge 
a) Public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
Community attitudes 
a) Public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
Victim needs 
a) Public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
Office policy 
a) public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 ;,' 4 3 2 1 
Political concerns 
a) Public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
Career advancement concerns 
a) Public Defender's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
b) District Attorney's Office 5 4 3 2 1 
Demands of special interest groups 
a) public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Relationship with particular attorney 
handling other side of the case 
a) public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Need to maintain good relations with 
others in the court system 
a) Public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Avoiding court overload 
a) public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Conserving staff resources 
a) public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Speedy case settlement 
a) Public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Due process 
a) Public Defender's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Crime control 
a) Public Defertder's Office 
b) District Attorney's Office 
Very 
Much 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Some 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
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None 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
For the following questions, please circle the response which most 
closely reflects your opinion. 
2. If your client decides to plead quilty, how important is it to you 
that he/she receive some benefit in exchange for a guilty plea? 
Very 
Important Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Not Very Not At All 
Important Important 
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3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
B. 
2B6 
After having studied a case assigned to you, how often do you 
feel that you can reasonably anticipate 
a) whether or not the case will be plea negotiated? 
Always Usually Sometimes Not Usually Never 
b) what kind of a bargain will be made? 
Always Usually Sometimes Not Usually Never 
How often would you say you are satisfied with the disposition 
outcome of cases you handle? 
Always Usually Sometimes Not Usually Never 
Approximately how many accused felons do you think are actually 
guilty, either of the formal charge or of some related charge? 
Over BO% 80%-60% 60%-40% 40%-20% Less Than 20% 
Approximately how many accused felons assigned -to the public 
Defender's Office do you think are actually guilty, either 
of the formal charge or of some related charge? 
Over BO% BO%-60% 60%-40% 40%-20% Less Than 20% 
Of cases which are settled by guilty pleas, how many do you 
think involve some kind of bargain, however minimal? 
Over BO% BO%-60% 60%-40% 40%-20% Less Than 20% 
The district attorney has the "upper hand" in the plea 
negotiation process. 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
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APPENDIX E 
OBSERVATION SCHEDULE: PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Following is a sample form of the observation schedule used 
to record data from the pre-trial conferences in felony court. 
The data in the cells are ficticious but resemble data in the 
actual completed forms. Unlike this sample form, the actual 
forms provided space for an unlimited number of comments. The 
letters in the cells indicate the speaker (A = Prosecutor; B = 
Public Defender; C = Defendant). The headings at the top of each 
column (with the exception of the first column) indicate the subject 
matter of the comment. A question mark in a cell indicates that 
the verbalization was a question. The column labeled "Researcher 
Comments" allows for elaboration on the subject matter. 
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APPENDIX F 
OREGON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 
FINAL DRAFT AND REPORT 
CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION 
NOVEMBER, 1972 
The present Oregon criminal procedure code gives formal 
recognition to plea bargaining as a method of case disposition. 
The Cornmrnission which drafted the present code viewed plea bargaining 
as necessary and useful in terms of the needs of the criminal 
justice system. Due to its common use for case disposition, the 
Commission felt that plea bargaining should be given legal status. 
In its final report, it stated: 
In Oregon criminal justice administration, as elsewhere 
in this country, the practice known as "plea negotiation," 
"plea bargaining," "cop out" and "deal" is regularly en-
gaged in by prosecutors and defense lawyers. The Oregon 
Criminal Law Handbook recognizes that the negotiated plea 
serves a useful public purpose and suggests that the terms 
employed in connection with the practice should be stripped 
of their anti-social implications. (158) 
The Commission also quoted in its report a statement made by the 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice which lends support to the philosophy behind the procedure 
code drafted by the Oregon Commission. This statement reads as follows: 
The negotiated guilty plea serves important functions. 
As a practical matter, many courts could not sustain the 
burden of having to try all cases corning before them. 
The quality of justice in all cases would suffer if over-
loaded courts were faced with a great increase in the number 
of trials. Tremendous investments of time, talent, and 
money, all of which are in short supply and can be better 
__ .i~ ___ .. __ ... 
used elsewhere, would be necessary if all cases were 
tried. It would be a serious mistake, however, to 
assume that the guilty plea is no more than a means of 
disposing of criminal cases at minimal cost. It 
relieves both the defendant and the prosecution of the 
inevitable risks and uncertainties of trial. It 
imports a degree of certainty and flexibility into a 
rigid, yet frequently erratic system. (158) (Challenge 
of Crime in a Free Society, 135:1967.) 
The following four sections of the criminal procedure code give 
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plea bargaining legal status and set out procedural guidelines for 
its use. The sections are quoted in full below. 
Section 263. plea discussions and plea agreements. 
1) In cases in which it appears that the interest of the 
public in the effective administration of criminal 
justice would thereby be served, and in accordance 
with the criteria set forth in section 264 of this 
Act, the district attorney may engage in plea dis-
cussions for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement. 
2) The district attorney shall engage in plea discussions 
or reach a plea agreement with the defendant only 
through defense counsel, except when, as a matter of 
record, the defendant has effectively waived his right 
to counselor, if the defendant is not eligible for 
court-appointed counsel, has not retained counsel. 
3) The district attorney in reaching a plea agreement may 
agree to, but is not limited to, one or more of the 
following, as required by the circumstances of the 
individual case. 
a) To make or not to oppose favorable recommendations 
as to sentence which should be imposed if the 
defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest 
to the offense charged; 
b) To seek or not to oppose dismissal of the 
offense charged if the defendant enters a plea 
of guilty or no contest to another offense 
reasonably related to the defendant's conduct; 
or 
c) To seek or not to oppose dismissal of other 
charges or to refrain from bringing potential 
charges if the defendant enters a plea of guilty 
or no contest to the offense charged. 
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4) Similarly situated defendants should be afforded 
equal plea agreement opportunities. 
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Section 264. Criteria to be considered in plea discussions 
and plea agreements. 
In determining whether to engage in plea discussions for 
the purpose of reaching a plea agreement, the district 
attorney may take into account, but is not limited to, any 
of the following considerations. 
1) The defendant by his plea has aided in ensuring the 
prompt and certain applications of correctional measures 
to him. 
2) The defendant has acknowledged his guilt and shown a 
willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct. 
3) The concessions made by the state will make possible 
alternative correctional measures which are better 
adapted to achieving rehabilitative, protective, 
deterrent or other purposes of correctional treatment, 
or will prevent undue harm to the defendant from the 
form of conviction. 
4) The defendant has made public trial unnecessary when 
there are good reasons for not having the case dealt 
with in a public trial. 
5) The defendant has given or offered cooperation when 
the cooperation has resulted or may result in the 
successful prosecution of other offenders engaged in 
equally serious or more serious criminal conduct. 
6) The defendant by his plea has aided in avoiding 
delay in the disposition of other cases and thereby 
has increased the probability of prompt and certain 
application of correctional measures to other offenders. 
These criteria seem to suggest that the defendant who cooperates 
and thus enhances criminal justice goals and system needs should be 
rewarded with a reasonable bargain. In the commentary following 
this section of the code, the Commission offers the rationale 
behind each criterion. The rationale behind Subsection 1) is: 
Promptness and certainty in punishment are both 
important in accomplishing the goals of the criminal 
justice system. The swift and certain punishment of 
a given defendant aids in the deterrence of others and 
"'.' 
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in accomplishing rehabilitation of that defendant. A 
defendant who pleads guilty may substantially contribute 
to both the promptness and the certainty of his punish-
ment. (160) 
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The rationale behind Subsection 2) emphasizes the importance of the 
attitude of the defendant concerning his or her criminal conduct: 
This factor recognizes the defendant's acknowledgement 
of guilt and willingness to assume responsibility for 
his conduct as a valid consideration in dealing with the 
guilty plea defendant. It is consistent with prevailing 
and accepted sentencing criteria, which emphasizes the 
relevance of the "attitudes of the defendant" and his 
willingness to assume responsibility for his actions. (160) 
In Subsection 3), the Commission seems to be advocating the 
reduction of severity of punishment: 
In view of the wide range of sentencing options that 
Oregon judges have for most crimes, the main purpose 
in including this standard is to recognize that in 
many cases a plea to a reduced charge is to avoid a 
felony conviction, or conviction of a crime that carries 
a particularly reprehensible label. (160) 
The rational behind Subsection 4) has to do with protection of 
victims in certain offenses, e.g., sex offenses where it might be 
traumatic for the victim to have to appear in court; theft by 
extortion in which public exposure of the victim might be best 
avoided. Subsection 5) is said to be in line with the recommendations 
of the American Bar Association (ABA) which suggest that "whatever 
is lost by the reduced punishment of one offender is gained by 
the resulting conviction of one or more other offenders" (160). The 
rationale behind Subsection 6) may be the most far-reaching in its 
willingness to reward defendants for co-operating by pleading gUilty. 
It is said that guilty plea defendants as a class make a "meaningful 
contribution toward the attainment of the objectives of the criminal 
justice system" by reducing court congestion and enhancing speedy 
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case settlement. This, in turn, is said to further thp. goal of 
prompt and certain punishment for all guilty defendants. The 
Commission refers to an ABA commentary which states that 
••• it is not inappropriate to grant concessions 
to those defendants who by their plea increase both 
the proximity and probability of punishment for other 
guilty defendants. (161) (Commentary 1.8.) 
The Commission also makes reference to a study of plea bargaining 
in Oregon in which it was found that "when asked how the administration 
of justice is aided by the plea bargaining process, over half of the 
responding district attorneys indicated that it saved time, money and 
reduced the case load of the courts (Klonoski study. 50 Or L Rev 
supra at 131). The Commission then concludes that: 
The standard set out in this subsection (6) is con-
sistent with the above observations and recognizes that 
avoiding delay in the disposition of other cases is a 
proper matter to be taken into account by a district 
attorney or trial judge in determining whether to agree 
to a "barqained for" plea. 
The policy of the Office of the District Attorney of Multnomah County 
appears to conflict with the intent of the law as outlined above, 
for Office policy states that plea negotiations shall never be used 
to reduce case backlogs or reallocate manpower. The Office considers 
such considerations to be a "flagrant abuse of the process." 
Section 265. Responsibilities of defense counsel. 
1) Defense counsel shall conclude a plea agreement 
only with the consent of the defendant, and shall 
ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea 
of guilty or no contest is ultimately made by the 
defendant. 
2) To aid the defendant in reaching a decision, defense 
counsel, after appropriate investigation, shall advise 
the defendant of the alternatives available and of 
factors considered important by him or the defendar..t 
in reaching a decision. 
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In their commentary on Section 265, the Commission elaborates on 
the kinds of information that are important for counsel to give the 
defendant. Among these are: the probability of being convicted 
should the defendant stand trial; consequences which would follow a 
plea of guilty as opposed to conviction by trial; concessions 
offered by or agreeable to the district attorney. 
Section 266. Responsibilities of trial judge. 
1) The trial judge shall not participate in plea 
discussions. 
2) If a tentative plea agreement has been reached which 
contemplates entry of a plea of guilty or no contest 
in the expectation that charge or sentence consessions 
will be granted, the trial judge, upon request of 
the parties, may permit the disclosure to him of the 
tentative agreement and the reasons therefore in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The 
trial judge may then advise the district attorney and 
defense counsel whether he will concur in the proposed 
dispos~tion of the information in the presentence 
report or other information available at the time for 
sentencing is consistent with the representations made 
to him. 
3) If the trial judge concurs, but later decides that 
the final disposition of the case should not include 
the sentence concessions contemplated by the plea 
agreement, he shall so advise the defendant and allow 
the defendant a reasonable period of time in which 
to either affirm or withdraw his plea of guilty or 
no contest. 
4) When a plea of guilty or no contest is tendered or 
received as a result of a prior plea agreement, the 
trial judge shall give the agreement due consideration, 
but notwithstanding its existence, he is not bound by 
it, and may reach an independent decision on whether 
to grant sentence concessions under the criteria set 
forth in section 264 of this Act. 
Subsection 2) of Section 266 is a new provision in the criminal 
procedural code. It recognizes that a bargain agreed upon by the 
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prosecuting and defense attorneys which includes sentence 
recommendation requires cooperation from the judge. The Commission 
comments: 
It recognizes that it is proper for the judge, when 
requested by the parties, to permit certain procedures 
that will allow a greater degree of certainty when the 
proposed concessions involved the sentence or the dismissal 
of other charges before the court. (163) 
Subsection 3) allows the defendant a further safeguard in the event 
that the trial judge changes his or her mind regarding the proposed 
concessions. 
The criminal procedure code of Oregon devotes three sections 
to the due process rights of defendants who plead guilty. The first 
section outlines the court's responsibilities in advising the 
defendant of the implications of his or her plea. The second states 
that the court must be satisfied of the voluntariness of the plea, 
and the third states that the court must be satisfied of the 
accuracy of the plea. These three sections are given in full below, 
along with commentary of the Criminal Law Revision Commission. 
Section 260. Defendant to be advised by court. 
1) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest to a felony or other charge on which the 
defendant appears in person without first addressing 
the defendant persona'lly and determining that he under-
stands the nature of the charge. 
2) The court shall inform the defendant: 
a) That by his plea of guilty or no contest he 
waives his right: 
To trial by jury; 
Of confrontation; and 
Again self-incrimination. 
f·:· 
b) Of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, 
including the maximum possible sentence from 
consecutive sentences. 
c) When the offense charged is one for which 
a different or additional penalty is 
authorized by reason of the fact that the 
defendant may be adjudged a dangerous offender, 
that this fact may be established after his 
plea in the present action, thereby subjecting 
him to different or additional penalty. 
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Section 260 is based on previous court rulings (both federal 
and state) in which opinions have been expressed that due process 
has been violated if defendants have not been advised of the above 
(Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238:1969; McCarthy v. United States, 394 
US 459:1968; Lay v. Cupp, 1 Or App 296, 462 P2d 443:1969; Nealy 
v. Cupp, 2 Or App 240,467 P2d 649:1970). 
Section 261. Determining voluntariness of plea. 
1) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest without first determining that the plea is 
voluntarily and intelligently made. 
2) The court shall determine whether the plea is the 
result of prior plea discussions and a plea agree-
ment. If the plea is the result of a plea agreement, 
the court shall determine the nature of the agree-
ment. 
3) If the district attorney has agreed to seek charge or 
sentence concessions which must be approved by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally 
that the recommendations of the district attorney are 
not binding on the court. 
Subsection 1) of Section 261 is based upon the ruling of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Boykin vs. Alabama in which it was said that 
it was error, plain on the face of the record, 
for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea 
without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent 
and voluntary. (156) 
.... 
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Subsections 2) and 3) are in line with ABA recommendations 
which suggest that plea negotiations be given "visibility" by 
court inquiry. It appears that knowledge of plea negotiations is 
also perceived of as useful in determining voluntariness of plea. 
Section 262. Determining accuracy of plea. 
After accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the 
court shall not enter a judgment without making such 
inquiry as may satisfy the court that there is a factual 
basis for the plea. 
Section 262 is a new provision in Oregon law. Commentary by 
the Commission states that procedures for determining accuracy of 
plea may vary: 
The court would be free to use any appropriate procedure 
which seems best suited to the court and for the kind of 
case involved. (157) 
In the Commission report there is also a reference regarding 
this section to ABA commentary. ABA comments that although inquiry 
into plea accuracy may reduce some of the efficiency of the guilty 
plea process, the benefits of such investigation for the defendant 
and for the system outweigh efficiency reduction. 
Primarily, inquiry ensures that the defendant actually 
committed a crime at least as serious as the one to 
which he is willing to plead. Furthermore, investigation 
into the factual basis of guilty pleas helps to increase 
the visibility of charge reduction practices, a common 
form of plea agreement. Also, inquiries provide .a more 
adequate record of the conviction process and minimize 
the chances of a defendant successfully challenging his 
conviction later. Finally, increased knowledge about the 
circumstances of the defendant's crime allows the court to 
better evaluate his competency, his willingness to plead 
guilty, and his understanding of the charges against 
him. (157) 
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APPENDIX G 
FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR LEVELS: 
STATUTORY CLASSIFICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES* 
Murder 
Manslaughter I 
Manslaughter II 
Crim Neg Horn 
Assault I 
Assault II 
Assault III 
Menacing 
Harassment 
Kidnap I 
Kidnap II 
Rape I 
Rape II 
Rape III 
Sex Abuse I 
Sex Abuse II 
Sod I 
Sod II 
Sod III 
Public Indec 
Rob I 
Rob II 
Rob III 
Disord Condt 
Crm Mischf I 
Crrn Mischf II 
Crm Mischf III 
Coercion 
Promot Prost 
Unclass Fel 
(max life) 
A Fel 
B Fel 
C Fel 
A Fel 
B Fel 
A Misdrn 
A Misdrn 
B Misdm 
A Fel 
B Fel 
A Fel 
B Fel 
C Fel 
B Fel 
C Fel 
A Fel 
B Fel 
C Fel 
A Misdrn 
A Fel 
B Fel 
C Fel 
B Misdm 
C Fel 
A Misdrn 
C Misdrn 
C Fel 
C Fel 
* A Fel (max 20 years) 
B Fel (max 10 years) 
C Fel (max 5 years) 
Burg I 
Burg II 
Crrn Trespss I 
Crrn Trespss II 
Theft I 
Theft II 
UUV 
Forg I 
Forg II 
Arson I 
Arson II 
Recklss Burn 
CAID 
Crrn Use Drugs 
Crrn Drug Prom 
Escape I 
Escape II 
Escape III 
Fail Appear I 
Fail Appear II 
Resist Arrest 
Hindr Prosecut 
Supply COntrbd 
ECPFA 
Carr Cone Wepn 
DUlL 
A Fcl 
C Fel 
A Misdrn 
C Misdrn 
C Fel 
A Misdm 
C Fel 
C Fel 
A Misdrn 
A Fel 
C Fel 
A Misdrn 
B Fel 
A Misdm 
A Misdm 
B Fel 
C Fel 
A Misdm 
C Fel 
A rtisdm 
A Misdm 
C Fel 
C Fel 
Unclass Fel 
(max 5 years) 
Unclass Misdm 
Unclass Fel 
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APPENDIX H 
JOB DESCRIPTIONS OF EMPLOYED DEFENDANTS 
An attempt was made to get some idea of the nature of jobs 
held by those offenders who were employed. Many of the case files 
only gave the name of the defendant's employer, and thus it was 
not possible to ascertain the nature of the job. However, job 
descriptions were obtained for 72 defendants from the 1976 sample. 
The great majority of these defendants either had "blue collar" 
jobs (skilled or semi-skilled labor) or had low-level service jobs. 
It should be remembered that defendants are relatively young, and 
therefore it would not be expected that they would have high-level 
employment. Nevertheless, the data do suggest that accuse:::'! felons 
have jobs which social scientists would cateogrize at the lower end 
of the social class scale. 
Nineteen defendants were skilled or semi-skilled laborers. Of 
these, three were construction workers, two were truck drivers, two 
were machinists, and two did automobile body work. The others 
worked as: auto mechanic, carpenter, freight loader, painter, 
printer, roofing contractor, tree service employee, meat company 
employee, livestock market employee, and railroad worker. 
Eleven people did some kind of building maintenance work. 
Seven of these described their positions as janitor, two as 
maintenance workers in care centers, one as hotel maintenance, 
and one as housekeeper. 
31')0 
Nine defendants did some kind of restaurant, tavern or bar 
work. Positions included waiter/waitress, bartender, busboy, 
dishwasher, cook. 
Another nine people worked in retail sales. Of these, seven 
were store clerks. One described his position as sales manager of 
a bakery, one sold produce at an outside stand. 
Six defendants described themselves as self-employed. Of 
these, the three who gave further information were a junk dealer, 
a craftsman and a mechanic. 
Five people worked at various jobs assigned to them either 
through a government-funded poverty program or through a temporary 
work agency, e.g., Manpower. 
Three were gas station attendants, and three were field 
laborers. One was a cashier in an amusement park; one was a 
theater concession stand worker, and one worked in a massage 
parlor. Another was a security guard. 
Only three could be considered to be "white-collar" workers. 
Two of these held positions in state agencies, and one was a 
businessman. 
Admittedly, the data are not complete, and thus it is 
possible that those employed defendants for whom there was no job 
description held higher-level jobs. The available data, however, 
strongly indicate that people who get into trouble with the law 
tend to be either unemployed or have employment which this society 
characterizes as working or lower class. 
'., 
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APPENDIX I 
SUMMARY PROFILE OF SELECTED OFFENSE TYPES: 
1976 AND JULY THROUGH DECEMBER OF 1977 
Following is a summary profile of six offenses: Burg I; 
Other Burg; Theft I; Other Property; CAID; Other Drugs. The 
variables on which the summary data are given are listed in the 
first column. Under the column labeled Hi %, the category of the 
variable with the highest percentage of cases for the particular 
offense is given. Under the column labeled Variation Tot %, the 
pluses and minuses symbolize the following. Four pluses (++++) 
means that the Hi % variable category is over 35% higher than the 
total percentage (for all offenses) of that variable category; 
three pluses (+++) indicates that it is from 25% to 34% higher; 
two pluses (++) refers to a percentage that is from 15% to 24% 
higher than the total; one plus (+) means that it is from 5% to 
14% higher. Minuses have the same meaning in the opposite direction, 
e.g., one minus (-) indicates that the Hi % variable category is 
from 5% to 14% lower than the total percentage of that category. 
Where the variable category was less than 5% higher or less than 
5% lower, the word "same" has been used. Thus, for example, the 
highest percentage of Burg I in 1976 was closed by PG, and this 
percentage was over 35% higher than the total percentage of PG 
closings in 1976. Similarly, the highest percentage of Burg I 
defendants had public attorneys, but this percentage was only from 
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5% to 14% higher than the total percentage of cases handled by 
public attorneys. For easier interpretation of these summary 
profiles, the plus and minus codings are given below in concise 
fonn. 
++++ Over 35% higher than total % 
+++ 25% to 34% higher than total % 
++ 15% to 24% higher than total % 
+ 5% to 14% higher than total % 
Same Less than 5% higher or lower than total % 
5% to 14% lower than total % 
15% to 24% lower than total % 
1976 
(N = 14) 
Burg I 
1977 
(N = 11) 
303 
304 
Theft I 
1976 1977 
(N = 23) (N = 14) 
Variation Variation 
variables Hi % Tot % Hi % Tot % 
Type Clos PG ++++ PG ++ 
Attorney Public Public 
Custody Jail same Jail ++ 
1',: Sentence No Incarc + Incarc +++ 
Prior Record Felony Felony same 
Education HS ++ HS same 
I Employment Unempl Unempl same 
i Age 21 - 30 ++ 21 - 30 ++ i I, 
r·. r: 
t 
> 
t , 
f 
Other F' Property l 
f 
1976 1977 ~ i. (N = 36) (N = 15) f 
l 
I· 
I Variation Variation , 
f Variables Hi % Tot % Hi % Tot % l 
! 
f Type Clos PGTLs + PGTLs ++++ [ Attorney Public + Public " f. 
\ Custody Jail same Recog + 
( Sentence No Incarc ++ No Incarc ++ 
f Prior Record Felony Felony same 
t 
Education HS same Less HS ++ 
Employment Un emp 1 +++ Unernpl ++ 
Age OVer 30 ++++ 21 - 30 + 
1." 
I:' 
variables 
Type Clos 
Attorney 
Custody 
sentence 
prior Record 
Education 
Employment 
Age 
Variables 
Type Clos 
Attorney 
Custody 
Sentence 
Prior Record 
Education 
Employment 
Age 
i;· 
'., 
1976 
(N = 17) 
CAID 
variation 
Hi % Tot % 
PG + Dis ++ 
Public 
Recog ++ 
Incarc + 
Felony same 
HS same 
Un emp 1 + 
21 - 30 same 
Other Drugs 
1976 
(N = 29) 
Variation 
Hi % Tot % 
PGTLs ++++ 
Public same 
Recog +++ 
No Incarc ++ 
Felony 
HS + 
Unempl + 
21 - 30 ++ 
1977 
(N = 15) 
Hi % 
PGTLs 
Public 
Recog 
No Incarc 
Felony 
HS 
Unempl 
21 - 30 
1977 
(N = 13) 
Hi % 
PGTLs 
Public 
Recog 
No Incarc 
Felony 
HS 
Unempl 
21 - 30 
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variation 
Tot % 
+ 
+ 
+++ 
++ 
+++ 
same 
++ 
Variation 
Tot % 
++++ 
++ 
++ 
same 
+ 
+ 
same 
APPENDIX J 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON QUESTION ONE 
FROM INTERVIEWS WITH KEY COURT ACTORS 
In Question One respondents were asked to rate the amount 
of consideration on a five-point scale (from five meaning very 
much consideration to one meaning no consideration) given each 
of 26 factors by the Public Defender's Office and by the District 
Attorney's Office. The means, modes, ranges and standard 
deviations of these ratings are given below. The order in which 
respondent groups are listed was determined by ranking means from 
high to low. 
strength of Prosecutor's 
Case 
P.D. 's Office: Judges 
Prosecutors 
Pub Defenders 
D.A.'s Office: Judges 
Pub Defenders 
Prosecutors 
Report of Arresting Officer 
P.D.'s Office: Judges 
Pub Defenders 
Prosecutors 
D. A. 's Office: Pub Defenders 
Judges 
Prosecutors 
Mean 
5.0 
4.7 
4.5 
5.0 
4.5 
4.4 
3.6 
3.4 
3.3 
4.3 
4.0 
3.5 
Mode Range 
5 0 
5 1 
5 2 
5 0 
5 2 
5 2 
3 2 
4/3/2 3 
3 4 
5 3 
4 2 
3 3 
Standard 
Deviation 
.0 
.5 
.7 
.0 
.6 
.8 
.9 
1.1 
.9 
1.0 
.8 
.9 
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Standard 
Mean Mode Range Deviation 
Seriousness of Offense 
P.D. 's Office: Pub Defenders 4.2 5/4 2 .8 
Judges 4.1 4 2 .6 
Prosecutors 3.7 4 3 1.0 
D.A. 's Office Pub Defenders 4.7 5 1 .5 
Prosecutors 4.7 5 1 .5 
Judges 4.5 5/4 1 .5 
Prior Record of Defendant 
r; 
L P.o. 's Office: Pub Defenders 3.5 4 3 .9 I 
t Prosecutors 3.4 3 3 .9 
t, Judges 3.1 3 4 1.2 
t· 
F D.A.'s Office: Prosecutors 4.5 5 2 .7 f 
i Pub Defenders 4.3 5 2 .7 i 
! Judges 3.8 4 3 1.0 
I Actual Guilt of Defendant 
I 
~ , 
r 
l P.D. 's Office:' Judges 4.3 5 3 1.0 [, 
Pub Defenders 2.9 5/1 4 1.8 I [ Prosecutors 2.8 3 4 1.2 
e, 
~: . D.A. 's Office: Prosecutors 4.5 5 3 .9 i [. Judges 4.4 5 3 1.1 [ 
f Pub Defenders 2.7 2 3 1.0 [ General Character of Defendant i' 
" f 
r 
P.D.'s Office: Pub Defenders 3.3 3 3 1.0 
Prosecutors 3.2 3 4 1.4 
r Judges 2.3 3 2 .9 
r 
f, D.A.'s Office: Pub Defenders 3.0 3 2 .7 
r Judges 2.5 2 2 .8 
r 
Prosecutors 2.2 2 3 2.0 
F' Attitudes of Defendant 
P.D. 's Office: Pub Defenders 3.4 4 4 1.2 
Prosecutors 3.1 3 3 1.0 
Judges 2.4 2 3 .9 
D.A. 's Office: Pub Defenders 3.0 3 4 1.0 
Prosecutors 2.8 3 3 .9 
Judges 2.5 2 2 .8 
i 
~;,: 
f·-
.:: 
(~ 
~~ 
., 
I, 
.,. 
;~'-----". 
~B fR 
I, 
t' f. L' 
f
;'·.'·" ~.; 
f'~. 
l,' 
t. 
I;"', 
I 
I 
L 
t 
I 
" . 
. ::., 
Defendant's Wishes 
P.D. 's Office: Pub Defenders 
Prosecutors 
Judges 
D.A. 's Office: Prosecutors 
Judges 
Pub Defenders 
Tendencies of Juries 
P.D.'s Office: Pub Defenders 
Judges 
Prosecutors 
D.A.'s Office: Judges 
Pub Defenders 
Prosecutors 
Tendencies of Judges 
P.D. 's Office: Pub Defenders 
Judges 
Prosecutors 
D.A.'s Office: Judges 
Pub Defenders 
Prosecutors 
Community Attitudes 
P.D. 's Office: Pub Defenders 
Judges 
Prosecutors 
D.A. 's Office: Pub Defenders 
Judges 
Prosecutors 
Victim Needs 
P.D. 's Office: Prosecutors 
Pub Defenders 
Judges 
D.A.'s Office: Prosecutors 
Pub Defenders 
Judges 
Mean 
4.7 
4.3 
4.3 
1.9 
1.5 
1.5 
4.1 
4.0 
3.5 
3.9 
3.8 
3.2 
4.3 
3.6 
3.3 
3.8 
3.5 
2.2 
2.1 
2.1 
1.8 
4.0 
3.8 
3.6 
2.2 
2.0 
1.6 
4.2 
3.4 
3.3 
Mode 
5 
5 
5 
2/1 
1 
1 
4 
5/4 
3 
4 
4/3 
3 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
1 
2 
2/1 
2 
5 
5 
4 
2 
1 
1 
4 
4/3 
4 
Range 
1 
3 
4 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 
4 
1 
3 
3 
2 
4 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
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Standard 
Deviation 
.5 
.9 
1.4 
.8 
.8 
.5 
.6 
1.1 
.8 
.7 
.8 
1.0 
.6 
.9 
1.3 
.9 
1.1 
1.0 
.7 
1.4 
.4 
1.0 
1.3 
.6 
1.2 
1.0 
.5 
.6 
.6 
.9 
-,=--
fO'" " ___ ._.'-"'.'" 
F~ ~i~ ~f:' 
K\': /,';' 
309 r «>~ Standard 1,:', 
/' Mean Mode Range Deviation :,;'': 
F' 
f" Office po1icl h' 
~.J 
t·; 
V'; P.D. 's Office: Judges 4.0 5/4 3 1.1 l~ Prosecutors 2.6 3/1 4 1.4 
r ' Pub Defenders 1.2 1 1 .4 I" 
F 
I" 
Office: Pub Defenders 4.6 5 1 .5 ;: D.A.'s L 
f 'Judges 4.4 5 2 .7 
i' Prosecutors 4.1 4 2 .7 t, 
I 
~ "', 
I Political Concerns r. 
i-: 
!, 
1; P.D. 's Office: Prosecutors 1.6 2/1 1 .7 
(, 
Judges 1.1 1 1 .4 r· 
t Pub Defenders 1.1 1 2 .3 
" 
D.A.'s Office: Pub Defenders 4.2 5 3 .9 
L: Judges 3.6 4 3 .9 
, 
2.1 3 2 .9 i Prosecutors i 
i 
t .. Career Advancement Concerns f 
P.D. 's Office: Judges 2.0 3/1 2 .9 
:~ 
Prosecutors 1.5 1 1 .5 r -i 
I! Pub Defenders 1.3 1 1 .5 f 
r 
f, D.A. 's Office: Pub Defenders 3.4 3 4 1.0 
t Judges 2.9 5/2/1 4 1.6 
r 
Prosecutors 1.4 1 1 .5 
, 
L Special Interest Groups 
r 
I. 
~ P.D.'s Office: Judges 2.0 2 2 .8 
r 
I Prosecutors 1.8 1 3 .9 
~ " Pub Defenders 1.1 1 1 .3 
t· D.A. 's Office: Pub IDefenders 3.7 4 4 1.2 l Judges 3.3 4/3/2 3 1.1 
Prosecutors 1.6 2 2 .6 
RelationshiE With Adversa~ 
Attornel 
P.D.'s Office: Pub Defenders 2.8 3 3 .8 
Judges 2.8 3 4 1.2 
Prosecutors 2.2 2 3 .9 
D.A.'s Office: Judges 3.0 3 4 1.4 
Pub Defenders 2.9 3 3 .7 
Prosecutors 2.1 1 3 1.0 
, 
,,' 
:-: 
',' 
Maintenance of Good Relations 
with Others in Court System 
P.D. 's Office: Judges 
Prosecutors 
Pub Defenders 
D.A. 's Office: Pub Defenders 
Judges 
Prosecutors 
Avoiding Court OVerload 
P.D. 's Office: Judges 
Prosecutors 
Pub Defenders 
D.A. 's Office: Judges 
Pub Defenders 
Prosecutors 
Conserving Staff Resources 
P.D. 's Office: Judges 
Pub Defenders 
Prosecutors 
D.A.'s Office: Judges 
Prosecutors 
Pub Defenders 
Speedy Case Settlement 
P.D. 's Office: Judges 
Prosecutors 
Pub Defenders 
D.A. 's Office: Judges 
Pub Defenders 
Prosecutors 
Due Process 
P.D. 's Office: Pub Defenders 
Judges 
Prosecutors 
D.A.'s Office: Judges 
Prosecutors 
Pub Defenders 
Mean 
2.8 
2.5 
2.1 
3.0 
2.9 
2.6 
2.4 
1.5 
1.4 
3.3 
2.1 
1.6 
3.3 
2.1 
2.1 
3.4 
2.4 
2.3 
3.1 
2.5 
2.4 
3.9 
2.9 
2.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.2 
4.4 
3.8 
2.9 
Mode Range 
3 2 
2 3 
2 4 
2 4 
3 2 
3 3 
1 4 
1 2 
1 2 
5/4/3/1 4 
3 2 
1 2 
5/3 4 
2 4 
3 2 
3 3 
3 2 
2 3 
3 4 
3/2 3 
3/2 3 
3 2 
2 3 
3 3 
5 2 
5 2 
5 3 
5 2 
5/3 3 
4/2 3 
310 
Standard 
Deviation 
.7 
.9 
1.1 
1.2 
.6 
.8 
1.5 
.9 
.6 
1.6 
.8 
.8 
1.5 
1.1 
.9 
1.1 
.8 
.9 
1.1 
.8 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
.8 
.8 
1.1 
.7 
1.1 
1.0 
311 
Standard 
Mean Mode Range Deviation 
Crime Control 
P.D.'s Office: Pub Defenders 2.0 1 4 1.3 
Prosecutors 1.9 2 2 .8 
Judges 1.8 1 2 .9 
D.A. 's Office: Prosecutors 4.3 5 2 .8 
Judges 4.1 5 2 .6 
Pub Defenders 3.9 4 3 1.0 
I· 
.: . 
. ~ '. 
